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1 FOREWORD 
Andrej Christian Lindholst  
 
Public sector reforms have pushed for an increased use of competition and involvement of private 
contractors in the delivery of park and road maintenance services since the 1980s. The type, 
strength, path and outcomes of reform have varied immensely among countries. This research 
report adds to our knowledge on reform and change in the public sector by exploring in further 
detail the trajectories of the push for reform within the park and road sectors in Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway and the UK.  
The research report is a key output from the ‘INOPS’ research project ’Innovations in the 
organization of public-private relations.
1
 The research project was prepared in 2013 by DDH 
Contractors A/S and Department of Political Science, Aalborg University. The formulation of the 
INOPS research project was partly initiated as a continuation of research carried out in 2012 and 
2013 in a smaller research project focusing on quality effects from contracting out led by the 
Swedish Agricultural University, Sweden and financed by Hedeselskabet, Strategy and Innovation, 
Denmark. Hedeselskabet, Strategy and Innovation, Denmark and Aalborg University, Denmark 
have co-financed the INOPS research project. 
From a business perspective, contracting out of public services represents new market 
opportunities, but also new challenges related to investment in and development of well-performing 
business models and service concepts. Likewise, from a managerial perspective it is also important 
to gain insight on different paths for development of contracting out as well as how contracting out 
can organized in ways supportive to policy objectives. Ensuring a continuous ‘fit’ between private 
contractors’ capabilities, available ‘service concepts’ and the ways public authorities engage private 
contractors in their service delivery systems is key for producing outcomes of ‘public value’. 
Present challenges for aligning the ‘fit’ in ways that produce outcomes of public value are multiple 
and complex. An incomplete list of challenges relates financial constraints, cuts in, and 
prioritization of public budgets, continued pressures for increasing the overall efficiency of service 
delivery systems, intensification and changes in legal and regulatory frameworks, changing political 
                                                 
1 The original Danish title of the research project is: ’Innovationer i organiseringen af det offentlige-private samspil i et 
internationalt perspektiv med fokus på kommunaltekniske driftsopgaver’ with the abbreviated title ’innovationer i det offentlige 
private samspil’. The Danish acronym for the title is: ’INOPS’. 
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objectives and mix in policy instruments, life-style changes and demographic developments as well 
as enlarged and complex planning needs to forecast and deal with the consequences of changes in 
the use of and demand for ‘green’ recreational, ecological and social resources as well as transport 
infrastructure in urban zones.   
From a research perspective, contracting out of public services is a well-known theme. 
Contracting out has commonly been perceived as a standard policy instrument with somehow stable 
characteristics and framed by research questions related to evaluation of its outcomes and 
differences in its adoption. Research, however, which includes park and/or road maintenance have 
been less frequent over the years. Insights based on comparisons across several countries as well as 
differences in contractual frameworks are also rare. 
On the backdrop of the preparation and interests outlined above, the research project was 
given the objectives to address, in an international perspective, current variations in the organization 
of, purposes for and outcomes from contracting out as well as come up with advice for how 
contracting out within the park and road sector can be improved. The research has relied on a 
variety of data sources in terms of primary and secondary data sources. The research has in 
particular relied on primary data from national surveys as well as case-studies carried out in 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the UK.  
The research project was commenced 1
st
, January, 2014 and carried out in collaborations with 
researchers from Denmark, Norway, Sweden and England. INOPS was led by Andrej Christian 
Lindholst (main author) and Morten Balle Hansen, Aalborg University. The main author is sole 
responsible for all conclusions and analyses presented in the technical report and the project 
summary (in Danish). Partners in all countries have contributed to various parts of the project. 
Partners in Sweden were Ylva Norén Bretzner and Johanna Selin, School of Public Administration, 
Gothenburg as well as Bengt Persson and Thomas Barfoed Randrup, Swedish Agricultural 
University, Alnarp. The partners in Norway were Merethe Dotterud Leiren, Norwegian Centre for 
Transport Research and Ingjerd Solfjeld, Norwegian University of Life Sciences. Partners in 
England were Mel Burton and Nicola Dempsey, University of Sheffield and Peter Neal, Peter Neal 
Consulting Ltd. Partners in Denmark were Ole Helby Petersen, Roskilde University and Kurt 
Houlberg, KORA. In addition, several student assistants have assisted the project. The project has 
been co-financed by Hedeselskabet Strategi & Innovation and Aalborg University. Hedeselskabet 
Strategi & Innovation has been represented by Lisbeth Sevel.  
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Without the contributions from a long list of people and organizations it would not have been 
possible to carry out the various research tasks in INOPS. The partners in INOPS especially thank 
all employees in park and road departments in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the UK that devoted 
some of their time to answer our survey and contribute with information for a series of case-studies. 
The partners would also thank colleagues who provided feedback and ideas for the research.   
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2 INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT 
 
2.1 Relevance and policy context 
The use of competition and private contractors in service delivery systems through the means of 
public procurement and contracting out has been on the reform agenda in the Danish public sector 
as well as in other OECD countries since the 1980s and until present day. The reform agenda has 
over the years resulted in substantial changes in service delivery systems within virtually all public 
service sectors as well as municipal park and road management.  
In a Danish context, the political and administrative objective of contracting out has 
historically been articulated through the oxymoron ‘best and cheapest’. The oxymoron reflects 
policy-makers’ long-standing interest in adopting contracting out as a way of improving technical 
efficiency, in particular by reducing costs, in service delivery systems in the public sector. 
However, today objectives may be different or at least more multi-dimensional. Ideas related to 
‘partnerships’ and ‘collaboration’ has been introduced since the 2000s in a Danish context as well 
as earlier in early marketization countries such as the UK, Australia, New Zealand or USA. These 
ideas can be said to relate to a broader interest in ‘allocative efficiency’ in contrast to the earlier 
interest in ‘technical efficiency’. Efficiency may now not only be about reducing costs per unit of 
service provided, but also about providing services in ways espoused and valued by local 
communities as well as among responsible public authorities and service providers across the public 
and private sectors.  
2.1.1 Contracting out as innovation in the public sector  
Contracting out, where private companies, through law-regulated procedures for procurement, are 
delegated temporary responsibilities for providing various services in the public sector, can be 
regarded as an innovation in the public sector on the same level as other recent reform elements 
such as performance management or user choice.
2
 Successful public sector innovations include 
phases of developing, testing, utilization and dissemination of new ideas within an organisation or 
organisational field. Seen in the light of the increasing use of public procurement and contracting 
                                                 
2
 Hansen, Morten Balle, 2013, Transnational organisatorisk innovation i den offentlige sektor, Politica (45)3: 267–286. 
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out in the Danish municipalities since the beginning of the 1990s, it can be argued that public 
procurement and contracting out have been relatively successful innovations.
3
 However, the on-
going political declarations, objectives and agreements regarding increased usage of contracting out 
on the municipal level continue to spur explorations of the innovative potential of contracting out.  
Historically, contracting out has contributed to organisational change and development with 
respect to the opportunities offered by a ‘standard’ – or ‘conventional’ – approach characterized by 
standardization of services, a strategic focus on cost minimizing, arm-length managerial relations 
and the use of competitive markets. Today, it is also possible to ask whether and how a number of 
new ideas, approaches and forms for organizing contracting out can create new changes and 
directions for the development and reform of the public sector. In an organisational perspective, the 
difference in approach can be framed as a difference between ‘competitive’ strategies and 
‘cooperative’ strategies to engagement in and utilization of inter-organizational relations.  
2.1.2 Scandinavia and the UK 
The primary context of the research is the three Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway and the UK. The Scandinavian countries shares some characteristics such as a large public 
sector, a strongly decentralised welfare state dominated by principles of universalism, being highly 
developed and rich countries with open economics depending on exchange with other countries, a 
shared cultural outlook, as well as being relatively small countries internationally in terms of 
inhabitants. The Scandinavian countries also differ in important respects, such as administrative 
structure and geography. Since the 1980s the public sectors in the Scandinavian countries have 
experienced national versions of reforms based on principles and doctrines associates with new 
public management as well as newer reform trends based on the new public governance paradigm.   
The UK has long been regarded as a ‘benchmark country’ for the study of marketization and 
new public management types of public reforms (Barzelay, 2001). Reform ideas have emerged and 
been implemented early in the UK, the width and depth of reforms has been profound and the 
approach to implementation has been more radical and swift than in the three Scandinavian 
countries.  
 From a research point of view, it is interesting to compare how the same basic reform ideas 
and models for marketization have fared and shaped the public sector and service delivery systems 
                                                 
3
 For 1993, 2006 and 2011, the private supplier indicator (PLI, 2012 definition) has been calculated as, respectively, 
16.3%, 19.5% and 24.9%. In the years 1993–2005, the average annual rate of increase is 1.4%. In the years 2006–11, 
the annual rate of increase is 4.6%. Source: www.noegletal.dk. 
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in the three countries as well as benchmarking Scandinavian with the UK. Do the three countries 
converge or diverge in comparison with the UK? Have the countries in Scandinavia ‘catch up’ with 
the UK? Are they following a similar route in the marketization of the public sector? What are the 
comparative outcomes between the four countries? 
2.1.3 The park and road sectors 
Responsibilities for park and road services are often found organized within the same or 
neighbouring departments in the technical administration with a mid-level manager (within the 
overall municipal hierarchy) as responsible for both types of services. Still, the, the two services 
differ substantial in their content (e.g. serving recreational versus transport needs), are not regulated 
by the same administrative and legal frameworks and the technical expertise as well as professional 
identity differs between the two sectors.  
From a theoretical point of view, some research finds that the two sectors exhibit relatively 
conducive characteristics for contracting out and public procurement. Services related to 
maintenance of parks and green spaces as well as maintenance of roads and streets have been 
regarded as a ‘low transaction cost services’ which are characterized as relatively easy to specify 
and monitor as well as demanding a relatively low degree of specialized investment.  
Indeed, park and road maintenance services have along with other services organized within 
technical departments in local governments been at the forefront in the implementation of public 
reforms in many countries. In particular, the introduction of contracting out and public procurement 
as well as the import of business-like principles for the organization of in-house provision (e.g. 
business plans and financial autonomy) has been at the agenda for years in the two sectors. 
However, professionals in Scandinavia often regard Sweden as a ‘forerunner’ in Scandinavia, 
Denmark as second while Norway is a latecomer in the implementation. The UK is still regarded as 
a true ‘forerunner’ in innovation of the tools of marketization compared to Scandinavia as well as a 
source for inspiration and learning.  
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2.2 Research aim and key questions 
This technical report contains background analysis and findings from the INOPS research project. 
The purpose of the INOPS project was, from an international perspective, to describe, analyse and 
recommend different forms of contracting out and public–private co-operations within the technical 
area in municipalities, including a focus on innovation and how to involve contractors ‘optimally’. 
The INOPS project should investigate the background for and implementation of various forms of 
contracting out and public–private co-operation based on experiences with contracting out in the 
roads and parks area in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and England.  
 
The research report addresses three key research questions in a comparative perspective:  
 
1. Why are park and road maintenance services contracted out? 
2. How are park and road maintenance services contracted out? 
3. What are the outcomes from contracting out park and road maintenance? 
 
The first research question focuses on the purposes – or strategic intends – for contracting out. The 
scope of the research question is broader than the conventional cost perspective. The cost concern 
are pervasive in the political and administrative discourse on contracting out as well in many studies 
of contracting outcomes, but strategic intends in local governments might differ from the ruling 
discourse. The purposes of cooperative strategies to contracting out, for example, differ from 
competitive strategies. The second research question is about the variations in how contracting out 
is organized and managed. The introduction of cooperative strategies for contracting out in terms of 
‘partnerships’ or ‘partnering’ as well as other innovations such as long term performance-based 
contracting have expanded the options for local governments. The third research question is about 
the outcomes form contracting out in terms of the conventional evaluation of cost effects as well as 
a more multi-dimensional evaluation of the performance of private contractors. By addressing the 
three key research questions it is also possible to address how far innovative models of contracting 
out has been implemented as well as whether some approaches to contracting out performs better 
than others for the provision of park and road maintenance services.  
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2.3 Methods 
The INOPS project included a number of different methods for data collection and analysis as well 
as involved a network of researchers within and across Denmark, Sweden, Norway and England. 
The INOPS project is based on a ‘mixed method’ research design where data collection has 
encompassed both quantitative and qualitative kinds. The quantitative parts of the data collection 
were carried out before the qualitative data collection. The appendices include detailed descriptions 
of the collection of both quantitative (survey) and qualitative (cases) data. 
2.3.1 Quantitative parts 
Design of the quantitative data collection was driven by theory as well as a priori insights on service 
delivery within the municipal park and road sectors. The survey instrument, which was used for 
collection of quantitative data, was designed to allow for comparisons across all four national 
contexts but a degree of adaption of survey designs to the national contexts was required in all 
countries. The national surveys were carried out electronically in all four countries with the total 
population of local authorities with responsibilities for park and road management as the sample 
frame. Some analyses also integrate register based data on municipal spending and contracting 
levels as well as demographics. Register based data was sourced from national statistic bureaus. The 
quantitative data has been used for both descriptive and inferential analytical purposes. The analysis 
of quantitative data material provides, with some reservations, general overviews (by statistical 
generalization) over current status and trends in the organisation and use of contracting out. By 
inferential analysis the quantitative data materials also, to some extent, allows for nomothetic 
assessment of causal mechanisms. The cross sectorial nature of the survey based data do not allow 
for the same degree of scientific control as found in longitudinal or experimental research designs. 
However, cross sectorial survey data is a common and widely used for assessment of causal 
mechanisms in social sciences.  
2.3.2 Qualitative parts 
The qualitative data collection was initially guided by findings from analysis of quantitative data. 
The qualitative data collection and analysis has been employed to explore in greater detail the more 
parsimonious findings in the quantitative analysis. Qualitative data was collected through a range of 
case studies in each country. The case-studies have in particular investigated ‘innovations’ in 
municipal service delivery systems in each national context where private contractors were 
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involved.  The case studies are organised as rich accounts and each case in particular provides an 
opportunity for ‘naturalistic’ generalizations as well as generalizations based on comparative case 
analysis. The case studies also allows for idiosyncratic assessments of causal mechanisms in 
individual cases (e.g. why has a particular contracting outcome occurred for a particular 
municipality).  
2.3.3 International collaboration 
Also, as part of the project’s methods, collaborations were established with researchers from 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK. Collaborations were a requirement for designing and carry 
out surveys in national languages as well as analysing and interpreting data and findings.  
Involvement of more researchers in a project can furthermore be seen as a method for triangulation 
in analysis and overall improvement of validity of the research.   
2.3.4 Scientific products 
 An explicit aim at the point of departure of the research project was to deliver research of high 
international standards with publications in academic national and international journals. The aim 
was important as it is congruent with the aim of delivering valid and unbiased insights based on 
sound research methods. The research and the data it has provided have until June 2016 resulted in 
publications of seven titles in academic journals and series:  
 
 Marketization trajectories in the Danish road and park sectors: A story of incremental institutional change. 
Lindholst, Andrej Christian, Hansen, Morten Balle & Petersen, Ole Helby (2016). International Journal of Public 
Sector Management, vol. 29, issue 5. 
 Marketization Revisited. Hansen, Morten Balle & Lindholst, Andrej Christian (2016). International Journal of 
Public Sector Management, vol. 29, issue 5. 
 Capability versus efficiency: Contracting out park and road services in Norway. Leiren, Merethe, Dotterud, 
Lindholst, Andrej Christian, Randrup, Thomas Barfoed & Solfjed, Ingjerd (2016).International Journal of Public 
Sector Management, vol. 29, issue 5. 
 Contracting Out Parks and Roads Maintenance in England. Dempsey, Nicola, Burton, Mel & Selin, Johanna 
(2016).International Journal of Public Sector Management, vol. 29, issue 5. 
 Is public procurement efficiency conditioned by market types? A critical test in park and road sectors in Sweden. 
Bretzer, Ylva Norén, Persson, Bengt & Randrup, Thomas Barfoed (2016). International Journal of Public Sector 
Management, vol. 29, issue 5. 
 Samarbejdets betydning i den ’klassiske udlicitering’: En analyse af de transaktionelle og relationelle 
dimensioners betydning. Lindholst, Andrej Christian (2015). Politica, årgang 47, nummer 4, 522-540. 
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 Hvordan fungerer udlicitering bedst? Lindholst, Andrej Christian. Bogkapitel (12) i Politologisk Årbog 2015/16. 
Sider 52-55. København: Hans Reitzels forlag.   
 
The range of articles provide detailed insights and various analyses based on INOPS data on 
contracting within each of the four countries as well as more general insights on contracting out. 
The data and analysis in the INOPS project and the international collaborations it has spurred are 
expected to result in several additional publications in the years to come.  
 
INOPS  Technical report 
 
20 
2.4 Reading guide to the technical report 
The technical report is organized in a series of chapters which provide partial analyses of the key 
questions. Insights from the various analyses contained in the different chapters are used as basis for 
a final discussion and drawing up conclusions. The executive summary (in Danish) sums up the 
findings related to purposes (why), variations (how), outcomes (what) and forwards 
recommendations for development of contracting out in Denmark.  
Each chapter is organized in a similar format. The first sections in a chapter put forward a 
range of research questions which is subsequently addressed within the chapter. Findings in each 
chapter are presented immediately after the research questions. All analyses, which sustain findings, 
are provided in the last (and lengthy) sections of a chapter. Each chapter also provides a range of 
figures and tables where data and analysis are presented.  
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3 EARLIER RESEARCH ON CONTRACTING OUTCOMES  
 
This chapter provides an overview on earlier research on outcomes from contracting out park and 
green space maintenance services and road maintenance services. The chapter is based on a 
literature search. For parks, findings from altogether 10 studies are presented and discussed. For 
roads, one study is presented and discussed.  
 
3.1 Park maintenance: Ten studies 
Altogether 12 studies which report findings on outcomes from contracting out park maintenance 
services were identified in an extensive literature review. Two of the 12 studies were excluded from 
further review due to methodological issues. Table 1 provides a chronological overview of 
remaining 10 studies which were found methodological adequate and reports on outcomes from 
contracting out park and green spaces maintenance services.
4
  
3.1.1 Comparison of studies from the park sector 
The 10 studies cover the timespan of almost three decades (1988-2015). With a few exceptions, the 
studies tend to focus on only one or two key outcomes. Economic outcomes in terms of cost savings 
and/or technical efficiency are the most reported outcome. Explanations for outcomes are not 
systematically addressed across the studies, but together the 10 studies provide a list of potential 
explanations for the various outcomes. The evidence is mainly based on quantitative data which is 
analysed with various statistical methods or reported descriptively. Altogether 7 studies report 
statistics as part of their key findings while 3 studies report findings in terms of qualitative 
accounts. 4 studies are purely quantitative in terms of data, 2 studies are purely qualitative in terms 
of data while 4 studies are based on a mix of quantitative and qualitative data. The literature 
represents studies form a very limited number of countries. USA (3 studies), England and Wales (4 
studies), and Denmark (3 studies) are the only represented countries.  
 
                                                 
4
 See end of chapter for more details on the methods for the literature review.  
INOPS  Technical report 
 
22 
 
Table 1. 
Chronological overview on studies on outcomes from contracting out maintenance services in parks and green spaces. 
Source Reported outcomes Reported explanatory factors  Evidence base 
Country 
context 
Berenyi & 
Stevens 
(1988) 
Improved technical efficiency (approx. 
37%) 
Less labor intensive organization 
More direct control with manpower 
and use of technical equipment 
Different characteristics of 
employees and employment 
Analysis based on quantitative data on 
the comparable efficiency and 
effectiveness of street tree maintenance 
in 20 cities between public and private 
service provisions. Results are significant 
at the .90 percent level. 
USA 
Martin & Stein 
(1992) 
Insignificant relationship between 
contracting out and overall spending on 
operations.  
Theoretical considerations about 
government need to reduce costs 
and number of public employees. 
Cross-comparison of overall cost levels 
and service provisions in 877 local 
authorities  
USA 
Walsh & 
Davis (1993) 
Cost saving (average 10%) and some 
improvements in technical efficiency  
Increases in productivity and 
changes (higher or lower) in work 
standards. 
Includes analysis of quantitative survey-
data for eight services, including 69 
grounds maintenance contracts from 40 
local authorities. 
England 
and Wales 
Patterson & 
Pinch (1995) 
Estimated average reductions in staff 
about 32% for private and 13% for 
public providers.   
Organizational change toward ‘strategic 
centralization’ and ‘operational 
decentralization’  
Legislative requirements. Cost-
focused contracting policies 
Narrative account based on secondary 
data (statistics) 
England 
and Wales 
Clark (1997) Improved technical efficiency and 
improved monitoring reported in a 
majority of local governments (no 
estimates for effect size provided). 
Not discussed. Analysis of survey data based on 268 
responses (response rate 53%) from local 
governments in England and Wales. 
England 
and Wales 
 
Jones (2000) 
Improved information level on assets, 
costs and service levels. Reduced 
production costs. Decreased standards 
and quality of services. Loss of staff 
engagement and motivation. Loss of 
skills and local knowledge. 
For cost savings: Tight and cost-
focused contracting policies 
Longitudinal study (retrospective) based 
on qualitative data in four city councils. 
England 
Jang (2006) No change in overall expenditures on 
services from contracting out to profit-
seeking firms, but lower expenditure on 
services in municipalities contracting 
out to non-profit or other public 
providers. 
For negative effects: Transactional 
risks (difficulties with service 
measurability and monitoring). 
For positive effects: Economy of 
scale, sufficient competition. 
Combined statistical analysis of register 
and survey data (from 1997).  
USA 
Lindholst 
(2008) 
Improved technical efficiency (34%) 
Improved managerial effectiveness  
Former in-efficient in-house 
organization. Stronger 
management instruments (‘high 
powered incentives’) 
Embedded case study of one contracting 
authority based on quantitative and 
qualitative data on six grounds 
maintenance contracts. 
Denmark 
Nuppenau 
(2009) 
Decentralization of operational 
decision-making and responsibilities. 
Differential staff experiences (adapting 
to contract management as both 
difficult and stimulating). Creation of 
common goals and common spirit / 
cultural change. Improved technical 
efficiency. 
Marketization as a locally driven 
organizational change process. 
Competitive pressures.  
Case study of six municipalities with 
different characteristics (size and 
geographical location). 
Denmark 
Lindholst et 
al. (2015) 
Improved technical efficiency 
Decreased allocative efficiency 
Limited managerial focus on 
functionality. Limited outlook in 
contract management practices 
and ‘mind-sets’ 
Case-study based on analysis of existing 
literature.  
Denmark 
All studies identified by inspection of reviews of contracting out, reference lists and literature searches.  
 
The studies which measure cost change at the level of individual contracts (Berenyi & Stevens, 
1988; Walsh & Davis, 1993; Clark, 1997; Lindholst et al., 2015) all find that cost savings has been 
a result when services are contracted out. The studies which measures cost change at the level of 
overall budget / spending levels and provide analysis based on statistical analysis of quantitative 
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data (Martin & Stein, 1992; Jang, 2006) do not find any relationship between contracting levels and 
spending levels. Studies which report on change in overall spending levels based on qualitative data 
or narratives (Jones, 2000; Lindholst, 2008; Nuppenau, 2009). Regarding effects on service levels 
and quality some studies (Jones, 2000; Lindholst et al., 2015) found or report about negative effects 
while other studies (Lindholst, 2008; Berenyi & Stevens, 1988; Walsh and Davis, 1993; Clark, 
1997) found no negative effects. Studies which consider effects on both quality and cost levels 
(Berenyi & Stevens, 1988; Walsh and Davis, 1993; Clark, 1997; Jones, 2000; Lindholst, 2008) all 
find that technical efficiency improves (e.g. improved productivity). However, two studies (Jones, 
2000, Lindholst et al. 2015) indicate problems with the allocative efficiency (e.g. satisfaction of 
user needs). Some studies also report on different managerial, organisational and staff effects 
(Nuppenau, 2009; Patterson & Pinch, 1995; Clark, 1997, Lindholst, 2008, Lindholst et al, 2015). 
On the balance, the effects for staff are predominantly negative while the effects for management 
are predominantly positive.  
In sum, the review finds supportive evidence for an assumption that contracting out in 
contrasts to in-house provision reduces operational costs for maintenance services. However, no 
evidence is found in support for the assumption that contracting out should also reduce overall 
spending levels within the overall service delivery systems. The evidence furthermore suggests that 
technical efficiency is improved while some long-term problems with allocative efficiency may 
arise. The evidence also indicates that substantial changes are involved for management, 
organisation and staff. In particular the number of operational staff are reduced, some aspects of 
management is improved (e.g. ‘effectiveness’) while new organisational principles are introduced 
(e.g. ‘strategic centralization’ and ‘operational decentralization’).   
The findings need to be generalized only with careful reservations. Findings may, for 
example, equally be a result from contextual particularities or methodological limitations (e.g. 
confounding factors or ‘lurky’ variables). Contextual particularities may include policy context, 
market structure or administrative structure.   
3.1.2 Parks: resumes of individual studies  
The following section provide presentations and short discussions of altogether 12 studies which 
report findings on outcomes from contracting out park and green spaces maintenance services. 10 
studies are found methodologically sound while 2 studies are found problematic due to 
methodological issues.  
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Berenyi & Stevens (1988) 
The study by Berenyi & Stevens (1988) compares the cost and quality of public versus private 
service delivery across eight municipal services in 20 cities in the metropolitan area of Los Angeles, 
US. The study includes street tree maintenance which for the purpose of this review can be regarded 
as a typical part of grounds maintenance.    
Data for the analysis included measurement of actual cost for street tree maintenance, 
measurement of quality by trained arborist (by rating the quality of pruning cuts, general health of 
trees and safety procedures), service scale (measured by the number of tree visits) and service levels 
(measured by the level of pruning and number of maintenance activities performed).   
The study finds a statistical significant difference at 37 percent (at a 90-percent confidence 
level) in technical efficiency (by provision at the same service level/quality, but at a lower cost) 
between public and private provision of street tree maintenance. The study did not provide a direct 
causal analysis for explanation of the differences in technical costs and quality levels but provided 
evidence for statistical significant differences between public and private provision across all eight 
services. The differences included management and personnel practices as well as technology and 
its usage for some services. The main differences in personnel practices included lower levels of 
absentee, a younger workforce, lower level of fringe benefits, lower average age and tenure, easier 
access to hiring and firing, shorter distance between management and direct labor as well as a 
general lower level of labor costs among private contractors compared by municipal organizations. 
 
Martin & Stein (1992) 
The study by Martin & Stein (1992) compares the level of spending and level of government 
employment for altogether seven functional categories across contracting and non-contracting 
municipalities in the US (N=877).  
For the category ‘parks and recreation’, an amalgamate of the functions ‘parks’ and 
‘recreational facilities’, they find a statistically significant (p. > 05) higher spending level for 
contracting municipalities compared to non-contracting municipalities. However, the spending level 
for parks and recreation in the main analysis includes costs for land acquisition and development. 
By omitting costs for ‘land acquisition and development’ and including only ‘outlays for current 
operations’ in the analysis, Martin & Stein (1992) find no significant statistical difference between 
contracting and non-contracting municipalities. Thus their main analysis basically indicates that 
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contracting municipalities has a higher level of spending on land acquisition and development than 
non-contracting municipalities. Regarding the number of employees, measured by full time 
equivalents (FTE), it comes as no surprise that contracting municipalities has a statistically 
significant lower FTE compared to non-contracting municipalities. The findings by Martin & Stein 
(1992) indicate that contracting out should have no effect on overall spending levels regarding parks 
and recreation. However, findings on spending levels are impeded to an unknown degree by the 
lack of control for differences in service levels between contracting and non-contracting 
municipalities as well as any change in service quality as a result of contracting out (or non-
contracting). 
For all functional categories in their analysis, Martin & Stein (1992) find that contracting out 
is significantly related to (slightly) lower levels of spending. However, lower spending from 
additional contracting is found insignificant after a city contracts for more than 25 percent of its 
services. This finding empirically echoes the theorem of ‘diminishing return to competition’ as, for 
example, discussed within the context of public service delivery by Boyne (Boyne, 1998a, pp. 182-
3). The theorem states that introduction of additional levels of competition in a context already 
characterized by a degree of competition has increasingly lower effect on performance.  
 
Walsh & Davis (1993) 
The study by Walsh & Davis (1993) addresses various effects and changes resulting from the 
introduction of compulsory competitive tendering for altogether eight different technical services in 
Local Governments in England and Wales in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The study by Walsh & 
Davis (1993) relies on survey data collected from altogether 40 local authorities and included data 
on 69 grounds maintenance contracts. 
Walsh & Davis (1993) find that the shift from provisions of grounds maintenance by direct 
services organizations (in-house) to contracting out had resulted in average cost reductions by a 
magnitude of 10.9 % (p. 143). An additional analysis of the data provided by Walsh & Davis (1993) 
shows that the standard deviation is around 15 %. An inspection of the provided data shows that 
costs increased for 13 contracts, costs remained stable for nine contracts and for 46 contracts costs 
had decreased. For the ten contracts reporting the largest cost reductions the range were reported to 
be between approximately 26 % and 50 %. For the ten contracts with the highest cost increase the 
range were reported to be between approximately 3 % and 19 %.  
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Walsh & Davis (1993) also report that local authorities find that specified services standards 
for grounds maintenance in general were attained by private contractors (p. 134). The main sources 
for cost reductions were for all services reported by local authorities to be due to increases in 
productivity and changes toward lower work standards while the main source of cost increases was 
reported to be changes toward higher service standards. (p. 147). On the whole, these data indicates 
that not only were cost savings achieved, but technical efficiency on the average also was improved 
in some (but unknown) degree. 
 
Greene (1994) 
The study by Greene (1994) addressed whether efficiency in service provisions were higher for six 
different services areas in cities with low levels of contracting compared to cities with high levels of 
contracting. Services within parks and recreation were included as one of the six service areas in the 
study. The comparison included a shortlist of altogether 12 cities in the US that were found to be 
alike regarding size and service levels but differing regarding the level of contracting. Cities with 
low levels of contracting had less than 10% of their services provided by private contractor whereas 
cities with high levels of contracting had more than 35% of their services provided by private 
contractors. For parks and recreation the service level was operationalized by a standard where the 
city maintained at least one tennis court per 5,000 residents (p.1322). Cities with high levels of 
contracting was found to spend 74.6 % less money per capita on parks and recreation compared to 
cities primary relying on municipal departments with public employees. Cities with high levels of 
contracting had furthermore 59.4% less employees within parks and recreation as well as a 74.7% 
lower payroll. The differences for money spend per capita and payrolls were both significant at the 
.05 level.  
The credibility as well as the generalizability of the findings in the study by Greene should be 
severely questioned. Firstly, the low N (=12) in the sample is problematic for a pure statistical 
analysis. Secondly, the sampling strategy is problematic for the generalizability of the findings. 
Thirdly, the huge difference in expenditure between cities with high and low levels of contracting 
may be due to factors not accounted for in the comparison or very unusual circumstances in one or 
both of the two groups. Fourthly, and most critical, the assumption that service levels among the 
compared cities were alike regarding parks and recreation services due to the number of tennis court 
per 5,000 inhabitants can best be regarded as outright nonsense. The amount and type of green 
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infrastructure and recreational facilities are indeed suspect to vary hugely among cities and should 
by no means by assumed to be reflected by any number of tennis courts.  
 
Patterson & Pinch (1995) 
The study by Patterson & Pinch (1995) uses secondary data in a narrative account on the effects 
from introduction of compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) in the UK on workforce and the 
organizational conditions for various services including grounds maintenance. In support of their 
narrative, Patterson & Pinch (1995) provide evidence for large reductions in workforce for grounds 
maintenance contracts won by private contractors compared to public providers (direct service 
organizations). Private contractors are reported to reduce the workforce by 32% on the average 
while direct service providers (DSOs) are reported to reduce the workforce by 13% on the average. 
The reduction in workforce is furthermore demonstrated to be accompanied by deteriorating 
employment terms and conditions and creating a labor market characterized by lower wages and 
precarious working conditions. The drivers behind the reported effects are argued to be strongly 
related to requirements in the CCT legislation. This encompasses an organizational development 
toward strategic centralization and operational decentralization which weaken the influence of 
workers as well as fragmenting the workforce by relocation to different producer units; a shift 
toward a business and commercial discourse focused on ‘efficiency’, ‘performance targets’ and 
‘consumer needs’. In their conclusions, Patterson & Pinch point out an important organizational 
outcome by the observation that the CCT legislation has established ‘a separation of a concern for 
the services to be provided from a concern for those people who will provide that service’ (p. 1458).  
Thus, the introduction of contracting out through the requirements in the CCT legislation has 
reduced service provision to a matter of lowering costs.  
 
Clark (1997) 
Similar to the earlier study by Walsh & Davis (1993), the study by Clark (1997) addresses the 
effects of implementation of compulsory competitive tendering in Local Governments in England 
and Wales; however, Clark (1997) focuses solely on grounds maintenance. The study relies on 
survey data from a total of 268 responses from park managers in England and Wales (response rate 
53 %). The study identifies key questions to be addressed by reviewing the debates in the sector for 
key issues. The study reports simple descriptive statistics on various key effects including value 
received for tax payers, quality and monitoring and staff training as well as a range of questions 
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related to the characteristics of contracts. 71% of the respondents reported that ‘better value for tax 
payers’ where achieved against 25% reporting that this was not achieved. 36% reported that quality 
levels had decreased against 37% that reported that quality levels had increased. 52% reported that 
monitoring had become more difficult against 31% that reported that monitoring had become easier. 
64% reported that monitoring had become more effective against 18% that reported that monitoring 
had become less effective. Furthermore, 80 % reported that staff training was not included in the 
vast majority of contracts against 10 % reporting that this was included.  
Drawbacks of the study are that it does not include the size, magnitude or perceived 
importance of the various effects. The study does furthermore not provide an analysis of whether 
the effects are statistically correlated. The drawbacks make it impossible to say whether the 
reported overall improvement in received value for tax payers is correlated with for example higher 
level of competition, more effective monitoring, size of contracts or a lack of staff training. 
However, given the high percentage of respondents that confirms an improved value for tax payers 
a conclusion in favor of a generally improved value for tax payers, this is improved allocative 
efficiency, seems inevitably. Similar can be said for the improved effectiveness of monitoring, 
albeit this may be associated with more difficulties. Regarding the question on staff training the 
study clearly highlights that this is not included in the reported contracting practices. 
 
Hodge (2000) 
In a meta-study of ‘all globally available studies’, Hodge (2000) calculated an estimated average 
cost saving for contracting out parks and recreational services about 7.5% The estimate is based on 
two studies by respectively Greene (1994) and Martin & Stein (1992). However, a caveat with 
Hodge’s estimate for parks and recreational services is that the two included studies are ill-fitted for 
the purpose of the meta-analysis. The findings by Greene (1994) should be regarded as utterly 
implausible due to severe flaws in the comparison of service levels and amount of green space 
provisions across cases. The findings on higher spending levels by contracting municipalities in the 
study by Martin & Stein (1992) is explicated by the authors to be most likely caused by a higher 
level of land acquisition and development activities in some municipalities. The statistics provided 
by Martin & Stein (1992), in other words, do not compare spending on maintenance services alone.  
Due to lack of proper screening of the ‘fit-for purpose’ of the more substantial matter of the 
included studies for the ‘park and recreation’ category in the meta-analysis the calculated estimate 
for cost savings for contracting out maintenance services (7.5%) cannot be taken as evidence or any 
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indication for the possible effects from contracting out of maintenance services within parks and 
recreation as suggested by Hodge.  
The study by Hodge does, however, include the study on street tree maintenance by Berenyi 
& Stevens (1988), but this study is grouped within a general category of ‘maintenance’ separate 
from a group referring to ‘parks and recreation’. Street trees should be acknowledged to be an 
inherent part of a city’s green infrastructure. Hodge does not provide any arguments underpinning 
the grouping of various services in his study as well as any list of which functions and services that 
are placed within each group.  
 
Jones (2000) 
Jones (2000) provides a longitudinal study of development of services in four park departments in 
UK during three reforms eras. The study relies on extensive qualitative interview data analyzed 
with the method of conceptual ordering. An era of ‘competitive compulsory contracting’ (CCT), 
spanning from 1988 to the mid-1990s, demarcates the introduction of strict regulations and 
requirements for contracting out in a pre-context characterized by ‘traditional management’. A 
subsequent era of ‘best value’ reforms, taking off in the late 1990s, demarcates an introduction of a 
more flexible and approach to service provisions. The study by Jones (2000) does not provide 
statistics, but a broad comparative perspective on the advantages and disadvantages of the 
introduction of a tightly cost-focused approach to contracting out in the context of public park 
services.   
Advantages by introducing a cost-focused contracting regime, vis-à-vis ‘traditional 
management’, include more cost-efficient performance, standardization of work activities and 
outcomes across locations and sites and creation of information and resource systems for 
centralized management and decision-making. The disadvantages include a shift in focus from 
managing parks toward managing contracts, punitive and futile contract enforcement procedures, 
lack of investment in and loss of the sector’s skills base, making the areas ‘easier’ by ‘making parks 
fit for movers rather than movers fit the needs of the park’, loss of community contact by a shift 
from site-based staff toward mobile work gangs, loss of initiative, morale and creative flair in the 
work force by the need to follow prescriptive ‘to dos’ performed at speed and at a price, a shift in 
management mentality toward a ‘maintenance only culture’, and finally a reduction in standards and 
creation of rundown and derelict park areas low of horticultural and recreational value.  
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In the study by Jones (2000) the list of disadvantages is clearly longer than the list of 
advantages in the era of CCT. The subsequent era of ‘best value’ policies allowed managers to 
address some of the earlier malaises by embedding contracting practices in broader approaches 
which included community involvement, strategic planning and visions, a partnership approach to 
contractual relations as well as a public agenda for ‘reclaiming parks’.   
The findings in earlier studies by Walsh & Davis (1993) and Clark (1997) is partial confirmed 
in the study by Jones (2000). However, Jones (2000) adds to the earlier findings by identifying a 
range of long-term and basically negative outcomes from the introduction of a cost-focused 
approach to contracting out. Jones (2000) furthermore points out the need for a broader strategic 
and partnership-based approach to contracting out. This finding is somehow a critical comment to 
the mainstream assumptions on conditions for effective and successful contracting out in the public 
sector. Later commentaries in articles by Beer et al. (2003) and Hebbert (2008) on the outcomes 
from contracting out in the context of England and Wales have furthermore paraphrased the 
findings in the study by Jones (2000). 
 
Jang (2006) 
A study based on a combination of available (secondary) register and survey data on 1055 US 
municipalities from 1997 by Jang (2006) found that contracting out services related to ‘parks and 
landscaping maintenance’ to private contractors (profit seeking firms) did not result in any 
statistically significant change in overall service expenditure while contracting out to non-profit 
organizations or other public providers resulted in statistically significant lower expenditures. 
Economy of scale and sufficient competition were furthermore found to be drivers of lower 
expenditure from contracting out while transactional risks such as difficulties with service 
specification and measurement as well as place-boundedness were discussed to be drivers of higher 
expenditures. However, the argument on particular difficulties with service specification and 
measurability as well as place-boundedness for parks and landscape maintenance compared to other 
public services under contract is only stated as a claim without further substantiation (p. 800). The 
study by Jang (2006) did furthermore not include data on service level or quality nor on the history 
of contracting out for US municipalities. The dynamics of contracting out and in may explain 
efficiency gains (Hefetz & Warner, 2004) while omission of data on service levels or quality 
effectively restrict a study from any conclusion on technical efficiency (Boyne, 1998b). 
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The findings by Jang (2006) regarding the (lack of) effect on overall expenditure level from 
contracting out to profit-seeking firms are congruent with the findings in the study by Martin & 
Stein (1992). Likewise, the findings by Jang (2006) are limited to conclusions on the overall 
expenditure level (i.e. comparative cost levels) and do not extent to conclusions on technical 
efficiency. However, while Martin & Stein (1992) in their analysis explicitly control for costs to 
land acquisition and development there is no indication whether the data sources in the study by 
Jang (2006) include or exclude these costs, however, the services are referred to as ‘parks and 
landscaping maintenance’ (p. 807). Overall, the conclusions by Jong (2006) seem credible 
regarding the empirical findings, but the theoretical interpretation and arguments can in some 
degree be questioned.  
 
Lindholst (2008)  
In a case-study of contracting out of grounds maintenance in a handful of historical parks and 
gardens in Denmark, Lindholst (2008) reported that sustained direct cost savings by 34% were 
realized though introduction of contracting out and successive rounds of procurement without 
compromised service levels and quality of service delivery. The cost levels in the case study were 
compared against a historical baseline where services were provided by a former – and undoubtedly 
inefficient, unresponsive and poorly managed – in-house arrangement. This study by Lindholst 
(2008) also found that management of ground maintenance services had become more effective by 
the introduction of contract management of externally provided services. The increase in 
effectiveness could be attributed to more sturdy safe-guarding practices rooted in so-called ‘high-
powered’ incentives (e.g. access to economic penalties written into a formal contract).  
The study is longitudinal, but do not control for other factors such as developments in price 
index within the sector or shift in transaction costs. However, it is very unlikely that decreasing 
prices within the sector or the level of transaction costs should out-weight the reported cost savings. 
Adding to the credibility of the study is the control for change in service levels. However, the 
generalizability of the study is questionable as the change in cost levels may be due to specific or 
untypical circumstances such as an overly technically inefficient former in-house arrangement. 
 
Nuppenau (2009) 
The study by Nuppenau (2009) provides a narrative account based on six case studies of 
marketization processes in municipal park departments in Denmark. In the narrative contracting out 
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is positioned as part of wider organizational change strategies toward an increasing ‘marketization’ 
of municipal park departments. Contracting out and implementation of its organizational 
requirements is found to have differential effects on staff as well as organizations. Firstly, 
contracting out has involved a reorganization of the work at the operational level where 
responsibilities are decentralized to staff in ways that provide greater autonomy for the individual as 
well as require new competencies in the daily work. Secondly, the change in organizational 
structures has required a change in roles, mentality and cultural outlook, including setup of new 
common goals, routines and performance standards as well as the individual’s understanding of hers 
own ‘identity’ in the organization. These organizational changes have had differential effects on 
staff of both positive and negative kinds. On the negative side, change processes related to 
contracting out where for example reported to be experienced by the staff as ‘a time of resistance, 
skepticism, anxiety and insecurity’, suspected by staff for being a way for management to get rid of 
unwanted colleagues (p. 162) as well as inducing a focus on fulfilling the contract instead of 
fulfilling maintenance needs in parks (p.166). On the positive side, for example, new performance 
standards and organization of work were found to be helpful in generating learning, sharing 
experience and focusing work efforts. The impact of competitive contracting on municipal park 
departments was furthermore reported to increase work pace and make work routines more 
efficient.  
 
Lindholst et al. (2015) 
The study by Lindholst et al. (2015) primarily addresses the implementation of quality standards in 
municipal park management and does only indirectly address outcomes from contracting out 
grounds maintenance. However, implementation of quality standards is explicated to be intimately 
associated with contracting out practices as for example also highlighted in the studies by Walsh & 
Davis (1993), Nuppenau (2009) and Lindholst (2009). Implementation of service specifications has 
been a requirement for pricing and monitoring of contracts. However, the study by Lindholst et al. 
(2015) points out that the particular version of service specification adopted for contracting out of 
grounds maintenance has had some drawbacks. In particular, it tends to reinforce a limited 
professional view on what quality is about, i.e. compliance to measurable technical specifications 
based horticultural knowledge, rather than adopting a conceptualization of quality that enables 
broader views on what services is about. Thus the study by Lindholst et al. (2015) can be seen as a 
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study of explanatory factors that drives some of the contracting outcomes that have been identified 
in earlier research. 
The study by Lindholst et al. (2015) relies on secondary data sources, a document study of 
quality specifications as well as discussions with point of departure in the earlier research. The 
association of certain types of service specification with certain contracting outcomes is mainly 
substantiated as a credible hypothesis and no data driven evidence is provided. 
 
3.2 Road maintenance: one study 
Only one study was found in the literature search which report on economic outcomes from 
contracting out road maintenance. The study by Blom Hansen (2003) is presented in some details 
below.  
Blom-Hansen (2003) provides an analysis based on register based data from all years 1988-
1999 of effects on cost levels from contracting out in Danish municipalities. The main finding from 
the analysis is that higher involvement of the private sector for provision of municipal road 
maintenance (measured by the percentage of total expenditures spend on private contractors) leads 
to cost savings (reduced overall expenditure) without a loss of road quality, i.e. ‘real’ cost savings 
are resulting from involvement of private contractors in service delivery systems. A secondary 
finding is that scale economy matters for cost effects (a longer total length of municipal roads is 
significantly correlated with lower expenditure per meter road). It is also found that higher quality 
levels are significantly correlated with higher expenditure levels.   
Blom-Hansen (2003) argues that the main finding are ‘conservative’ as the context for the 
study (by the national competition authorities) was characterized by ‘very weak competition’ and a 
degree of ‘tacit collusion’ among the private contractors in the market for road maintenance works. 
Blom-Hansen (2003) also explicates that the study uses the level of private sector involvement as a 
key predictor of cost effects, but this does not differentiate between involvement out of ‘habit’ and 
involvement based on competitive tendering processes. 
Two arguments are provided based on indicative evidence (two secondary case studies) for 
explanation of the cost effects. First, cost savings may accrue due to more efficient utilization in 
private firms of labor force through years with seasonal differences in work load. Blom-Hansen 
(2003) finds this argument to be in line with the ‘ownership argument’ on why the private sector 
should perform better than the public sector. Second, cost savings may accrue in both public and 
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private provisions due to introduction of competition among public and private providers. 
Introduction of competition with private providers by tendering processes also forces cost levels 
down for public service provision. Blom-Hansen (2003) finds this argument to be in line with the 
‘competition argument’ on why contracting out should lead to cost savings in the public sector. In 
sum, Blom-Hansen (2003) argues that a mix of ownership and competition effects is congruent with 
the overall empirical findings in the analysis.   
 
3.3 Short summary  
For both the road and park sector it is fair to conclude that the overall balance of the evidence 
indicates that cost savings has accrued from contracting out of maintenance services. The evidence 
for the park sector is more composite and involves more dimensions than the evidence for the road 
sector.  
The differences between the studies of expenditure levels within the park sector and road 
sector may be due to differences in country context. The two studies within the park sector from the 
US where contracting out and competitive tendering has a longer history shows no significant cost 
differences in overall expenditures. The one study within the road sector is from Denmark where 
contracting out and competitive tendering has a shorter history shows significant cost savings from 
relatively higher expenditures on private contractors. Similarly, all reviewed studies which report on 
effects from the introduction of contracting out finds economic performance to be improved. 
Efficiency gains from contracting out can furthermore be expected to be more likely in contexts 
with a shorter histories of competitive pressures than in contexts where competitive pressures has 
existed for many years.  
 
3.4 Methods for literature search 
The included materials for the review were found by searches within two sources of literature. The 
first source included a review of existing comprehensive studies and reviews of outcomes from 
contracting out in the public sector in general. The second source included a review of existing 
studies of contracting out within park management in local governments. Literature lists in all 
resulting titles from the two searches were subsequently inspected for reference to relevant studies. 
Key words in the searches and inspections were ‘privatization’, ‘marketization’, ‘contracting’, and 
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‘park/grounds/green space management/maintenance’. Key criteria for inclusion in the review were 
reference and information on outcomes including key concepts such as ‘efficiency’, ‘cost savings’, 
‘quality’, ‘service levels’ or ‘standards’ as well as more generic concepts such as ‘outcomes’ or 
‘effects’. The first source included studies and reviews by Borcherding et al. (1982), Berenyi and 
Stevens (1988), Donahue (1989), Walsh and Davis, (1993), Domberger (1997), Boyne (1998a; 
1998b), Hodge (2000), Hjelmar et al. (2013). The second source included key titles by Jones 
(2000), Baycan-Levent and Nijkamp (2009), Lindholst and Bogetoft (2011), Jansson and Lindgren 
(2012) and Lindholst et al. (2015).  
Each title was firstly carefully screened for any inclusion or reference to services with 
relevance for urban green spaces / urban green infrastructure, e.g. parks or urban green space 
maintenance, or services that forms part of grounds maintenance services e.g. street tree 
maintenance. Secondly, each title was reviewed for any report evidence on service and/or 
organizational outcomes related to the provision of green spaces services. Thirdly, the credibility of 
the evidence was reviewed by assessment of the methods and data supporting any reported 
outcome. Some titles were excluded in this process. This includes a number of titles, such as Painter 
(1991) and Brown and Potoski (2003) which include grounds maintenance as part of studies with 
more general research purposes related to contracting out in the public sector, but not reporting on 
any particular outcomes from contracting out grounds maintenance. A few titles of initial interests 
was also excluded, such as Beer et al. (2003) and Hebbert (2008), as these only provided 
summarizing comments on earlier studies, but without any (re-)analysis of evidence.  
Two studies by Greene (1994) and Hodge (2000) was excluded due to severe methodological 
problems. In a comparison of 12 assumed alike US cities, Greene (1994) report that cities with high 
levels of contracting spend 74.6 % less money per capita on parks and recreation compared to cities 
primary relying on municipal departments with public employees. However, Greene (1994) 
assumes that the compared cities are alike regarding their services level in parks and recreation on 
the basis of a similar number of tennis courts per 5,000 inhabitants. This is non-sense as the amount 
and type of green infrastructure and recreational facilities must be expected to vary hugely among 
cities and by no means can be assumed to be reflected by any comparable number of tennis courts. 
Hodge (2000) calculates an estimated average cost saving for contracting out parks and recreational 
services about 7.5%. The estimate is partly based on the study by Greene (1994) and partly a study 
by Martin and Stein (1992). The selected data from both studies are ill-fitted for the purpose of the 
meta-analysis. The credibility of findings by Greene (1994) is evaluated above. The main findings 
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in the study by Martin and Stein (1992) is credible, but is explicated by the authors to be most likely 
caused by a difference in land acquisition and development activities. The statistics provided by 
Martin and Stein (1992), in other words, do not include spending on maintenance services alone. 
However, Martin and Stein (1992) also report findings for maintenance alone but these are not used 
by Hodge (2000). 
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4 ANALYSIS – COUNTRY CONTEXTS 
 
With contributions from Andrej Christian Lindholst, Johanna Selin, Ylva Noren Bretzer and 
Merethe Leiren Dotterud  
 
4.1 Denmark 
This section is partly based on an article on marketization of the municipal park and road sectors in 
Denmark by Lindholst, Hansen and Petersen.
5
 
4.1.1 Marketization policies in Denmark 
The first political initiative in Denmark which explicated various forms of marketization as 
systematic strategies for reforming and running the public sector dates back to the early 1980s 
(Ejersbo and Greve, 2014), where the Danish economy witnessed a period of economic austerity. 
Due to the economic crisis and the failure of the global economy to provide durable solutions, the 
late 1970s can be considered a critical juncture in the Danish and the global market economy, and 
one of the strategic responses in many countries (particularly in the Anglo-Saxon countries) to the 
global economic crisis was the introduction of marketization in the public sector. Marketization, 
particularly in terms of public procurement and contracting out, was launched alongside other tools 
for modernization of the public sector, such as decentralization, deregulation, service orientation, 
new technologies and human resource development. Marketization in terms of procurement and 
contracting out was presented as a tool for achieving ‘economic or administrative benefits’ with an 
emphasis on delivering services in ways that are ’best and cheapest’. Subsequent governments in 
the 2000s also launched and promoted a public-private partnership (PPP) agenda for private sector 
involvement (and investment) in public service delivery in general and infrastructure in particular 
(Petersen, 2010). In spite of these attempts to promote a broader marketization agenda, the amount 
of PPP activity in Denmark has so far been limited and contracting out and public procurement are 
still dominant forms.  
                                                 
5
 Lindholst, Andrej Christian, Hansen, Morten Balle & Petersen, Ole Helby (2016). Marketization trajectories in the 
Danish road and park sectors: A story of incremental institutional change. International Journal of Public Sector 
Management, 29(5). 
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The local level has in general had a relatively high autonomy vis-à-vis central government in 
deciding on service levels and whether services are provided by means of in-house provision or 
contracting out to the private market (Sellers and Lidstrom, 2007). Public provision of services was 
for long the municipalities’ preferred form of service delivery, although the involvement of private 
contractors has been gradually increasing over the past decades. Since the 1980s, public 
procurement and contracting out has gradually become a backbone in various government and 
administrative policies for reforming and running the public sector (Ejersbo and Greve, 2014). The 
marketization agenda as well as the wider NPM reform wave has had a profound impact on 
municipalities’ provision of services. While the level of private sector involvement in the 
municipalities’ service provision has been estimated to be less than 10 per cent in the 1980s, it has 
been gradually increasing over the years and now represents 26 per cent of overall municipal 
expenditure on services. However, the involvement of private companies differs greatly across 
services and municipalities, with the general trend being that private involvement is general high in 
technical services such garbage collection, road maintenance and green space operation, and more 
modest in social services like education, childcare and care for the disabled. Private provision, for 
example, represents more than 40 per cent in technical services like urban planning and road and 
park maintenance (Petersen et al., 2015).   
The general approach to public sector reform, including marketization and modernization in 
Denmark has over the years been characterized as one of pragmatism and incremental change rather 
than one of systematic principles and political ideology as well as a modest emphasis on 
marketization (Greve, 2006; Jensen, 1998; Pedersen and Löfgren, 2012). However, measured by the 
content of policy initiatives over the years, it is clear that right-wing governments have promoted 
the marketization agenda with greater enthusiasm and more sturdy policy instruments than left-wing 
governments. Especially, the characterization of the Danish approach as one of ‘pragmatism’ has 
been challenged by right-wing government initiatives in the 2000s, which has sought to increase the 
share of public services provided by the private sector through a mix of more or less cohesive 
policy instruments ranging from reformed administrative coordination, private sector rights to 
challenge public service delivery, binding targets for the level of contracting out in local 
governments and political proposals concerning implementation of compulsory competitive 
tendering in specific sectors.  
The Social-democratic led (center-left) government that was in office from 2011-2015 
momentarily chose to roll back the cohesive policy instruments while retaining political support for 
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innovation and public-private partnerships. Recently, an incoming right-wing government in 2015 
re-emphasized private sector involvement in public service delivery and announced that binding 
minimum targets for competitive tendering in the local government sector will by Spring 2016 
again be enforced.  
This brief overview of Danish marketization policies for the past thirty years shows that new 
pro-marketization initiatives have gradually been launched in an incremental and steady fashion, 
though recent political initiatives by the liberal-conservative government re-launch binding targets 
for competitive tendering of municipal services, which departs from a long tradition of municipal 
independence and denotes a more radical type of institutional change. The ‘pragmatism’, 
characterizing public sector reform in Denmark from the 1980s and onward, has been supplemented 
with more cohesive policy pressures. Today, the general policy framework which embeds 
developments in the municipal parks and roads sectors may be characterized as one of ‘directed 
pragmatism’.  
 
4.1.2 Demography  
In an international perspective, Denmark is a small, but highly developed and densely populated 
country. The population, around 5.7 million, is relatively evenly distributed across the country, 
although more densely in a few urban centres and the metropolitan area in the capital region. Table 
2 shows key demographic characteristics of Danish municipalities within the five administrative 
regions in Denmark. Overall, differences in Danish municipalities’ size, measured by the number of 
inhabitants and physical area are relatively small. The average number of inhabitants is 57,547. 
Seven municipalities have populations larger than 100,000 inhabitants. Copenhagen municipality 
has by far the largest population (570,000 inhabitants). Seven municipalities, of which five are 
islands, have populations less than 20,000 inhabitants. 30 out of the remaining 82 municipalities 
have populations between 50,000 and 100,000 while 52 have populations between 20,000 and 
50,000 inhabitants. On the average at the regional level the most densely populated (686.5 
inhabitants per km
2
) as well as the geographically smallest municipalities (2,558 km
2
) are located in 
the Capital Region while the least densely populated (73.8 inhabitants per km
2
) are located in North 
Denmark and the geographically largest municipalities (12,737 km
2
) located in the Central Region. 
The three geographically largest municipalities, Ringkøbing-Skjern (1470 km
2
), Viborg (1409 km
2
) 
and Herning (1321 km
2
) are located in Central Denmark.   
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Table 2.  
Characteristics of Danish municipalities 
Regional location 
Number of 
municipalities 
Municipal size within region  
(population) 
a
 
Municipal size within region 
(area, km
2
) 
Population per area (km
2
) 
within region 
Mean Total Mean Total Mean 
 
South Denmark 22 54,732 1,204,111 569 12,524 96.1 
 
Capital Region 29 60,550 1,755,974 88 2,558 686.5 
 
North Denmark 11 52,849 581,340 716 7,879 73.8 
 
Central Denmark 19 67,340 1,279,467 670 12,737 100.5 
 
Region Zealand 17 48,160 818,732 425 7,223 113.4 
 
All of Denmark 98 57,547 5,639,625 438 42,924 131.4 
Note: all figures based on 2014 data from Statistics Denmark. 
 
4.1.3 Organisation of the public sector  
The public sector is large, tax financed and provide most welfare services freely on basis of 
universal principles (Andersen and Larsen, 2015). The public sector is organized at three levels; 
municipalities, regional authorities and the central administration. The current structure consists of 
98 municipalities and five regional authorities. The current structure was implemented after several 
years of preparation in 2007 and reduced a former number of municipalities from 271, provided a 
more uniform size as well as a delegated new responsibilities to the municipalities. Key objectives 
of the new structure were to enable a more efficient provision and administration of services 
through economies of scale, professionalization as well as further use of reform instruments (Blom-
Hansen et al., 2012). 
In the post-war decades, local government became the primary provider of welfare state 
services in Denmark. The current system was established in the 1970s and the 2007-reform was a 
consolidation of this governance system. Most public services, including primary schools, 
eldercare, social services, local planning and urban and environmental services (including roads and 
parks), have been provided by the municipalities since the 1970s.  
 
4.1.4 Municipal organization of park and road responsibilities 
Within road and park services, Danish municipalities are responsible for planning, managing and 
maintaining municipal owned parks and green spaces as well as operation of roughly 95 per cent of 
the 74,500 km public road network. Maintenance responsibilities have by tradition been organized 
within technical departments in the municipalities, though the specific management and 
organizational structures differ from municipality to municipality (Gjelstrup, 1992; Nuppenau, 
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2009). Activities in the road sector are legally and administratively tighter regulated than activities 
in the park sector. While municipalities, for example, are required by law to ensure a well-
functioning road network as part of the overall transport infrastructure there are no mandatory 
requirements for provision of municipal parks and green spaces. 
Additional differences between the two sectors are overall level of spending and the 
involvement of private providers. The gross expenditure for all services related to road maintenance 
was about 7 billion DKK in 2014 – about three times higher than the gross expenditure (1.9 billion 
DKK) for all services related to maintenance of municipal parks and green spaces (including forest 
and nature areas). The expenditure for park and road maintenance accounts only for a minor 
fraction – or approximately 4 % – of overall expenditure on public services in Danish municipalities 
(Statistics Denmark, 2014). 
4.1.5 National framework for contracting out 
The Danish legal-regulatory framework and common standards for public procurements and 
contracting out with relevance for both the road and park sector has evolved substantially in the 
period from the 1980s to the 2010s. Public procurement in Denmark has in the 1990s and 2000s 
been regulated by both national and EU-regulations in a rather complex regulatory setup. At the 
sector level common contractual standards have been in place since the early 1990s. ’AB92’ from 
1992 is a widely used common contractual standard for construction works which also find use for 
maintenance works. In addition, in 2003, a specific contractual standard, ‘ABService’, was 
developed for procurement of services and maintenance work. 
In both the park and road sectors, almost common professional vocabularies for specifying 
maintenance standards have been developed in the late 1990s (published respectively in 1998 for 
parks and 1999 for roads) and later revised in both sectors. State authorities have spurred and 
supported the development in both sectors. In both sectors, the drivers were requirements to meet 
tighter financial conditions (e.g. limited budgets) and support the use of competitive tendering and 
contracting out. The methodology for specifying maintenance standards has been based on a 
‘transactional’ paradigm focusing on the needs for defining quality (in a measurable way), 
competitive pricing, control/monitoring and follow-up on service provisions (Lindholst et al., 
2015b).  
In the 2000s, the road and park sectors witnessed the development of alternative and more 
collaboratively oriented approaches to contracting out. The development reflected the general 
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interest in the national policy agenda for partnerships and new ways of organising public-private 
relations. In the park sector, a concept of ‘integrated park management’ introduced a framework for 
integrating strategy, investments and development as part of a collaborative approach to contracting 
out. In the late 2000s the park sector also witnessed several experiments with various so-called 
‘holistic approaches’ to contracting out based on multiple performance measures as well a 
collaborative approach. In the road sector, collaborative contractual approaches to maintenance 
termed ‘partnering’ were from the early 2000s onwards developed and implemented by the national 
road authorities as well as promoted for use in the municipalities. Partnering involves a formal 
collaborative arrangement in which partners engage in the process under a shared vision, joint 
activities and mutual economic incentives. Partnering provides flexibility in maintenance contracts 
in urban zone with relatively unpredictable conditions.
6
  
During the early 2000s the municipalities also started to use long-term performance based 
maintenance contracts in the road sector with the purpose of ensuring a more efficient mix between 
investment and maintenance costs under relatively predictable conditions in particular in land 
zones. By 2015, our survey data indicates that about 20 per cent of all municipalities use long-term 
road maintenance contracts, typically running between 10 and 15 years. Furthermore, in 2013 the 
first fully fledged public-private partnership (PPP) in the road sector delivered a new state highway 
including a 30-year maintenance period. 
 
4.1.6 The level of contracting out of park and road maintenance in Danish municipalities 
By the Mid20100s, almost all Danish municipalities use private contractors for provision of park 
and road maintenance. Only very few municipalities rely only on in-house provision. Table 3 
provides an overview of Danish municipalities’ use of different provider types for provision of park 
and road maintenance services. Eighty-one percent of the municipalities use private contractors in 
some degree for provision of park maintenance while 92 % of the municipalities use private 
contractors in some degree for provision of road maintenance.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 See also case study for Skive Municipality 
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Table 3. 
The use of different provider types for provision of parks and road maintenance services 
Type of provider 
Park maintenance Road maintenance 
N = 74 N = 73 
Use private contractors (only or partly) 81 % (60) 92 % (67) 
 Only use private contractors 11 % (8) 11 % (8) 
 Partly use private contractors 70% (52) 81 % (59) 
Use in-house provider (only or partly) 89 % (66) 89 % (65) 
 Only use in-house provider 19 % (14) 8 % (6) 
 Partly use in-house provider 70% (52) 81 % (59) 
Other type of provision* 3 % (2)
a
 1 % (1)
b
 
 Only use other type of provision 0 % (0)
 a
 0 % (0)
b
 
 Partly use other type of provision 3 % (2)
a
 1 % (1)
b
 
Data is based on categorical questions (yes / no / don’t know) on whether the municipality used different types of 
providers for park and/or road maintenance services.  
* ‘Other type of provision’ include: ‘public-private company’, ‘other municipal provider’, Inter-municipal company as well as 
‘other arrangements’.  
a
 Include: private land owner association (lodsejerforening) and inter-municipal company. 
b
 Include: Inter-municipal company. 
 
The percentage of municipalities that only or partial use private contractors is slightly higher for 
road maintenance services compared to park maintenance services. The percentage of 
municipalities that only use in-house providers is higher for park maintenance services (19%) than 
for road maintenance services (8%). A mix of private contractors and in-house providers is the most 
frequent arrangement for provision of park maintenance (70%) as well as road maintenance (81%) 
among Danish municipalities. Only very few municipalities use other types of provision for park 
and/or road maintenance (3%). Figure 1 illustrates the distributions of Danish municipalities’ use of 
private contractors and in-house providers for park and road maintenance services.  
 
Figure 1.  
The use of private contractors and/or in-house providers for park and road maintenance 
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Table 4 provides an overview of the current distribution of parks and roads maintenance budgets 
between different types of service providers. The (un-weighted) average allocation of maintenance 
budget for private contractors found to be 27.2% for parks and 47.2% for roads. The variation in the 
allocation of maintenance budgets between private contractors and in-house provision is 
considerable for both park services (S.D. = 32.1%) and road services (S.D. = 26.8%).  
 
Table 4. 
Current distribution (un-weighted) of parks and roads maintenance budgets between different types of service providers 
 Parks Roads 
Statistics* 
Private contractors In-house provider 
Other type of 
provider** Private contractors In-house provider 
Other type of 
provider** 
N 74 74 74 72 72 73 
Mean 27.2 % 72.6 % .2 % 47.2 % 52,7 % 0 % 
S.D. 32.1 % 32.1 % 1.3 % 26.8 % 26.8 % 0 % 
Median 15.0 % 82.5 % 0 % 48.0 % 52.0 % 0 % 
Low value 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 
High Value 100 %  100 % 10 %  100 % 100 % 0 % 
Source: INOPS survey data for Denmark  
The table reports the current distribution of maintenance budgets on different types of providers.  
Data is based on self-reported estimates based on the size of budgets distributed for different arrangements.  
** ‘other type of provider includes: ‘public-private company’, ‘other municipal provider’, inter-municipal company as well as ‘other arrangements’.  
 
Figure 2 shows the historical development 1990-2014 of the share of total municipal budgets for 
park and road maintenance services which is spend on private contractors. Figure 2 is based on 
municipal statistics (not survey data). From 1990 to 2014, the share of the total municipal park 
maintenance budget spend on private contractors is increased from about 17 % to about 32 %. For 
municipal roads (local) the share is increased from about 36 % in 1990 to 44 % in 2014. However, 
if the share for roads includes municipal responsibilities for maintenance of some types of state 
highways, which was delegated to municipalities until 2000, the share in 1990 was about 40 %. For 
the two sectors together the budget share has increased from about 30 % in 1990 to 40 % in 2014. 
Overall the two sectors have witnessed substantial increases in budget shares spend on private 
contractors. The municipal park sector has in comparison with the municipal road sector witnessed 
the highest and most consistent increase over the years. The figure also shows that the development 
in the budget shares has been uneven and at times decreasing in both sectors. 
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Figure 2. 
Percentages of road and park maintenance budgets spend on private contractors, 1990–2014. 
 
Source: Calculations based on data from municipal statistics (Statistics Denmark).   
 
4.2 Sweden 
Section written by Ylva Noren Bretzer 
4.2.1 Introduction 
This section aims to provide an overview of the general functions and limitations of the local 
administrative public – private governing conditions within the green and black administrative tasks 
in Sweden.  
A general focus of the research project is to describe, analyze and recommend different forms 
of contracting out and to investigate different forms of contracting-out and public-private co-
operations within the technical and green areas in municipalities. The focus is on innovation and 
how to involve contractors optimally. The specific competence fields under scrutiny in this study 
are hence twofold. The first is the technical area, which further will get labeled as black 
administrative tasks; with a specific focus on the municipal road maintenance works.
7
 The second 
area is the green administrative tasks, which refer to the maintenance of municipal parks and 
recreation areas, care-taking of water and fishing areas, traffic signals and lights, snow-shoveling, 
                                                 
7
 The technical sector in the municipality normally also include city planning and building, waste and recycling, and 
water and sewage system issues. The technical sector may also include technical maintenance of own housing, 
which often is run by municipal housing companies.   
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playgrounds, bathing places etc. In short, these activities all relate to various kinds of land-use 
management.  
Before we proceed, we need to make some remarks about the Swedish case in general. 
Sweden, as its neighboring countries in Scandinavia; Finland, Norway, Denmark and Iceland, are 
known in international politics to stand out for two reasons. Each of these are unitary countries, 
which means that one constitution and body of law regulates all of the country, which is 
contradictory to federal states such as Germany or the US, where you will find different legislations 
in each and every  federal state. So, even if there are regional bodies left, these play a relatively 
weak role in the state-local relationships. What stand out in international comparison is on the other 
hand the relatively strong municipal bodies, which collect taxes from its local citizens, and the 
locally elected politicians who exercise budgetary power over these resources.  
The ideal of “municipal independence” often is referred to, and it is even noted in the Swedish 
constitution. In practice though, the municipal parliaments have to fulfill the national mandatory 
regulations first (eg. care-taking, education, nursing) before they can consider what to do with the 
left-overs. Therefore, the idea of “municipal independence” is often vastly overrated, although 
especially mid-sized and large municipalities do have a considerable share to act on. Small 
municipalities with a decreasing population on the other hand, face a harsh time to even cover up 
for the mandatory obligations. All in all, Sweden consists of 290 municipalities, ranging from 2 400 
inhabitants (Bjurholm) to 901 700 inhabitants (Stockholm). These vast differences naturally cause 
widely diverging pre-conditions for the various municipal activities and costs. 
 
Table 5.  
Municipal typology according to SALAR (2011). 
Municipal type N Municipal type n Municipal type n 
1. Large cities 3 
5. Commuter 
municipalities 
51 8. Rural municipalities 
 
20 
2. Suburban cities 38 
6. Tourism economy 
municipalities (large 
summer population, 
small winter population) 
20 
9. Municipalities in 
densely populated 
regions 
35 
3. Larger cities 31 
7. Commodity producing 
municipalities 
 
54 
10. Municipalities in 
sparsely populated 
regions 
16 
4. Suburban 
municipalities to larger 
cities 
22 
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Table 4 displays the municipal typology used by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities, 
SALAR, which often is very useful also in a research context. By analyzing similar municipalities 
together, it is most often useful to understand variations within a single category, than by working 
with variations across the full range of municipal conditions.
8
   
 
4.2.2 Public-private relationships in Sweden – a general overview 
As the core task of this project is public-private relationships, some general remarks about these 
processes should be made here (further: PP-relationships). Sweden has not remained unaffected by 
the international New Public Management-trends (NPM) of the past decades. The NPM movement 
has brought a cluster of ideas and innovations into the public sector, in order to standardise, 
effectivise and tender out what not necessarily needs to be produced “in-house” by the public sector 
itself. The public sector grew fast between 1970 up to the 1980s, and in the back-waters grew the 
criticism about the public sector being inefficient, too bureaucratic and being fearful to  
competition. The solution to the eternally growing bureaucratization problem in these days,  was to 
import role models from the private sector; the “market” and the “company” became ideals also for 
the public activities (Almqvist 2006: 11). Three core elements were introduced; tendering in 
competition, contract-steering and control. What partly happened here was that the problem of 
bureaucratic inefficiency was supposed to be solved by even more bureaucracy in terms of contract-
relationships, evaluation, and management by objectives at the same time as various detailed quality 
indicators were introduced. At the same time, citizens were transformed to “clients”, and politicians 
and top management concentrated more on budget steering and deciding on principal guidelines; 
while the translations into activities were directed downwards to executing levels in a classical 
Weberian manner (cf. Hassselbladh 2008: 197). The robotisation of skilled professions was once 
again put in the first room, in order to dampen professional demands.  
If the NPM-transformations have been successful or not, are at present under large debate in 
Sweden. Not only were these reforms introduced without “scientific evidence” which tends to be of 
great importance in the medical and social treatment areas, and which constitute important 
evaluation tools of the system itself, but the basis for the reform was more or less a scientific 
doctrine with no or little room for criticism. NPM-reforms has since the early 1990s been 
                                                 
8
 As the distribution of the municipalities are not normally distributed, but rather exponential, hence is it most often 
most useful to transform municipal sizes to a logarithmic scale.  
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introduced in child and elderly care, hospital processes, social work, labor market matching and 
care for the disabled. About one out of five employed in the welfare-sector is privately employed 
today, which is a great increase of the private share, according to Hartman 2011:258. She edited a 
book together with several of the previous pro-reform researchers, with the intention to evaluate 
what evidence there were for the reform effects. The results were meagre; they found little or no 
clear evidence for improved efficiency in the mentioned sectors. Rather, competition was 
concentrated to the urban areas (as many different providers can find their markets there)
9
, ideas 
about ‘customer choice’ followed the same pattern, and they found vast information asymmetries as 
quality indicators are lacking; as people tend to measure what is possible to measure (input 
measures) instead of output measures relating to quality. Her book caused a large debacle in the 
Swedish media, and her position as research officer at the SNS was withdrawn.
 10
 As a 
consequence, a reputable university professors resigned from SNS and a number of professors 
wrote a critical debate article about the incident in the Daily News (national news-paper).
11
   
Where these reforms or transformations are going are yet too early to be known. We know 
that NPM is about steering, or its intentions are to gain stricter control over organisations (Hall 
2012). However, this seems to take place to the price of the autonomy of professional expertise; the 
unions of the doctors, the policemen and school teachers have jointly criticized the present 
developments.
12
 What must be noted in addition is that contracting out in the green sector initially 
does not seem to be any complicated matter; rather, I believe most of the locally green tasks have 
been kept “in-house” without any larger NPM reforms, meaning that the traditional bureaucratic 
model applies here. This comment relates to the small share of the public responsibilities regarding 
green areas, here we mostly talk about green lawns, parks and public areas within the city borders. 
The “black sector” in the municipalities, referring to road maintenance may be conducted after 
occasional procedures of tendering, and sometimes by own personnel. But before we enter into this 
discussion in further detail, we need to elaborate the contracting-out legal framework on a general 
level, as the exercise of partnerships and similar constellations.  
                                                 
9
 In larger cities, the general assumptions of a free market are much more applicable, compared to the smaller 
municipalites or rural areas. In larger cities you find a plurality of providers, hopefully no or little monopolisaton, 
and information is perfect for both buyers and sellers.  
10
 SNS is short for the Study organisation for Business and Society (sv. Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle). 
One resigned professor was Olof Peterson. Further on, the Chief Executive Officer at SNS resigned.  
11
 http://www.dn.se/debatt/sns-har-fallit-undan-for-naringslivets-patryckningar/ 
12
 http://www.dn.se/debatt/vara-yrken-har-kidnappats-av-ekonomernas-modeller/ 
See also http://www.sjukhuslakaren.se/2013/09/09/nara-9-000-har-skrivit-pa-uppropet-idag/  
and http://professionsforbundet.se/ 
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4.2.3 The Public Procurement Act in Sweden 
Historically, public procurement was stated in the Ordinance of public procurement (1986:336), 
which directed the state level. Local governments’ and regional regulations were not initially stated 
in the national law, but the locally decided procurement regulations related to the national 
formulations. From January 1994 and onwards, it followed from the EES agreement that Sweden 
should implement the EC directive on public procurement, and in Sweden we decided to regulate 
public trade below the threshold values (B-services)(Sveman 2009:9). The present law 
(2013:2007:1091) on public procurement (in short: LOU) was set into effect from January 2008, 
and it supports the EU directive 2004/18/EG on public procurement. A novelty was however 
introduced here; services within water, energy, transport and postal services were not included in 
the LOU. Instead, these services follow the law (2007:1092) on procurement of water, energy, 
transport and postal services (in short: LUF).  
 
The central point of discussion has been whether LOU applies in municipalities when buying 
services from municipally owned companies.
13
 The revised version of LOU, in effect from January 
2013, allows municipalities to buy from own companies without applying LOU (a specific “in-
house” exception).
14
 This means that municipalities that run green and/or black services in publicly 
owned company forms, or in associations with other municipalities, does not necessarily need to 
activate LOU in order to maintain their ordinary tasks. When tendering building concessions, also 
separate legal frameworks applies. Various forms of public-private partnerships are not regulated at 
the EU level either, nor it is on the national level. But when public/private constellations need to 
buy something, the LOU regulations should get applied, or parallel regulations for concessions (for 
example in building projects).  
 
4.2.4 The exercise of different forms of partnerships 
Public policies often refer to partnerships in often a very loose and imprecise ways. Partnerships are 
semantically positive, but they may hide potential conflicts. Partnerships were probably invented in 
                                                 
13
 The Teckal case (C-107/98).  
14
http://brs.skl.se/skbibl/cirkdoc.jsp?searchpage=brsbibl_cirk.htm&search1_cnr=12%3A50&op1=&type=&db=CIR
K&from=1&toc_length=20&currdoc=1 
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the international relations context, where collaborative processes between world business actors and 
public actors especially took off at the Earth summit in Johannesburg in 2002. Thereafter, the 
World Business Commission for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) was established as the 
governments of the world had declared that ‘we cannot achieve sustainability without the business 
sector’. Further, the Millenium Development Goals is also working in a public-private (PP) spirited 
manner, and similar processes also relate to issues of clean water and deforestation.  
In the European Union, it has for long been the core idea that projects that apply for funding 
should constitute partnerships between public, private and also civil society associations, when 
possible. The more recent Europe 2020 strategy further emphasize the need to involve project 
partners from local to national levels, and from public as private sectors.
15
 There have been many 
EU projects unfolding in Sweden, primarily directed towards socially weak areas, which have put 
private and public actors into a horizontal collaboration mode, which substantially have loosened up 
the private/public divide which traditionally has been the pattern. These projects have normally 
been quite limited in scope, the EU has supported a large share of the financial resources, but the 
public and private actors also had to put their shares on-to the table. Projects have been limited in 
time and scope, and they have undergone surveillance from the County Councils or national 
authorities in Sweden.  
Another group of partnerships are the Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) which often relate to 
large investment projects. Famous examples in Sweden are the Arlanada airport railway (finished 
2000) and the New Karolinska
16
, a new hospital under construction in Stockholm. Core incentives 
here are that the partners share the risks, and that public partners often can get more advantageous 
capital rents than private actors can. Problems that need to be sorted out are the future ownership of 
the project, future maintaining responsibilities and total project costs. These kinds of models have 
also transferred to the local level, as they often have previous experience from partnered projects in 
the social area.
17
 However, another risk is that the partnering concept circumvents the LOU-
procedures in such a way that either known contacts get a preference, or the municipality binds 
itself too close to one partner and later-on it becomes problematic to replace the partner with a more 
advantageous competitor.
18
 There is a risk that the intentions of LOU in these circumstances are 
                                                 
15
 European Commission (2014) and Kappeler & Nemoz (2010).  
16
 http://upphandling24.idg.se/2.1062/1.337902/sveriges-storsta-ops-projekt 
17
 http://www.skl.se/vi_arbetar_med/valfrihet/driftformer/offentlig_och_privat_partnerskap 
18
 There is a right according to LOU to conduct a Competitive dialogue (sv. konkurrenspräglad dialog) with 
possible partners before a public tender is official.  
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bypassed by PPP.
19
 On the other hand, many earlier investments that could not happen solely on 
market terms, nor entirely on private terms, will get realized with the PPP model. It is necessary that 
the decision-makers have all the information on the table when entering these kinds of projects.  
 
4.2.5 Public-private contracting in the Swedish context 
Contracting out in the green and black areas started at national level, as the LOU first applied to the 
state level when it was introduced back in 1986. The Swedish Transport Administration (which was 
constructed by a merger of the Swedish Road administration, the Swedish Railway Administration, 
the Air transport administration and the Maritime Administration), and in their responsibility for the 
long-term maintenances of various transport systems, the share that was contracted out was 22 
percent of the total turkney contracts (sv. totalentreprenader). Also, consulted contracts were 20 
percent (Year report Trafikverket 2013: 78).  
Contracting issues were not mentioned in the yearly report for the Swedish Transport Agency 
or in the report of the Environmental Protection Agency, nor was it stated in the report from the 
National Heritage Board. However, the latter contained complaints about too many contracts that 
had been appealed against, which causes delays for archeological digs etc.  
 
Table 6.  
National administration agencies within green and technical areas 
 
State agency 
 
Responsibilities 
Size (Msek20 costs per 
year; number of 
employees21) 
The Swedish Transport 
Administration 
(sw. Trafikverket) 
Is responsible for the long-term planning of the railways, road 
system, shipping, and air transport systems. Also responsible for 
construction and maintenance of state road and railway 
networks 
 
35 Msek,  
7 004 employed 
The Swedish Transport Agency  
(sw. Transportstyrelsen) 
Is working out regulations, supporting the quality of the 
transport services, and maintain registers of the transport 
vehicles.  
1 Msek 
1 853 employed 
The Swedish Environmental 
Protection Agency 
(sw. Naturvårdsverket) 
Protection and administration of national parks (18 600 acres in 
total, of which 11 700 acres are productive) 
Monitoring of environmental objectives 
Monitoring of how environmental policy tools operate in 
practice 
1,4 Msek
22 
508 employed 
The Swedish Forest Agency 
(sw. Skogsstyrelsen) 
Protection of the forestry landscape in a long-term sustainable 
production. 
Protection of cultural heritage values.  
1,1 Msek 
1 456 employed 
                                                 
19
 The 2008 crisis bear some evidence that sometimes projects had started without the sufficient resources. See for 
example EPEC (2009). The financial crisis and the PPP market.  
20
 Msek refers to billion Swedish crowns, SEK, which is the national currency.   
21
 Including temporary employed.  
22
 A large share of this amount was used to buy land and forests for, to be included into the national protection plan.  
INOPS  Technical report 
 
52 
The Swedish National Heritage 
Board 
(sw. Riksantikvarieämbetet) 
 Preservation and restoration of historic environments 
 Archeological commissions 
 Archives 
0,43 Msek 
371 employed 
Sources: Information in the table is based on data from yearly reports in each authority. (Trafikverkets årsredovisning 
2013; Transportstyrelsens årsredovisning 2013; Naturvårdsverkets årsredovisning 2013; Skogsstyrelsens 
årsredovisning 2013; Riksantikvarieämbetets årsredovisning 2013).   
 
Table 6 displays the primary national agencies with responsibilities for the transport systems at 
large, as environmental protection, forestry and cultural heritage issues. The Swedish Forest 
agency
23
 do not support or maintain forest land. Rather, they act as the governmental authority in 
relation to the mostly private forest owners, as roughly 50 percent of the forest land is privately 
owned, while around 40 percent is publicly owned by state agencies or by companies run by the 
state.
24
 The primary task of the Forest agency is to secure that the forest laws and regulations are 
respected. This is conducted by continuous surveillance and close collaboration with County 
administrations. 
4.2.6 Public-private contracting from state to local level in Sweden 
What is the legal framework in order to strengthen the contractual practices within the green and 
black areas in Sweden? As we saw in the previous section, when we talk about forest land it is 
either in private hands, or placed in state-owned companies.
25
 In this regard, it doesn’t seem to be 
necessary to contract out the forest maintenance, as it primarily is done by “in-house” employees. A 
qualified issue here is of course whether publicly owned company activities ought to be labelled as 
“public” or “private”; which not either the practice is applying along any coherent lines. Ownership 
and profit-making is clearly the public, but in statistical terms in the public budgetary records, 
companies of all kinds are clearly labelled as private.
26
 At the national level, it seems to be most 
relevant to discuss tendering in the (black) construction sector when dealing with either producing 
new roads, or maintaining the present road infrastructure. As a matter of fact, it is hopeless to get a 
general overview of the level of public tendering in Sweden at the moment. The recent investigation 
SOU 2011:73 states that “about half of the public tenders that take place are missing in the tenders 
                                                 
23
 www.skogsstyrelsen.se 
24
 50 percent of the Swedish forest land is privately owned, while about 40 percent is owned by state owned or by 
state-owned companies.  
25
 The state-owned forestry company Sveaskog owns some 4,1 million acres out of which 3,1 is productive land. 
This ownership represents 14 percent of the Swedish forestry (Sveaskog årsredovisning 2013).  
26
 This is agued on the basis of statistical records dealing with the employed workforce in Sweden, and the national 
GDP accounts which count the companies to the private side – as they operate underneath the Limited companies 
Act (sw. Aktiebolagslagen 2005:551).  
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Sweden reports to the EU”, due to inadequate statistics in the field. The Swedish Competition 
Authority  issued a report stating that the number of public tenders in 2011 were 19 314, where 
municipalities and regions together were responsible for 19% of the total, government for 
additional 20%, and public companies and other were responsible for the last 29% 
(Konkurrensverket 2013:10, p. 14, 18).  
As Konkurrensverket rightly points out in their report from 2013, public expenses as share of 
GNP is not the same as public purchases. Public expenses consist of transfers (allowances), salaries, 
rents etc. In addition, the public budget is strengthened by income fees on various services (road 
taxes in Stockholm and Gothenburg for example). Public purchases therefore consist of publicly 
financed private goods (sv. sociala naturaförmåner
27
) (21%), Usables (58%) and investments 
(21%) (Konkurrensverket 2013:9, p. 19). Figure 3 illustrates this conceptual limitation, where 
purchases under the LOU/LUF regulations may not necessarily be part of the public expenses, as 
publicly owned companies are registered as private purchases, but also apply the LOU/LUF 
regulations.  
 
Figure 3.  
The limitations of public puchases under the LOU or LUF regulations. 
 
Source: Konkurrensverket 2013:9, p. 9.  
 
On the other hand, all public purchases may not be in focus for LOU/LUF as about 2/3 of these 
expenses relate to salaries and transfers (social security, social welfare, employment security etc).  
 
                                                 
27
 This is defined as services that citizens “buy” from private providers, such as childcare, education, health-services 
or medicines, which are privately provided but publicly financed.  
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4.2.7 Institutional frameworks in the ‘green’ and ‘black’ areas in Sweden 
The tendering practices in Sweden has clearly evolved over time, driven by the EU legislations 
originating from 2004/17/EG and 2004/18/EG to the most recent updates; KOM(2011)15, the 
Green paper on the modernization of EU public procurement policy, (summarized in table 2 
below). On national level, the Law (2007:1091) on public procurement has been into effect 
applying to all public actors when purchasing tools or services above certain threshold values.
 28
 An 
on-going discussion for many years was, whether public agencies had to tender a service publicly, 
let’s say in energy supplies, if it at the same time was the owner of an energy producing and 
supplying company. In the Teckal-criteria expressed in Swedish law in 2013 (but based on the 
Teckal case from 1999, C-107/98 Teckal), public agencies can buy from own companies or 
association in which the municipality is a member without tendering, if the tendered 
service/products are the primary activity of that company or association.  
The state agency with special responsibility to look after, or surveil, competition issues is the 
Swedish Competition Authority (sw. Konkurrensverket). Their primary tasks are to enhance free 
and fair competition in the Swedish markets, and supporting an effective procurement in the public 
and private markets. They also support with judicial recommendations in these matters, and they 
also exercise surveillance over the on-going tendering activities on the Swedish markets. All 
tendering activities are channeled through a number of private actors, see for example and 
www.opic.com, www.visma.se, www.upphandlingsstod.se and http://upphandling24.idg.se. A ‘cost-
free’ alternative is www.e-avrop.com. The national agency Kammarkolleget (no translation exists) 
was earlier responsible for publishing the tendering calls and contracts, but has recently handed it 
over to private actors. Instead they should, in collaboration with The Swedish Competition 
Authority, update the guidelines for the market actors. They will get published winter 2014/15.
29
   
Table 7 displays a brief overview of the national institutional framework which at a general 
level regulates the national framework concerning rules of the public purchasing game. When it 
comes to the green and black areas specifically, the LOU must be complemented by various quality 
standard instruments, securing the politically agreed quality standards of these resources. The green 
                                                 
28
 The upper limit for direct procurement is € 54 600 after 1 July, 2014, even if specific documentation is needed 
from contracts exceeding € 10 800 (or 100 000 SEK). This relates to LOU organisations.  
Threshold values are exercised for state authorities a above € 134 000, or € 207 000 for municipal agencies, which 
states when full LOU is excercised (B-contracts). For building orders full LOU applies for contracts over € 
5 186 000 (A-contracts, state as local agencies). The stated thresholds are updated every second year 
(Konkurrensverket (2014). Upphandlingsreglerna – en introduction. s. 13). ISBN 978-91-88566-25-6.   
29
 www.kkv.se/t/Page____9719.aspx 
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area is somewhat more difficult to pin-point which quality standards are in focus, apart from the 
more general Environmental code which applies over all environmental issues.
30
 On the other hand, 
the recommendations provided by Movium are scientifically founded, but unclear to what extent 
they also are publicly sanctioned. In the black sector on the other hand, there’s much more public 
elaboration on what specific quality properties roads should exhibit, in order not to be lethal or to 
cause damage to motorists using them. There’s also a general regulation for how roads and streets 
are allowed to be designed
31
, which is not elaborated to the same extent for local parks and alike. 
The latter case is much more up to deliberation between local politicians, tenants and house-owners 
in the neighboring surroundings and public discussions on how to design – or protect – a common 
green area when the Planning and building Act is claimed.  
 
Table 7.  
Institutional frameworks and support systems for tendering in green and black areas 
Institutional level Frames and support systems 
Primary EU law  2004/17/EG: procurement coordination for water, energy, transport and postal services 
 2004/18/EG: coordination of procedures for the award of public works, public supply contracts and 
public service contracts 
 KOM (2011)15: Green paper on the modernization of EU public procurement policy 
National law  Law (2007:1091) on public procurement, LOU 
- A-contracts 
- B-contracts  
- Framework contracts etc. 
 Law (2007:1092) on public procurement in the areas of water, energy, transport and postal services, 
LUF 
 January 2013: The Teckal-criterias applies, public agencies can buy from own companies without 
tendering
32
 
 From 1 July 2014, specific reasons should be documented if Direct procurement is excercised up to  
Provider of 
opened public 
tenders 
 www.konkurrensverket.se  
 www.e-avrop.com 
 www.opic.com 
 www.upphandlingsstod.se 
 http://upphandling24.idg.se 
 www.visma.se 
 Green Black 
Ordinances 
Standards 
 Environmental Code (1998:808) 
Ordinance (1998:1252) on area protection 
according to the Environmental Code etc.   
 Planning- & building Act (2010:900) 
 Green facts (Movium thinktank) 
 The Swedish Transport Administration’s 
technical demands and advice for roads
33
  
 TRVK/TRVR demands and advice
34
 
 
                                                 
30
 This might be an exaggeration, but it covers quality of water, air, the built environment, and various ways to 
protect natural resources [against more commercial resource uses]. As the public maintenances of for example 
public parks are not contested, or seldom seen in conflict with commercial uses, this law is not really the focus for 
the park administrations.  
31
 www.trafikverket.se/Foretag/Bygga-och-underhalla/Vag/Utformning-av-vagar-och-gator/ 
32
 www.kkv.se/t/Page____6333.aspx 
33
 www.trafikverket.se/Foretag/Bygga-och-underhalla/Vag/Tekniska-dokument/Tekniska-krav-och-rad/ 
34
 www.trafikverket.se/Foretag/Bygga-och-underhalla/Vag/Tekniska-dokument/Vagteknik/TRVKTRVR-kravrad/ 
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Moreover, in order to display how the ‘green’ and ‘black’ areas operate in the Swedish local 
context, we need to specify some of the fundamentals of Swedish local governments. These are 
primarily operating under the Municipal Law (1991:900), and together with the national 
Constitution, these together states that primary regulations are set in the national parliament, while 
local governments exercise and execute these laws and regulations. The local ‘self-independence’ 
mentioned earlier, makes the 290 local governments able to decide how should for example green 
and black tasks be designed, carried out, tendered; meaning that road designing is a different 
business in the cities of Stockholm or Gothenburg, compared to what it is in the most northern rural 
local constituencies. Local governments adapt to local circumstances of geography, population, 
development needs and economy. This is made through passing political decisions through each and 
every local parliament, or possibly the ‘green’ or ‘black’ boards underneath. Swedish municipalities 
have pretty extended administrations underneath the boards, it is the administrations – and 
sometimes the companies – that exercise the decisions taken at the political level. Smaller 
municipalities may also collaborate together in Municipal collaborative associations, or networks, 
in order to undertake the missions stated from the national level.
35
 Persons in municipalities dealing 
with the tendering issues may work on many different kinds of authorities, which soon shall be 
elaborated further. But before we move to the general empirical picture, we shall say something 
about how this investigation was carried out.  
 
4.2.8 A note on variations on “green tasks” and “technical administration” 
Variations in the organization of the technical administrations in Sweden are least among smaller 
municipalities. Here, both the green and black tasks were most often a responsibility on the desk of 
the Chief of technical administrations [teknisk chef]. Sometimes there is added an Operations 
Manager [driftschef] or a Street Manager [gatuchef] underneath, who is the responsible for 
management and maintenance. This information was evident at web-pages in roughly 50 to 75 
percent of the municipalities. Sometimes this information was found underneath the chief Planning 
Officer [samhällsbyggnadschef] but with no information about who’s in charge underneath of him 
                                                 
35
 See the municipal association in Norra Västmanlnad and Östra Smålands Kommunalteknikförbund, 
www.norberg.se/bo-och-bygga/information-om-nvk and http://osk.hultsfred.se/ 
In Stockholm there are signs that traffic planning, traffic maintaining and traffic entrepreneurs may form a 
collaborative networks. See further: 
www.sll.se/Global/Politik/Politiska%20organ/Trafiknamnden/2014/2014-09-23/p33-Svar-pa-skrivelse-S-
samverkan-kommun-trafikutovare-TF.pdf 
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or her. Further, problems clearly increased with size, in larger municipalities there could be many 
different positions, and it took more effort to find the right persons out. Persons can be ‘at the top’ 
of his/her administration, or pretty ‘deep down’ in the organizational capillaries. Variations found 
were for example:  
 
 Sometimes it is the internal procurement unit that holds these tasks coherently underneath 
the Head administrative office, but they act as a LOU competence resource – but they don’t 
sit on the detailed quality specifications 
 Green and black procurement tasks were placed at ‘development units’, instead of at 
planning or technical offices (about 10) 
 Outsourcing or sharing these responsibilities with other municipalities (Vadstena & Motala)  
 Street maintenance at municipal Energy Companies, or ‘technical services’ in a municipal 
company
36
 (10 to 20 municipalities) 
 
In larger cities, responsibilities could be shared between Street Managers, Parks & nature, City 
Planning office, Technical administration, Traffic department, Development unit, Energy 
companies or even town boroughs. 
 
                                                 
36
 The municipal Street Manager could be placed at a municipal company (few cases).  
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4.3 Norway 
Section written by Merethe Dotterud Leiren 
 
As the literature is limited, supplementary interviews have been carried out with representatives of 
key interest groups, representing local park and road services: Park, Bath and Sports and 
Norwegian Association of Municipal Engineers. Information has also been gathered from civil 
servants in two municipalities: one large (Oslo) and one small municipality (Kvinnherad).  
4.3.1 Laws and regulations 
Norway is a not an EU member and therefore does not participate in the EU legislation processes. 
However, EU rules addressing the common market apply in Norway as the country is a member of 
the European Economic Area (i.e. Norway is obliged to transpose EU law). EU influence has been 
extensive in the Norwegian transport sector. According to the white paper ‘Outside and Inside: 
Norway’s agreements with the European Union’ (NOU 2012: 2), the number of transposed 
legislative EU acts in Norway have been the second-greatest in the transport sector – only second 
after the food sector.  
 One key law, which adheres to the EU Procurement Directive (2004/17/EC), is the Public 
Procurement Act. It requires that all public procurements above a certain threshold adhere to the 
rules of competition.  
 Other important national laws include regulations of different organisational types, for 
example the Limited Liability Companies Act, which regulates all types of such companies – public 
as well as private. Another law is the Local Authority Act
37
, which regulates municipal and inter-
municipal undertakings.  
 For roads, the Road Act regulates safe planning, building, maintenance and operation of roads 
with the aim of ensuring safe traffic, including consideration of other societal interests. There are 
also environmental laws that are related to parks and roads such as the Biodiversity Act 
38
, which 
regulates among others the use of plants and pesticides and the Pollution Act
39
. These are relevant 
as for example, some municipalities have experience issues, using too much salt on roads.   
                                                 
37
 http://www.handboka.no/Sak/Lover/Kommune/kol11.htm 
38
 https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2009-06-19-100 
39
 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dok/lover_regler/lover/forurensningsloven.html?id=171893 
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4.3.2 Managerial systems and standards 
There are a few managerial systems available for the park area, for example Norconsult’s ISY 
park
40
, which offer a complete management system, and Focus Anbud
41
, which offers a system for 
management of procurement processes. Both systems integrate the Norwegian Standard’s ‘NS3420’ 
which contain a service specification for horticultural works. For roads, the Norwegian Public Road 
Administration follows several national handbooks that set road standards. These are compulsory 
for national roads, while several counties have agreed to follow them; however, it is disputed as 
they are considered to increase costs by creating roads that are ‘too good’. It is not common to 
follow these handbooks among municipalities.  
4.3.3 Professional associations 
In both the park and road sector there are associations that provide support to their member 
municipalities. The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities do not has particular 
expertise with regards to parks and municipal roads; other associations are more important. Park, 
Bath and Sports
42
 is the largest interest organisation providing forums, information and competence 
development within the green areas. Its resources are based on project financing from the Ministry 
of culture, membership fees, conference and course fees and other project financing. The 
association has organised several meetings focusing on competitive tendering as a topic.  
 Similarly, for roads there is a road department within the Norwegian Association of Municipal 
Engineers
43
, which is an association for technology and the surrounding and natural environment. It 
has 110 municipalities as members from rural and urban districts. They share knowledge and 
develops standards, which are also accessible for non-members. Ten members have for example, 
recently created a common standard for digging licences. 
In addition, it should be mentioned that some municipalities have local support functions. For 
example, in Oslo there is a separate agency which focuses on framework contracts for all the 
different policy areas, which the municipality is responsible for. The municipality also has an 
internal web page about public procurement issues, which includes information about how to 
arrange for procurements etc. The civil servants working in this agency are trained in issues of 
corruption and other economic or illegal issues.  
                                                 
40
 https://www.nois.no/produkter/fdv/isy-park/ 
41
 https://www3.focus.no/produkter/focus/focus-anbud/ 
42
 http://badparkogidrett.no/ 
43
 http://www.kommunalteknikk.no/ 
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4.3.4 The built-up area and resources spent on roads and parks 
Roads and parks make up considerable amount of space and there are considerable public resources 
being spent on such services. A calculation of land use in Norway shows that land used for roads is 
39 percent and dominates the built-up area (i.e., buildings, structures and permanently sealed 
surfaces and associated areas) (Statistics Norway 2013
44
). In total, there is approximately 2,100 
km
2
 of space for road. Green areas, sports and recreational services account for 4 percent of the 
built-up area. 
 
Figure 4.  
The proportion of built-up area in Norway in 2013. 
 
(Source: Statistics Norway45) 
 
Residents of the largest cities have poorer access to areas for recreational walking compared with 
residents in smaller cities (Statistics Norway 2013
46
). This is also the case regarding access to 
smaller recreational areas, but the difference is smaller. About 44 percent of residents in all urban 
settlements have safe access to areas for recreational walking and about 43 percent have safe access 
to smaller recreational areas.  
 The following illustration shows how much resources have been spent over time on 
operational tasks for roads in the Norwegian counties (see the appendix for actual numbers, 
including numbers for municipal roads)
47
.  
                                                 
44
 http://www.ssb.no/en/arealstat 
45
 http://www.ssb.no/en/arealstat 
46
 http://www.ssb.no/en/natur-og-miljo/statistikker/arealrek/hvert-2-aar 
47
 No similar statistics found for parks. 
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Figure 5.  
Net operational costs (1,000 NOK) for county roads  
 
 
(Source: Statistics Norway) 
 
4.3.5 Different ways of organizing ‘black’ and ‘green’ public services 
While public park services are local responsibilities, road responsibilities are in the hands of three 
different political levels: national, regional and the local. Literature about how local park and road 
services are organised in Norway is lacking. The focus has mostly been on the national (e.g., Boge 
2006; Ravlum and Sørensen 2005) and regional level (Leknes and Gjerstad 2013; Leiren and 
Krogstad 2014). Therefore, the INOPS project will make an important empirical contribution to this 
field in Norway. This section gives a preliminary overview as to how local park services and local 
and regional services are organised in Norway. There are 19 counties and 430 municipalities.  
 
4.3.6 Organisation of park services 
According to one informant, there are as many ways of organising park services as there are 
municipalities. Some have organised park services with sports (this is the traditional model), others 
with buildings or roads. For example, the municipality of Kvinnherad with 13,000 inhabitants has 
organised the park responsibility together with buildings, as parks are usually in front of buildings. 
In this municipality there are not so many densely populated areas and hardly any parks along 
roads. Moreover, some municipalities (e.g., like Kvinnherad) have invested in their own equipment 
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and carry out the services internally, others borrow equipment from other municipalities or they 
have outsourced operational tasks. Some of the large cities (e.g., Oslo since 2004) have delegated 
parts of the green service provision to neighbourhoods, which traditionally take care of health 
services. This is sometimes criticised due to lack of competence in the administration of these 
neighbourhoods or among the workers, who carry out the operational tasks: for example, when 
people who receive social benefits are set to carry out park services.  
Outsourcing of park services has occurred to a lesser extent and later in Norway than in 
Denmark and Sweden. It has also occurred at a slower pace than for roads. However, there has been 
a clear development of increasing outsourcing during the last decade. Most of the largest cities have 
outsourced their park services, making use of competitive tendering. Oslo has outsourced 100 
percent of their park services. Bergen has done the same with the exception of a small area in the 
city centre. In contrast, Trondheim carries out the maintenance tasks of parks internally in the 
municipality. Trondheim has only carried out one pilot of competitive tendering in one of its 
neighbourhoods. 
When outsourcing occurred in the neighbouring countries, there were expectations about a 
transfer of such policy to Norwegian municipalities. As part of this development, some cities 
initiated a separation between the procurement body and an operator. Such re-organisation 
contributed to create a better overview of the municipal responsibilities. For example, it has been 
common to employ students during the summer months. They took care of all green areas whether 
public or private, as they did not always know what was public and what was private. In addition, to 
creating a better overview of what was actually a responsibility of the municipality, the 
municipalities started to make IT tools in order to improve the stipulation of costs based on space.  
 Several mid-sized municipalities have also outsourced their park services. Drammen was the 
first municipality to do so, around the year of 2000. Bærum followed suit as the second 
municipality to outsource its park services. Bærum created its own operation company and carried 
out some tenders where also private companies won the bids. However, this municipality has 
decided to re-integrate some of the services, arguing that competitive tendering was expensive. 
Sometimes mid-sized municipalities use competitive tendering in order to test the price level, i.e., to 
check how much they would get for a certain amount of resources. 
 Other mid-sized municipalities such as Sandnes, Skien and Porsgrunn, have internal operators 
similar to the model in Trondheim. These municipalities have not introduced competition. 
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Small municipalities usually organise their park services in the traditional way, i.e., 
administration and operation are included in the same entity internally in the municipality. 
4.3.7 Organisation of road services  
There are national, regional (i.e. county) and local road responsibilities in Norway. Since the 
delegation of 80 percent of the national road network, including ferries, to the regional level on the 
1
st
 of January 2010, the regional level is the largest road owner.  
Since the introduction of the Road Act in 1963, there has been a common administration of 
national and regional roads in Norway. Organisationally this common road administration is part of 
the Norwegian Public Roads Administration. In practice, this means that the Chief Regional Road 
Officer is head of the road administration for the national government in national road issues as well 
as for counties in regional road issues. Both the county and the national government therefore use 
services from the common road administration (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6.  
Common Road Administration in Norway  
 
(Source: Leiren and Krogstad 2014) 
 
Prior to the implementation of the decentralization reform in 2010, the Norwegian Public Roads 
Administration was responsible for implementing regional road tasks. Existing legislation, 
guidelines and handbooks provided the delegation of national and regional road responsibilities to 
the Norwegian Public Roads Administration. Some counties had additional or separate frameworks 
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and yearly supply agreements with the Norwegian Public Roads Administration, but this was not 
common.  
During the policy process of the decentralization reform, there was a discussion about 
transferring the road administrative tasks to the new regions or counties. However, the argument 
that fragmentation of the professional road knowledge would weaken the road competence made 
the political majority reject this proposal (White Paper no 12, 2006-2007: 44-45). The common road 
administration remained. Therefore, the reform is mainly a political decentralization reform and not 
so much an administrative reform. Nevertheless, the combination of increased regional 
responsibilities and the common road administration provided different opportunities as to how to 
organise regional transport policies.  
Two key organizational solutions characterize the implementation of the reform: Only one 
county (Nordland) has adopted an integrated model; the other counties have chosen a procurement 
model. In the integrated solution in Nordland, the Chief Regional Road Officer is part of the county 
administration. He has the same duties and authority as the other heads of department in the county. 
In terms of authority, he is equal to the Chief Transport Officer in the county administration. It 
means that the Norwegian Public Roads Administration carries out procedures on behalf of the 
county and has to ensure political clarifications itself – and does not leave such clarification to the 
transport department of the county (as in other counties).  
In contrast, the procurement model includes four key horizontal governance channels 
(Evaluation Group 2013): (1) transport plans with a ten-year perspective including a four-year 
action plan for the regional roads; (2) a financial plan and budget for several years; (3) a framework 
agreement between the county administration and the Norwegian Public Roads Administration, 
including general conditions, division of roles, reporting procedures and rules for deviation; and (4) 
a yearly supply agreement between the county administration and the Norwegian Public Roads 
Administration, which includes activities and resources, budget for investments and maintenance as 
well as a specified planning program.  
Among the counties that have adopted the procurement model, the extent of delegation to the 
common public road administration varies: some have taken larger steps in increasing the road 
competence within their own organisation (Evaluation Group 2013). A majority of the framework 
agreements follow a common template. Commonalities of the delegation to the Norwegian Public 
Roads Administration include case treatment, participation in administrative and political processes, 
investigation and preparations of proposals of strategic documents (e.g. regional plans), action 
INOPS  Technical report 
 
65 
programmes for regional roads, budgets and financial plans for regional roads, implementation and 
financial reports, planning and implementation of construction, operation and maintenance as well 
as continuously providing information. Some counties mention particular plans such as for bikes. 
Some of the plans follow a ‘negative principle of delegation, which means that if a responsibility 
has not been mentioned in the agreement, it is usually delegated to the Norwegian Public Roads 
Administration. 
On behalf of the counties and the national government, the Norwegian Public Roads 
Administration outsources the maintenance and construction tasks to private entrepreneurs, who 
compete for tasks via procedures of competition. This has been practiced since the 1st of January 
2003, when the national government outsourced the Norwegian Public Roads Administration’ 
production operations and established the state-owned shareholding company, Mesta AS. Prior to 
this outsourcing, the Norwegian Public Roads Administration carried out operational tasks itself. 
While there is considerable knowledge about how road services are organised at the regional 
level, there is a lack of such knowledge of local road services. In contrast to the counties, the 
Norwegian municipalities do not make use of the common road administration; rather they are in 
charge of the administration of their own services.  
There are three key organisational forms of local road responsibilities: municipal undertaking, 
internal operation or outsourcing to private entrepreneurs. The majority of small municipalities have 
internal operation. One informant argues that this is because small municipalities more easily have a 
full overview. However, organisational form is also dependent on the political constellations, where 
left-wing local governments tend to have internal operation more often than right-wing 
governments. The same informant is of the opinion that it makes more sense to operate such 
services internally in the municipality rather than outsource it, because there is no income on 
maintenance of roads, only costs. Another benefit is that the controllers or inspectors themselves 
can carry out tasks, when they discover that something is wrong (e.g., removing leafs and mend 
holes in roads). It creates less administration than having to go via external entrepreneurs and give 
them penalties.  
However, maintenance of roads during winter is often too extensive for a municipality to carry 
out by itself. Typically, municipalities therefore outsource such winter services to private operators. 
When such contracts are above the threshold in the Public Procurement Act, they initiate 
competitive tendering processes. Traditionally farmers carried out some cleaning of roads. Today 
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the tasks tend to be bigger and given to small, local enterprises, who may in some cases use 
farmers. 
The development towards increasing outsourcing of local road responsibilities started early in 
the 21
st
 century, in particular after the national government decided to separate the production 
services of the Norwegian Public Road Administration and establish Mesta AS. This created a spur 
to do the same among municipalities. For example, Oslo established the company Oslo Veg AS 
(‘Oslo Road’) as an entrepreneur on the 4
th
 of April 2001. This company represented a 
‘continuation’ of a department in the city with a history of 150 years. This department was 
responsible for contractor services, service and maintenance operations, crushed stone and asphalt 
production as well as authorised repair shop services. The aim of this outsourcing was to make the 
service production more flexible and increase efficiency by means of competition. However, Oslo 
Road went bankrupt on the 7
th
 of December 2012. It was one among several entrepreneurs with 
contracts with Oslo. Oslo had to put in place emergency contracts with other entrepreneurs over 
night, when it occurred and these contracts were not cheap. 
  
4.3.7.1 Different governance models in the ‘green’ and ‘black’ area 
Based on the descriptions above, there seem to be in particular three relevant governance models: 
 
1. A political entity – with an administrative procurement agency – and delegation of tasks to 
entrepreneurs either via: 
a. competitive tendering 
b. negotiations 
 
2. A political entity – which delegates production tasks to entrepreneurs either via 
a. competitive tendering 
b. negotiations 
 
3. A political entity which carries out the production tasks itself 
 
None of the informants is aware of any inter-municipal companies or inter-municipal cooperation in 
this field; nor does existing literature on such organisational forms mention roads or parks 
specifically. In such research reports, the labels of policy areas are at a higher level, for example it 
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could be that roads are part of ‘technical services’ in such studies. We therefore do not know 
whether such organisational forms exist within the policy areas of parks and roads in Norway.  
The governance structures in the models mentioned above are either hierarchical or horisontal. 
The lines ( – ) illustrate the horizontal chains of contracts between the different responsible entities. 
In the third model of internal operation, the governance structure is hierarchical.  
The administrative procurement agency and/or the entrepreneurs may be organised as 
shareholding companies or as municipal undertakings. It means that the political body may steer in 
terms of being owners as well as being procurers (Leiren et al., 2014). When the shares of 
shareholding companies are in public hands, the board of such companies may consist of 
professional and/or political representatives. Political influence as owners occurs via the general 
assembly. The ability of politicians to steer a municipal undertaking is somewhat larger than 
steering a shareholding company. In a municipal undertaking, the ownership steering occurs via a 
council.  
4.3.7.2 Horizontal governance structures: contracts and the development of contracts 
In the context of horizontal governance, including public and the private actors, state control is not 
direct but indirect via an agreement or contract. The contracts may be more or less specified in 
terms of what the operators are supposed to do (e.g., cut the grass, keep the parks and streets clean, 
empty garbage bins, put gravel or salt on winter roads). When a municipality launches a new call 
for proposals, it typically makes use of existing contracts and then try to improve it, asking 
questions like, ‘What do we want the new contract to provide us with?’ The civil servants may look 
to contracts in other areas to see if there is something, they can learn from them. 
The informants mention three key aspects related to contract formulation. One issue is about the 
duration of contracts. In Kvinnherad and Oslo the duration of the contracts is four years. If they are 
shorter, they have an option for an extension. Duration is important as it says something about the 
ability or willingness of the contractor to for example, invest in the necessary equipment. It might 
be willing to make larger investments if the contract period is long. 
Another question is the size of the contracts. Contract size is important as it affects the number 
of companies that are able to attend a competition and therefore the price level. Small companies 
are not be able to join a competition, where the contracts are too large. Currently there is a 
discussion in Oslo whether the contracts are too large. However, so far the competition has worked 
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well. According to the informant, the contractors have ‘stretched’ far in order to win, but some big 
companies have been more successful than others. 
A third issue is about how much risk the municipality should take: whether the risk should be 
placed in the hands of the municipality or the contractor. For example, it is always uncertain 
whether there will be a lot of snow in winter. If the contractor gets paid for snow removal, and there 
is no snow, the municipality pays for services that are not carried out.  
 
4.3.7.3 Democratic accountability 
As mentioned, in the context of horizontal governance, political steering may be indirect. One 
informant argues that the politicians are not involved in designing contracts. However, the 
politicians make the budget and the administration has developed standards, which shows the 
politicians what they get for how much. There is also extensive political guidance. Sometimes there 
is too much such guidance, according to one informant, because the administration may see the 
need for increased maintenance of roads (i.e., there is a large back-log on roads), while the 
politicians may be more interested in operational tasks such as ensuring that the streets are clean. 
A search on the internet suggests that a number of municipalities have a web page, where 
citizens can report to the municipality that in their neighbourhood there is a hole in the road, lack of 
snow removal, needs for trimming the edges and so on. In many cases local newspapers also play a 
role in such reporting. Oslo has also developed an application, where people can leave messages 
behind. Last year Oslo received about 20,000 inquiries, but some of the inquiries are reports about 
the same case.  
 
4.3.7.4 Control of contractors 
While all municipalities have a road inspector, a consequence of the increasing use of private 
entrepreneurs is that the municipalities increase their controlling tasks. Oslo has 12-13 control 
engineers, who ensure that the contractors implement and adhere to the contracts. Contract breaches 
are punished with penalties. Oslo also arranges meetings with the contractors every 14 days, where 
they go through what has to be done.  
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4.3.7.5 Complexity and competence 
According to one informant, it is a concern that several municipal administrations do not have the 
necessary procurement competence. It relates to the complexity of regulations. One informant 
argues, ‘The acquisition rules are rigid and difficult. Among the entrepreneurs, only the big, heavy 
construction companies have the necessary expertise and the resources. The regulations are “tiring” 
for the public administration as well.’ Another informant describes an administration that closely 
collaborates with lawyers, when working on the requirements in the contracts. In Oslo there are 
examples of litigation, where the private entrepreneur and the municipality have met in Court. Such 
cases have been related to the acquisition process, i.e., an entrepreneur has been disqualified to join 
the competition. 
The issue of competence relates not only to complex regulations, but also operational 
knowledge. On the one hand, several of the informants argue that when the operational tasks are in 
the hands of the municipality, the ‘ownership’ of the area is larger. In contrast, a result of 
outsourcing is that the specialist environment in the public administration is damaged. In their view, 
even if standards exist, lacking operational knowledge makes it difficult to design good 
programmes and contracts. The actors on the other side of the table have a lot more training. 
Without the necessary competence procurements may end up being very expensive, even without 
improved quality. One informant argues that this is particularly clear when it comes to additional or 
unexpected events, where private entrepreneurs charge much higher prices than for the ordinary 
services that are included in the contracts. The private entrepreneurs are considered powerful in 
such negotiations. Another informant argues that this is a question of how much risk the 
municipality is willing to and can afford to take in contracts. Another argues that it is crucial to 
keep a competent administration within the municipality with employees, who can take care of 
extra-ordinary events themselves, without having to go via contract partners. 
Informants also argue that if the procurement body is competent, outsourcing and competitive 
tendering may work well. It depends on the parameters in addition to price level that are included in 
the contracts, e.g., environmental aspects and type of equipment.  
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4.4 The United Kingdom 
Section written by Johanna Selin  
 
4.4.1 Introduction  
There have been many different models of public procurement in England and hence England has 
come to be a benchmarking country for innovative ways of organizing this aspect. As one of the 
countries most dedicate to the New Public Management regime, the country did challenge the 
traditional model of public administration early on by market-oriented systems for the handling of 
public services. The local authorities have since the 1970s and the Thatcher government, been an 
arena for experimentation of this neo-liberal ideology. 
The relation between local and central government is also one marked by a special and 
somewhat tense relation that has its roots in the Victorian era. In England, as a contrast to many of 
its European neighbours, central government is interfering with the business of local government to 
a great extent. Even after many years talk about localism and decentralization, the power is still 
highly centralized.  
The picture is further complicated by the fact that the organization of the local level in itself is 
acknowledged to be complex and fairly messy. Since the 1990s reorganizations of local government 
has been conducted a couple of times to make it easier to grasp but also to function more efficient 
and better. This complexity does make it difficult to unravel where responsibilities lay. During my 
time working with this report, I have found it hard the get a clear picture of the ways things are 
appointed and which regulations and/or incentives that have been the valid ones.  
One thing that can be stated is that the different shapes of public procurement that the country has 
tried, has left marks in the public sector. The starting point was the Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering under Thatcher, with consequences of diminishing transparency in local politic 
procedures, a rise in unemployment for public service workers and a great change in the 
organization of public services affected. A lot of this changed under the New Labour Party, but the 
route towards managerial models instead of bureaucracy remained, even if it now was called Best 
Value System. The development has continued with more new ways for arranging public sector. 
Central government has been pushing local authorities to involve private actors and continue the use 
of competition as a mechanism for cutting costs and improving quality. Focus has now developed 
INOPS  Technical report 
 
71 
into public tendering through partnerships and private finance initiatives. There might even be 
indications on an entirely new approach to partnership and an in-sight into the importance of the 
relational aspects when working in these constellations. As such, it seems that England will 
continue to try and develop new ways of using public tendering in public sector. 
4.4.2 Marketization and local government organization in the UK 
There is this notion that New Public Management was “born” in the UK. If not thoroughly true at 
least the NPM model is one significant element of the so-called marketization trend shaping the 
UK, as well as other Western countries. This concept is funded on the public choice theory where 
the problem is bureaucracy and the solution is competitive pressure. That public organisations and 
authorities shall operate as market-oriented companies cause to reconstructions of the public sector 
and leads to new forms for organizing the state to develop. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
UK is viewed as a benchmark when it comes to different ways of engage private actors in carrying 
out public services. The country was one of the earliest ones rearranging the public sector according 
to ideology of marketization, spurred on by the Thatcher government. 
The UK has an old model for governing, it goes back to the 17
th
 century, but they do not have 
a written constitution, as for example Sweden does. Theoretically this means that the parliament is 
able to decide on whatever they want to. Not being the actual case, parliament has a number of 
regulations of historical significance regulating this possibility. The constitution is therefore 
flexible, easily changed when needed, which is a quality looked upon with a sense of pride.  
The UK has a parliamentary government with the parliament consisting of two houses, the House of 
Lords, made up of 749 members who are appointed, and the House of Commons with its 659 
members of parliament, also called MPs. These are elected directly and each MP representing one 
specific area of the country. The party with a majority of MPs in the Commons will form the 
government. Head of government is the prime minister, today, the leader of the conservative party, 
namely David Cameron. It is he how forms the government by choosing ministers from both 
Houses. The Crown, or monarchy, still plays a part, if so today a more ceremonial one, but is a part 
of the parliament (Parliament, 2014). 
The arrangement of the executive is based on the Westminster model, a most traditional 
model. It is best described as a top-down model where central government is the quintessence of 
governing, uniting the country as a whole (Richards, 2011:30-31). This model has been, and is 
being, challenged. With a growing regionalist notion the unifying role is under pressure, 
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fragmentation of public service into private and voluntary approaches is seen as a sign of the 
diminishing ability of the central state and even the public ethos itself is questioned by the new 
managerial forms introduced in the country. These reforms, meaning to rearrange the way public 
sector works, to achieve better quality, a more efficient governing and smaller public spending 
could be described as governance. There is no longer one actor to decide the shape and form of 
public sector, there are many, where central government is just one of them. Which results in new 
ways of organizing public sector, based on principles of networks and markets (ibid., 2011:31-32).  
 
4.4.3 Marketization 
The influence of marketization on the UK policies and politics has been huge. The UK is in many 
ways a benchmarking country when it comes to trying out and developing new forms for arranging 
public services. Taking off under the Thatcher era with the introduction of Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering, a wish to minimize and create a more efficient public sector, to today’s central concept 
strategic commissioning and the encouragement of partnerships of different kinds. It is a 
development from the traditional contracting-out with one commissioner and many possible 
contractors, to a more collaborative way of working and a more complex procurement process 
(Bovaird, 2006).  
During the 1980’s, the essentials of marketization were an almost overall conviction. The 
New Right Agenda was gaining ground and in 1979 Margret Thatcher became prime minister. New 
Public Management (NPM) is one of the more famous descriptions of the different reforms and 
changes made to public sectors. Its neoclassical notion originates from the theories of public choice 
and rational choice that sees the bureaucratic model as wasteful and as such has to be cured with 
competition and performance measurements.   
In the beginning of the 1970, Europe experienced an economic crisis, affecting the financial 
situation in many European countries. In the UK, decreasing public sector seemed a necessity to 
modernize and stabilize the country. The public sector was considered too big and too inefficient 
and to make public sector more cost-efficient, competition on a market was seen as the way to 
improve and cut expenditures for public sector deliverance. It does not matter who is delivering the 
service; private, public, third sector, as long as the selection has been done through competition on a 
market (Boyne 1998). NPM replaced the traditional bureaucratic form for public administration and 
was followed by privatisations and the introduction of new models for arranging government and its 
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services. To make public services more efficient and accountable were the leading words and 
motivated the reorganisation of public administration (Gill-McLure, 2013; Kuhlman, 2010). A great 
confidence in the market as the best problem solver was at the core for the government and it 
changed the way the country was organized and how the public services should be carried out 
(Boyne, 1998). To push especially local government towards embracing more private actors on the 
public service arena was a question of priority for the Thatcher government (Painter, 1991). There 
was also an aim to increase central control over the actions of local government as a way to 
minimize the risk of challenging agendas from the left. The now famous quotation from Nicholas 
Ridley, then Environment Secretary, illustrates this: 
 
”The root cause of rotten local services lies in the grip which local government unions have over 
those services in many parts of the country.  … Our competitive tendering provisions will smash 
that grip once and for all. The consumer will get better quality services at lower cost” (Local 
Government Chronicle 4 April 1989, p. 1). 
 
When the Labour party under Tony Blair took the power there was a change in the way public 
sector was described, it was to be modernized and instead of focusing on only efficiency there 
would be a move towards quality instead. Their aim was to soften the regulations of market 
principles and the great influence of central government on local authorities and reform the way 
public sector was to be organized. It is possible to argue that the shift to the subject of securing 
“best value” instead of efficiency through competition did not mean a shift from the NPM tendency 
nor did the influence from central government over local authorities decline. It did only pose a 
different way of conceptualizing marketization and the neo-classical economic ways of viewing 
government and public sector. The use of performance targets and monitoring of these was 
developed as a tool for delivering the best service and the service the people actually wanted. Public 
procurement took a more partnership kind of look where collaboration was a key word (Bovaird, 
2006). The Blair government has since then been accused of doing the opposite to strengthen local 
government and instead accumulate power in central government. His successor, Gordon Brown, 
was on the other hand seen as too weak as a leader and his government did neither relocate power 
outside government or increase spending on public sector (Richards, 2011:39). 
The Coalition government that runs the country since 2010 have made severe cuts in public 
sector, the most significant ones since 1945 (Cowley, Hay & Heffernan, 2010:3). After the 
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economic crises in 2008 minimizing public expenditures has been seen as a solution to the 
country’s situation. At the same time the Coalition has continued and intensified the softer approach 
in the aspects of decentralization and localism. Their strategy included put an end to what they 
called Labour’s “big government” behavior where the state centralized more and more power, 
interfering on all levels of government. The Coalition saw this as one reason for diminishing 
quality, and inefficient organization, of public services. Instead, they established the concept of 
“Big Society” which meant a more direct influence on the shaping of society from the people 
affected and a greater permission to organize public sector with the help from not only public sector 
actors. 
Give the power back to the people has been their choice of words and democracy rather than 
bureaucracy (Richards, 2011:46). Meaning a greater involvement of third and private sector, which 
hitherto, leads to a bigger freedom to organize society as suitable and in best possible way. By 
giving away some of the central control, the Coalition are aiming to reduce government spending 
and the size of the public sector. The rise of the Coalition itself is something unusual for the UK, as 
the common way is a government with at party in majority. The collaboration between 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats and the creation of a hung parliament, is also seen by some as 
another indication on how the Westminster model is challenge (Cowley, Hay & Heffernan, 2011:1). 
As for today the neo-liberal agenda is still vivid and this discourse affects the changes and policies 
the government presents. One of the most important components of public service deliverance and 
also in managing this sector is the local governments (McEldowney, 2003). This leads to an 
interesting situation because it is today seen as a cornerstone for a well-functioning state and 
something essential to have a strong local government where decision-making is decentralised. At 
the same time many countries are following a neo-liberal discourse, which are questioning this 
notion. (Kuhlman, 2010) And the UK, in great contrast with many of the other OECD-countries, is 
a country that has a considerable central dominance over the whereabouts of the local governments. 
Even after the Coalition’s admittance and effort to lower this sort of interference, the UK still stands 
out when it comes to the possible ways of self-governing on the local level. 
 
4.4.4 Local government 
The way local government looks shows a great variation. The UK consists of the national 
government in Westminster but do also have devolved governments in Scotland, Northern Ireland 
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and Wales. Together with England these are the four countries of the UK. As this report mainly 
covers England this area will be the one presented. The local level is today organized in 56 unitary 
authorities, 36 metropolitan districts and 27 shire counties split into 201 (non-metropolitan) 
districts, as well as Greater London. The counties are two-tier administrative bodies and consist of 
the non-metropolitan districts as the lower-tier area. The functions are divided between the two 
levels, as is the most suitable for them and also the most efficient. In the 1990’s the unitary 
authorities were introduced. They are single-tier authorities and have all the responsibilities 
associated with local government. The metropolitan district councils were until 1986 sub-ordinated 
a metropolitan county council, which since then are abolished. They are single-tier counties with the 
same responsibilities as their district equivalents. London is two-tier council of its own, consisting 
of 32 boroughs and they have the same status, more or less, as the metropolitan districts (Office for 
National Statistics, 2014). 
Local governments are responsible for a variety of services, both through in-house 
management but also indirectly by contracting out. The two-tier system is the most common one in 
England and the county councils and district councils are responsible for carrying out different 
tasks. County councils have responsibility for education, transport, planning and social care. District 
councils care for rubbish collection, local highways as well as Council Tax collections. Unitary 
councils carry out all of the above by themselves. There is a third tier; the parishes and these are the 
very most local level in England. As such they used to be very important in local government but 
today their influence is limited. They range from very small ones to up to thousands of people and 
are responsible for services such as cemeteries, open spaces, playgrounds and war. In 2013 there 
were 10,501 parishes in England (Office for National Statistics, 2014). 
Local government spending is financed by central government grants and non-domestic rates 
and locally raised council tax, and also borrowing. Not all local governments are allowed to collect 
money through council tax, out of 444 local authorities, 326 are so called billing authorities. The 
year 2011-2012, local government expenditure was 23 % of total public sector’s expenditure. In 
England there has been a decrease from £172bn in 2010-2011 to £162bn in 2011-2012. The income 
to local government derives from 63 % central government, of which 55 % was government grants. 
37 % was local sources, where 26 % came from local taxes (Department of Communities and Local 
Government, 2013). 
As from 2010 there is new fiscal policy framework aiming to create sustainable public 
finances and by that make a balanced budget. To achieve this scaling down the public sector 
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borrowing is acquired, which will be done by reduce public spending, rather than raising taxes. In 
numbers it is equal to a decrease of 26 % per year in government funding to local authorities 
(Department of Communities and Local Government, 2013). 
The government has a department named the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) and one of their main tasks is to act in a way that will support the local 
governments. Their aim is to make them stronger and more united, enabling them to act on their 
own to solve problems. Thereby give more power to local people and without any intrusion from 
central government (Department of Communities and Local Government, 2014). Another public 
body with great relevance for local government is the Audit Commission, with which DCLG has a 
close collaboration. It is the Audit Commission that follows up on local governments public 
spending and makes controls of its use.  It has been one agency of significance for local government 
and was created in 1982, at the same time as the Local Government Act of that year was decided. 
This act would over all play an important role in the development of the local level and the role of 
public tendering. 
 
4.4.5 Central vs. local government 
The relation between central and local government has for an extended period of time been 
somewhat of an issue. The UK has a lengthy history of a strong and decentralized local government, 
derived from the medieval times, but in modern times’ central government has, to a greater extent 
than other European countries, gotten itself involved in the whereabouts of the local level. This 
trend grew stronger after WWII, during the creation of the welfare state and with the nationalization 
of local government functions (McEldowney, 2003) to make them a part of central governments 
agenda. The intervention picked up speed even more speed during Thatcher (Kuhlman, 2010). 
Local government came to be ”hollowed out” as some researchers put it (Kuhlman, 2010), meaning 
that democratically chosen and locally responsible forces was replaced by central actors and NGOs 
as well as private elements. (Kuhlman, 2010) This was meant to restrict public expenditure, all 
symptomatic with marketization. The Thatcher government did also put harder constraints on local 
government budgets and overshoots was punished with poorer interest before the next round of 
grants. By stripping away a lot of the responsibilities that traditionally had been local government 
tasks, it was easier for the Thatcher government to oversee the labour movements’ actions and 
block its gained influence in politics (Painter, 1991; Gill-McLure 2014). 
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Substantial interference and aims to control local government from a central point of view has 
been made, hence there has been reforms and regulations to maintain this sort of jurisdiction. As a 
consequence the organisation of local government itself has grown more and more complex and 
new ways for management of local level has been pointed out with every other central government 
(McEldowney, 2003). Thus, when Tony Blair and his New Labour won the elections in 1997, they 
also had an idea on how to organise the local level. The Thatcher regime’s intervention has cased a 
great split in local government as a result of the managerial reform to privatise of the public sector 
and put its services out to tendering. Labour wanted to soften the though demands on tendering 
local public service and instead of focusing on efficiency and economic aspects, there was to be a 
shift towards quality and in creating the greatest value. A diminished central control and more 
power transferred back to local government were also announced, devolution and decentralisation 
was a part of the political agenda. Even so, the overall course of the Labour party did not deviate 
from the Conservative agenda. The grip on local government did in some ways loosen but instead 
came the introduction of auditing regimes, central regelation and demands on meeting centrally set 
performance indicators (McEldowney, 2003). 
The Coalition has focused on changing the local level by public pressure. The wishes and 
demands of the people should govern the way local authorities organize services. This way more 
voluntary actors might be engaged in carrying out public services as well as a bigger part will be 
handled by private actors, something that would save money and shrink the public expenditures and 
the public sector as a whole. The Coalition was very critical towards the Labour Party’s, as they 
saw it, centralism, which the Coalition connected with a bigger, heavier, and more expansive 
bureaucracy. Decentralisation and democratisation would take care of this, empower the local level 
and thus shrink public sector (Richards, 2011:29-50).  
All of these reforms have meant great changes to local government and the management 
focus, instead of focus on deliverance and bureaucracy, has made the way local government is 
suppose to function, even more complex. 
4.4.6 Public procurement in the UK 
The process of public procurement usually follows three phases: planning which goods/services to 
be bought and when, choosing who to be the contracting partner and the terms for deliverance and 
also the administration of the contract to make sure it is a effective performance (Arrowsmith, 
2010). The objectives for using public procurement do differ some from one country to another, but 
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are in general mostly generic. The difference lay more in how important each of these aspects is 
seen. Accountability, value for money, fair treatment of providers and equal pre-conditions are 
some of these objectives (Arrowsmith, 2010), all of which are recognisable for the UK case. 
48
 The 
look of public procurement has developed and has taken new forms in later years. Bovaird (2006) 
points out four different forms of contracting-out, found in the UK today. Besides the traditional 
form of public procurement, he describes partnership procurement, distributed commissioning and 
relational procurement as important and all having some sort of collaborative relationship to them.  
Office of Government Commerce is responsible for procurement policy in the UK. Before 2014 the 
Department of Local Government handled the question of procurement for the local level but have 
now merged together with the Office of Government Commerce. The legal framework public 
tendering is in the UK handled by ordinary private courts, no special institution is responsible for 
these kinds of questions. 
The EU Directive 2004/18/EC is the main supra national level regulation. In the UK this one 
is implemented in the SI 2006 No.5 for England and Wales and Northern Ireland and SSI 2012 
No.88 for Scotland. The public procurement regulation is only relevant for contracts above the 
threshold set by the EU. The more general treaties regulate contracts below threshold. This includes 
services categorized as Part B services. These are not fully covered by the Directive and therefore 
less regulated. Examples of Part B services are hotel and restaurant services, health and social 
services and educational services. Part A services, viewed as priority services, include architectural 
planning of different kinds and accounting services and building-cleaning services. 
A change in the procurement directives has been up to discussion and 17
th
 of April 2014, the 
new EU Procurement Directives were announced as adopted on the EU level. The Directive is 
expected to be implemented by the member states within two years and is in the UK looked 
positively upon. Among things that have changed is regulation for helping small and medium 
enterprises to attend the procurement process. This has been a question of great interest for the 
British and the country is planning to implement the new Directives for almost all procurements and 
hopefully before the two years limit (Cabinet Office, 2014). 
                                                 
48
 For experiences and approaches of specific national and international systems to framework agreements see, in particular, S. 
Arrowsmith, “Methods for purchasing on-going requirements: the system of framework agreements and dynamic purchasing systems 
under the EC Directives and UK procurement regulations”, Ch. 3 in S. Arrowsmith (ed.) 
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Even so, before the requirements of the European Union procurement law, the United 
Kingdom relayed mainly on guidelines and administrative briefings rather than laws and mandatory 
regulations for aspects of public tendering. Instead the use of public procurement was to a great 
extent, interpreted by the organizations themselves. The commitment to the EU Directive is today 
only confined to rules and laws clearly stated in the directive. Other aspects are left outside 
(Arrowsmith, 2010). 
 
4.4.7 Public tendering and its different forms 
A total of 24 % of local government expenditure went to external contractors between the years 
2011-2012. In numbers that is £57.6bn on procurement of goods and services and out of that 
£27.7bn was paid to external contractors. 1,67m people work for local government, making them 
one of the largest employers in England. Most of these are found in administration and other 
support services. 48 % of the total government service expenditure goes to employees (DCLG, 
2013).  
During the Thatcher government the neo-liberal ideas made great impact on how the public 
sector was perceived and profoundly influenced how local government were supposed to organise 
public service. The focus on keeping public expenditures low and at the same time broaden the 
control over in what way local authorities used their resources, was legitimized by this right wing 
ideology and general acceptance for marketization. A part of this was the Thatcher government’s 
view of private actors in public sector as a key to big financial saving and therefore it wished to 
expand the amount of private actors in the public sector. As an extension of this Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering (CCT) was introduced and was more or less made mandatory for local 
government to abide. There never really was a choice whether to commence this form of tendering 
(Patterson & Pinch, 1995; Boyne, 1998).  
 
4.4.7.1 Competitive compulsory tendering (CCT) 
CCT was first presented in the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act. It was stated that 
construction and maintenance work had to be putout for tendering and in the 1988 Local 
Government Act a widening was decided to include more services. Competition would shrink the 
public sector and hinder local governments to spend too much on public services, all in line with 
existing government opinions. Services to be included in 1988 Local Government Act were, among 
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other things, cleaning of streets and buildings and ground maintenance. There was also a goal of a 
100 % competitive tendering in year 1994, when all activities defined by the act had to be open to 
private interest (Clark, 1997).  The requirements put on public bodies were strict and demanded a 
business-like behaviour, 6 % rate of return and forbid an anti-competitive manner. This was not 
demanded of private actors and therefore did it become a disadvantage for public actors. The 
process of CCT meant a lot of aspects for public sector to take into account, specifications to 
consider when creating the contracts, requirements on how the in-house organisation was supposed 
to act for not being accused of anti-competitive behaviour. There were also different steps in the 
tendering process local authorities had to follow.  
The effects of CCT turned out to be substantial. The most obvious consequence was the hard 
split in the local council’s organisation between the so-called client and contractor side. This split is 
still present in the today management of public services. A separation of these two was encouraged 
to avoid biased choices being made in the competition for tendering contracts (Clark, 1997) The 
manual service, before managed in a traditional way, was transferred to a Direct Service 
Organisation (DSO). They in turn had a client side, responsible for supervising and managing 
contracts and a contractor side, the ones performing the actual work. The DSO had to compete like 
any other company to win the contract. If not winning, the consequence for the in-house group was 
to stop exists being. There was no other place to go so they more or less only had one shot 
(Patterson & Pinch, 1995).  
The separation between client side and contractor side led to a feeling of the client side 
watching over the contractors and the contractors felt mistrusted be the new management people in 
the office. The fact that local government had to create contracts for areas for which they did not 
have experience to do so, added up to the complications of CCT. Many workers felt a loss of 
autonomy, their skill and knowledge was of no use, as a cause of rigorous ways of managing the 
work tasks.  
The strict demands on local government under CCT was criticised for making it to hard 
operating in local authorities. Less transparency and a diminishing democratic influence from the 
locally elected and the local people was also one thing noticed during the years of CCT. It was also 
possible to observe that during first round of CCT, a majority of the contracts were won in-house. 
Even so, this has been as a result of budget cuts in the local organisation, a lot of people have been 
redundant and lower wages been offered as a mean to compete with private contractors. There are 
statistics talking about an almost 20 % job loss between the years 1988-1991 within public sector. 
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Indications on generally worse working conditions have been seen and older staff has been replaced 
by younger personnel because of difficulties with handling the new ways of organize working 
schemes and the pressure it led to. (Patterson & Pinch, 1995). The picture is not homogenous and 
the effects of CCT are hard to measure. There is evidence on reductions in expenditure, and really 
no greater effect on quality and in some services (Boyne, 1998) the workforce has even described a 
growing feeling of autonomy than before (Patterson & Pinch, 1995). Even so, CCT was greatly 
criticised and when Labour took power in 1997, the system was abolished. It was replaced with 
Best Value system, quality instead of efficiency and performance instead of results were to be the 
new ways for local government. 
4.4.7.2 Best Value – quality instead of economy 
The Labour government criticised CCT for being non-flexible, creating unnecessary bureaucracy, 
forgetting the aspects of quality and instead putting too much focus on competition and efficiency 
and with that generate tough situations for employees and employers. In 1999 Local Government 
Act, CCT was abolished and it was no longer mandatory to tender out local services. Instead the 
system of Best Value was introduced to improve local public services, which was built on national 
performance targets (McAdam & Rodney, 2003). The Audit Commission was responsible for 
implementing the process of BV. BV is exercised as different kinds of models, some more common 
than others. 
Labour stated early on that quality was to be the main goal and both public and private actors 
should be a part of delivering public services as long as it was done with the highest quality – “what 
matters is what works”. Partnership was stressed as crucial and also empowering local taxpayers 
possibilities to have a say about the service deliverance – a greater democratisation of local 
government was going to take place. The Best Value system was the solution. The thought behind 
best value was to ensure that taxpayers and local people were provided with the most efficient, 
effective and economically best service and the principles behind Best Value stated both quality and 
cost as equally significant. Even if it was not compulsory to put services out to tender, competition 
was highly regarded as a key tool. Creating targets aiming at highest quality and with the local 
people and taxpayers wishes in mind, was seen as a cornerstone in the Best Value system. It was of 
utterly importance that the local authorities, on a continually basis, reported targets reached and 
how the performances were met. A wide array of different sorts of performances, targets, and plans 
was called on to be made, followed and be followed up upon. The system also demanded 
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continuous improvement within these performances (Consultation Paper Best Value, 1998). 
Auditors were put in use to publicly put out information on how local government fulfilled their 
goals and local government had to publish reports on how they met performances. The targets and 
indicators used to measure included both the local view but were very much based on criteria 
created by the central government. All of these were parts of the Labour government’s regime to 
modernize and improve local government and its functions. Best value was replaced in 2002/2003 
with the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) in both England and Wales (Gill-McLure, 
2013). 
The Labour government did change how both local and central government was functioning. 
In some ways it was a softer approach that was presented, less financial constraints on local 
government, more possibilities to decided on whether put out to tender or not, and central 
government put on the roll of being more strategic and working to encourage localism. On the other 
hand has there been little change in decreasing the centralization of policy-making and really spend 
more on public sector. McEldowney (2003) describes it as a wish to make local government 
become more accountable, looking more and more alike and through that become easier to measure 
and compare. Even though tendering no longer is compulsory, contracting out is still very much 
looked upon, and used, as a good option for organizing local service. All the different programs and 
models in the Best Value regime tried to change the course of the Thatcher government but it was 
not always adapted to complex reality of public service. Many times these centrally controlled 
performance indicators meant a heavier workload on local government (Kuhlman, 2010). 
4.4.7.3 PFI/PPP 
As a further strategy to improve public service and as the Government described it then: “The 
Government’s objective is to deliver world class public service” (HM Treasury, 2003) more money 
was to be spent and to be able to do this, new forms of investments was encouraged. Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) and Public Private Partnership (PPP) were two forms of particular interest 
for the Labour government. It meant that private actors where to finance local projects and also 
collaborate with public actors and thus be taking the risk of investment. It was suppose to happen 
where it meant value for money. PPP is used when there is collaboration between public and 
private, and sometimes also third, sector organizations in carrying out public services. PFI is more 
of a financially driven kind of collaboration where the private actor takes on all, or almost all, the 
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funding of a project for a service the government wish to carry out but do not want to take the risk 
for (Arrowsmith, 2010). 
It is important to separate PFI and PPP from the strict meaning of privatisation and 
outsourcing. Privatisation suggests a situation where a private actor has wholly responsibility for 
providing the service and is free to make arrangements of their own liking. To contract something 
out means that a service, before provided by public sector, now is carried out by a private actor but 
with the government still in charge of the finances. Private finance initiative places itself between 
these two (Arrowsmith, 2010). 
It is a sort of development of contracting out, creating partnerships between public sector 
clients and private contractors. Both PFI/PPP and public procurement was promoted as important 
tools for creating good public service during the Labour government and still are under the 
Coalition. This is an illustration of the continued influence from new public management on public 
organization and how it has changed the way it is carried out and who is responsible for what.  
The governing trend since Thatcher has lead to a stripping of local government their traditional 
tasks and these have been, through the marketization of public sector, transferred to central agencies 
and so-called quasi non-governmental organisations. Managing by competitive tendering has 
affected around 300,000 public jobs and women are among workers most gravely affected. 
(Kuhlman, 2010) 
The shifts in forms of management and organisation of public service on a local level, has 
developed new ways for how public procurement works and looks like. The more traditional form 
during CCT has now become more complex with more actors involved and a partnership-way of 
thinking (Bovaird, 2006). 
 
4.4.7.4 Strategic commissioning 
Today is strategic commissioning the model for how public sector should act to improve its 
services.  It is widely popular and it has been a concept quickly taken in, in both central and local 
government. Almost a discourse, it is being found everywhere in public services. Nevertheless the 
definition is blurry. Commissioning something can be translated to the public procurement process 
under CCT but the strategic commissioning covers more than just the actual commission, more than 
placing of an order. It’s the whole process of recognizing what is needed in an area and what people 
want and then make a plan that in the best of ways ensures this to happen, it is more about the 
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overall picture. Such a big task puts pressure on local government authorities to be good at 
designing this in an efficient way. As a consequence of the blurry meaning and the wide area it 
covers, there has been a great deal of variation in how it is perceived and converted to practice 
(Bovaird et al, 2014).  
The sort of freedom strategic commissioning suggests for local authorities ways of organizing 
its services is also a sort of challenge to the picture of the otherwise power hording central 
government. With such a big emphases on the people when designing public service deliverance, 
many forms of strategic commissioning has lead a sort of bottom-up organization. The whole 
picture approach is also something different in comparison with the traditional form of public 
procurement and there has also been a move towards greater externalisation of public services under 
the later years of strategic commissioning. This is a result of the pressure to create partnerships and 
mutual agreements with private actors. As a consequence there is now a great experimentation of 
new forms for public procurement and deliverance of public services going on. (Bovaird et al, 
2014). 
Two public services areas that has been in the interest of public tendering almost since the 
beginning, is park and road maintenance. Park and open spaces has for a long time been a local 
concern whilst roads is divided into highways managed by the government and local road nets 
handle by the local authority. 
 
4.4.8 Park and road maintenance 
Road and park maintenance are two different administrative fields. There seems to be no or nearly 
no responsibility on central government level for the question of parks and open spaces. It comes 
across as an area where local councils have full ownership. Roads on the other hand is an 
infrastructure question, and as such of big interest to the government. This might be why it has been 
easier to find regulations on this area than it is for parks and open spaces.   
Both the road and park sectors have challenges ahead. A report from the Local Government 
Association in September this year forecasts a 42 % rise in traffic level and a rise of 61 % of the 
congestion levels on the UK roads by 2040. The state of the roads in the country today are claimed 
to be in bad condition, which means a huge task for local councils to handle, especially as the 
backlog of maintenance is calculated (in year 2012 that is) to be around £12 billion. (Local 
Government Association, 2014) As for the parks in the country, the outlooks are not that great 
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either. In a report, published in 2014, the Heritage Lottery Fund found that 86 % of park managers 
had seen cuts in budgets since 2010 and expected the cuts to continue during the coming years. The 
study concludes that there is a declining trend in the levels of public parks similar to that seen in the 
1970s and 1980s. In some places this could mean that public parks services might not continue to 
be viable (Heritage Lottery Fund, 2014). Refer also back to earlier report on developments in the 
1990s and the situation for parks about 2000 (DLTR report).   
Whereas there seems to be big cuts ahead for park services, there is initiative to give more 
funding to roads and highways in the years to come. The differences between these two fields also 
mean that the different reforms of public tendering and local government power have affected them 
differently. 
 
4.4.8.1 Who is responsible for what? 
It is possible to divide the roads in England into three different categories – trunk roads and 
motorways, local authority major roads and minor roads. The government, via the Highway 
Agency, is responsibly for the funding and planning of the strategic road network and local 
authorities take care of how their roads are used in a more direct way through planning and 
maintenance and do show a great variation in how this is done (Local Government Association, 
2014). 
The overall responsibility for roads and highways in the UK is held by the Highway Agency, 
located under the Department of Transport. Their mission is to manage and improve the road 
network and give best possible service to road users. It is also a task of theirs to help local councils 
manage street work effectively. The Highway Agency uses procurement for carrying out both work 
on roads as well as for consultation and auditing. It is not all roads that are under the control of the 
Highway Agency, they are responsible for the trunk roads. The local government is accountable for 
all other public roads. The Department of Transport handles everything that has to do with 
transportation in the UK; buses, trains, boats and roads and they plan the infrastructure in the 
country as a whole. It is also on their table to develop policy and guidance to local authorities and 
help them with funding to keep local road networks functioning. They have around 20 agencies who 
work for them, where the Highway Agency is one of them (Department of Transport, 2014). 
On the local level, the question of transport is on the county council level. The local authority 
has its own road network to plan and maintain and the responsibility for local highways is often a 
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question for district councils. Where there is a parish council they have the right to enter the 
discussions about new roads, traffic signs, road widening and some aspects of highways.  
No matter how small or big a local authority are, they do all have some sort of influence on 
the local environment as well as ground maintenance. The tasks include tending to trees and grass, 
keeping weeds under control and managing flowers and alike, but not the planning and landscape of 
architectural parts (Clark, 1997). It has been hard to find whether there is a certain central 
government body to look after the management/area of parks and green spaces. There is a 
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, but they cover forest and woodland questions 
as well as climate change adaption and such, and not the park or green space maintenance. Parish 
councils have power to decide over recreation matters such as pleasure grounds, open spaces and 
village greens and also Rights of Way (Office for National Statistics, 2014). 
 
4.4.8.2 Regulations of roads 
The Traffic management act came 2004 and states that local government has to take responsibility 
for smooth traffic, without congestion, in their road network. Local councils issue permit schemes 
for those who carry out street and road work and the government is supporting them in creation of 
these. Roads and public paths owned by a private person is not local authorities’ responsibility, but 
is the responsibility of that private actor to take care of. 
The Transport Act 2000 reformed local transport, in England and Wales that is, how it was 
planned and delivered. It demanded that local transport authorities make a local transport plan and 
to follow those policies stated in the plan. It was meant to support safe, efficient and economic 
transport facilities (Transport Act 2000, 108). The Local Transport Act 2008 made it possible for 
local transport authorities to be more flexible and organize their arrangements in a suitable way 
based on the local need and features. During the year of 2014 the government has promoted an 
initiative called Local Growth Fund that is supposed to help out with the funding of local council 
activities. There is already a long list of sources for funding, the Local Government Association 
lists around 15 different forms (Local Government Association, 2014) which is a complicating 
factor to the issue of maintenance on roads and highways on the local level.  
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4.4.8.3 The effect of different procurement models on road maintenance 
The UK has a well-established practice of putting out road maintenance for public contracting. 
During the early years of marketization in the public sector in England, highway maintenance was 
one of the first subjects to be put out for tender under the 1980 Local Government Planning and 
Land Act. In the 1988 Local Government Act it was stated that also cleaning of streets should be a 
question for procurement. Under the era of Best Value, there was an array of different performances 
indicators for the local authorities to relate to as well as encouragement of creating their own 
(Department of environment, transport and regions, 2000). 
One of the more common ways of funding and organizing road maintenance today is PFI. The 
reasons behind using PFI are that it is seen to lead to ‘value for money’ such as efficiency, lower 
costs etc., and it make it possible to start a project where there would not be a project otherwise 
(Arrowsmith, 2010). Because it is partially, sometimes fully, finance by the private provider, the 
government encounters a lower risk. There is a notion of quite a big government involvement in 
subjects relating to roads and maintenance. There has been an expression for a wish for more local 
influence in this matter and more possibilities for local authorities to be flexible in the funding and 
arrangement of road maintenance (Local Government Association, 2014). Even if subjected to 
public procurement for a long time, the research on road maintenance on a local level seems to have 
been scarce. This is an indication on a gap to fill for future studies. 
4.4.9 Parks and green areas  
Parks in the UK have for a long time been regarded as neglected and not taken proper care of. To 
lower expenditures of local government, funds for parks were cut down during the years 1980-2000. 
It was an easy target and did not stir up heated arguments. CCT played an important role in this 
development. The neo-liberal fundament of CCT implied a market-oriented approach to provision, 
with the problem of parks being a public service but nothing anyone paid for. It could be described 
as a market imperfection and led to big savings but also overlooked maintenance. However, there 
are reports of more money being spent on parks since 2001, which has slowly improved the state of 
many parks (Williams and Twaites, 2007). The report by the Heritage Lottery Fund has also found 
an increase in the amount of visits to public parks in recent years (Heritage Lottery Fund, 2014). 
The consequences of CCT have been substantial. In the aspect of work related issues there was a 
loss of work skill and pride for the work performed, the overall moral sank and the connection 
between workers and park visitors disappeared. A rise in vandalism was also noted, along with a 
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lack of long-term perspectives. In contrast to this there was a measurable decline of costs and work 
was performed more quickly, but this was a result of neglected quality, safety and tidiness (Jones, 
2000). 
When Best Value was introduced under the Labour government, it covered parks as well. A 
more social approach was to be taken where including the citizens in the process was a cornerstone. 
Even so, the reality of the demand on meeting indicators and benchmarking performances and all 
the time being accountable made it hard to lift the social aspects of Best Value. The resources 
available were too small to really convert the holistic approaches of Best Value into action. This 
also complicated the fact of actually meeting the wishes of the public. Parks continued to be 
neglected for a long time, and even though efforts to improve the standards of public parks were 
made during the 2000s, it now seems like park standards are on the decline once more.  
The cuts that have been made to park management have left park service managers to find 
sources for funding outside the local authority. This means seeking out new ways of funding 
through development of more business like models and private financing. Today the change the 
park management has gone through has implicated a focus on partnerships and management 
according to private norms and this often misses out on the service aspects (Williams & Thwaties, 
2007). 
4.4.9.1 How park and green spaces are regulated 
The question of park and open spaces maintenance seem to be a responsibility for both district and 
parishes and county councils as well. Ground maintenance has been subjected to tender for as long 
as highway maintenance, but in line with the British tradition of not putting things into laws and 
instead encourage compliance according to central government recommendations, there are few 
regulations on how tendering of parks should be done.  
A way to get local councils to engage more in their parks has been through the incentive of 
the Green flag award. The Green flag award was introduced 1996 and works as a benchmark for 
parks and green spaces in the UK. It is awarded to a park/open space with an excellent management 
and high standard. It is a way for the local authorities to compare their parks and something to strive 
towards. The scheme is owned by the Department for Communities and Local Government (Green 
Flag Award, 2014). Another initiative that has become more common lately, are the development of 
so-called friend groups. 
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It is possible to say that the development in the management of park maintenance seems to go 
in the direction of shared responsibilities between local authorities and private and voluntary actors. 
This might be a result of diminishing funds to the local public sector from central government. It 
could also be because today it is more common to govern through governance mechanisms, 
meaning through network and partnerships. This is the ruling discourse and hence it is perceived as 
the best way of managing the aspect of park maintenance. This way it will cost less and still 
maintain a high quality. This picture is complicated by the fact that park maintenance seems to be a 
neglected area and short on funding. If public contracting is a way of solving this problem remains 
to be seen. 
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5 ANALYSIS – REASONS FOR USING PRIVATE 
CONTRACTORS  
 
5.1 Purposes for using private contractors 
This chapter delivers an analysis of the purposes for using private contractors to provide park and 
road maintenance in Danish municipalities. The analysis explores the importance of altogether 
seven key purposes for using private contractors, provides comparisons with historical purposes, 
purposes for using in-house provision as well as purposes for using private contractors in Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway and UK as well as the analysis finally explores the importance of key strategic, 
organizational and structural characteristics of the municipalities which can help understand 
differences in the importance of the purposes. 
 
The analysis addresses the following five questions:  
 
A. What are the current main purposes for using private contractors in Danish municipalities? 
B. How do the purposes for using private contractors compare with the purposes for using in-house 
providers in Danish municipalities? 
C. How do the current purposes for using private contractors in Denmark compare with historical 
purposes (in the period 1980s-2010s)?  
D. How do the purposes for using private contractors in Denmark compare with the purposes for 
using private contractors in Norway, Sweden and UK?  
E. Which characteristics (strategic, organizational and structural) can help explain differences in 
the importance of the purposes for using private contractors?  
 
The purposes for using private contractors in the public sector, more generally, have been described 
as a ‘moving target’, i.e. continually changing pending on policy and organizational objectives. 
However, primacy in public policies and theory have historically (or at least from the 1980s and 
onward) been given to economic objectives, in particular, in terms of cost reductions / cost savings 
(Hodge, 2000). Internationally, the cost-oriented focus has in some degree changed or been 
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complemented in the 1990s and 2000s by alternative purposes, such as delivery of ‘best value’, 
service development and cross-sectorial innovation (Entwistle and Martin, 2005). This shift is also 
echoed within the public park and road sectors where new collaborative arrangements have been 
introduced in various countries throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Lindholst 2009).  
In addition to the developments from the 1980s and onward, long-standing purposes for using 
private contractors are reasoned in a role for private contractors as a ‘buffer’ for the in-house 
providers in periods with peak work load (e.g. show clearing) as well as providers of tasks which 
require highly specialized machinery or expertise (Gjelstrup, 1992).   
The INOPS survey included comparable items on altogether seven purposes for using private 
contractors as well as in-house provision in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and United Kingdom which 
reflect long-standing purposes, more cost-oriented approaches as well as newer collaborative 
arrangements. The seven purposes are:  
 
 High maintenance quality 
 Low maintenance costs 
 Effective management of maintenance 
 Test and benchmark prices 
 Provide work the municipality/private cannot do 
 Develop and renew areas and services 
 Develop internal organization and work routines 
 
The seven purposes have been measured by responses from high-ranked municipal park and road 
managers to the question: “In what degree do you find the following purposes a key part of your 
municipality’s considerations for using private contractors to provide maintenance (in the areas 
your department has responsibility for)”. Respondents could indicate their response on a unipolar 
11-point response-scale with two end anchors, ranging from 0 (= ‘not at all’) to 10 = /‘very high 
degree’). 
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5.1.1 Key findings and perspectives 
5.1.1.1 Current purposes (question A) 
The most important current purposes for using private contractors among Danish municipalities are 
on the average: ‘low costs’ and ‘test and benchmark prices’ as well as to a slightly lower degree: 
‘provide work the municipality cannot do.’ The least important purposes on the average are: 
‘develop and renew areas and services’ and ‘develop internal organization and work routines’. The 
municipalities as a whole tend to agree most (i.e. least inter-municipal variation) on the importance 
they put on the purposes of ‘low costs’ and ‘test and benchmark prices’ while the tend to agree least 
(i.e. highest inter-municipal variation) on the importance they put on the purposes of ‘effective 
management of maintenance’, ‘high quality maintenance’ and ‘provide work the 
municipality/private cannot do’. 
Furthermore, while some purposes on the average are of less importance there are still some 
municipalities where these purposes are of a relatively high importance. For example, while the 
average importance of the purpose: ‘develop internal organization and work routines’, a substantial 
group of municipalities (one quarter of those who use private contractors) still puts relatively high 
importance on this purpose.  
5.1.1.2 Comparison between private and public provision (question B) 
Current purposes for using private contractors differ from the purposes for using in-house provision. 
The most important purposes for using in-house provision are primarily ‘high quality maintenance’ 
and ‘effective management of maintenance’ while the most important purposes for using private 
contractors are ‘low costs’ and ‘test and benchmark prices’.  
In direct comparison there is greater emphasis on multiple purposes for using in-house 
provision compared to an emphasis on a more narrow set of purposes for using private contractors. 
This indicates that in-house contractors on the average are used for a greater range of purposes than 
private contractors.   
5.1.1.3 Historical comparison (question C) 
The historical analysis shows that the purposes for using private contractors in Danish 
municipalities have changed substantially in the period from 1980s to the 2010s. In the time before 
1990s, the primary purposes for using private contractors in the Danish municipalities were for 
provision of tasks requiring specialized machinery or expertise as well as a buffer capacity in peak 
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work periods (Gjelstrup, 1991; 1992). In addition, the general belief in the technical departments 
was that the municipalities were the best and most cost effective for provision of maintenance tasks. 
Today, the purposes related to provision of specialized tasks and buffer capacity are still of some 
importance, but the overriding purpose are rooted in concerns related to cost effectiveness and 
benchmarks of cost and price levels. A comparison of historical survey data for the late 1980s 
(Gjelstrup, 1992) and for the late 1990s (Kommunernes Landsforening, 2001) indicate that the 
change has taken place in the 1990s. 
5.1.1.4 International comparison (question D) 
The purposes for using private contractors in Denmark are to some degree similar to the purposes 
for using private contractors in Sweden, Norway and England. Across all four countries, ‘low costs’ 
and ‘‘provide work the municipality cannot do’ are the highest scoring purposes while ‘develop and 
renew areas and services’ and ‘develop internal organization and work routines’ are the lowest 
scoring purposes. 
Denmark differs from the three other countries by a relatively higher importance of the 
purposes of ‘test and benchmark of prices’ and ‘develop internal organization and work routines’. 
Norway, in particular, stands out from the three other countries by a particular high importance of 
the purpose ‘provide work the municipality cannot do’ and lesser emphasis on all remaining 
purposes. 
Overall, the international comparison shows that the mix of purposes differs – as well as 
converges – in important aspects across the countries. In perspective, the use of private contractors 
is not the same across the four national contexts. The most striking difference is the substantial 
difference in the mix of purposes between Norwegian municipalities and municipalities in the 
remaining three countries (Denmark, Sweden and UK). However, it should be noted that although 
differences (and similarities) exists between the countries at the general level this do not rule out 
that subgroups of municipalities – or sub-regions –within each country are very similar (or very 
different).  
 
5.1.1.5 Explanation of variations (question E) 
The analysis shows that variations among municipalities (inter-municipal differences) in the 
importance of the purposes for using private contractors in some degree can be explained by 
differences in strategic (the level of administrative and political support for contracting out), 
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organizational (organization of operational responsibilities and level of contracting out) and 
general municipal (size measured by number of inhabitants) characteristics. In particular, 
administrative support for contracting out is significantly correlated – both positively and negatively 
– with differences in the importance of several purposes, while political support for contracting out 
only is significantly correlated with (a higher importance for) the purpose of ‘test and benchmark of 
prices’. The differences in the importance of the purposes associated with the level of 
administrative and political support is a particular finding. This finding indicates that while the 
political level in the municipalities in their support of contracting out mostly are interested in what 
could be called ‘economic accountability’ of the way services are provided the administrative level 
have a much more fine-grained set of special objectives when they support contracting out.  
The analysis finds regional differences in the purposes for using private contractors. 
Municipalities in Region North Denmark as well as Region Zealand, in particular, have different 
profiles in the mix of purposes compared to other regions in Denmark. One striking difference, for 
example, is the difference between municipalities in North Denmark and Zealand in the importance 
they put on ‘high maintenance quality’, ‘low costs’ and ‘effective maintenance’ as purpose for using 
private contractors (lower importance in North Denmark and higher importance in Zealand).  The 
profile of municipalities in North Denmark shows that the primary purposes for using private 
contractors in this part of Denmark are ‘provide work the municipality cannot do’ and ‘test and 
benchmark prices’.  
 Which purposes the municipalities emphasize also varies according to the type of contract. In 
particular, those municipalities which have a higher degree of formalization of a ‘collaborative 
framework’ (in terms of requirements for competence, joint planning and closer collaboration, 
user/citizen involvement and financial incentives) put greater emphasis on high quality, effective 
management, development and renewal of areas and services and development of organization and 
work routines as purposes for using private contractors in comparison with those municipalities 
which have a lower degree of formalization of the collaborative framework. Those municipalities 
which have a higher degree of formalization of the collaborative framework also put greater 
emphasis on multiple purposes than those municipalities with a lower degree of formalization of the 
collaborative framework. Municipalities with a lower degree of formalization of the collaborative 
framework mainly put emphasis on ‘low costs’, ‘test and benchmark prices’ as well as ‘provide 
work the municipality cannot do’. This group of municipalities puts (very) low emphasis on all 
other purposes. The differences in level of contracting out between the groups with high and low 
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formalization of collaborative framework are furthermore statistically insignificant. This finding 
indicates that the ‘market’ for contracting out is managed through two very different contractual 
frameworks and under two different set of purposes.  
5.1.1.6 Discussions and perspectives 
The analysis provides a nuanced portrait of the purposes for using private contractors for provision 
of park and road maintenance in Danish municipalities. The provided portrait differs from standard 
assumptions on purposes for contracting out in mainstream theory as well the official purposes 
underlying government policies (see introduction chapter). The detailed analyses of the purposes for 
using private contractors for provision of park and road maintenance services show that there are 
substantial differences between the municipalities – including subgroups of municipalities – as well 
as purposes has changed substantially over time. Substantial differences are also found across 
national contexts.  
In perspective, the analysis indicates that the context of contracting out shapes the mix of 
municipal purposes for using private contractors – or at least purposes varies across contexts. In 
particular the administrative level in the municipalities – when they more strongly support 
contracting out – makes a difference with regard to the emphasis – or de-emphasis – of the 
particular purposes in the total mix of purposes. The analysis also shows that stronger support from 
the political level mainly emphasizes the purpose of ‘testing and benchmarking prices’. However, it 
should be noted that the purpose of cost-effective maintenance is of relatively high importance for 
the political level regardless of the level of political support for contracting out. The analysis shows 
that the political and administrative level thinks differently about the purposes for involvement of 
private contractors in the provision of park and road maintenance services. Politicians are mainly 
concerned with economics while the administrative level in the municipalities is also concerned 
with a number of other purposes.  
 
5.1.2 Purposes for using private contractors in Denmark 
Reported survey results and case studies from time around 1990 by Gjelstrup (1991; 1992) show 
that an ‘administrative ideology’ in the technical departments in Danish municipalities at that time 
tended to favor in-house provision vis-à-vis the use of private contractors. Primary motives for 
reliance on in-house provision were a belief that it in general provided superior performance in 
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terms of being ‘best and cheapest’. However, at that time technical departments lacked transparent 
accountancy and performance management systems which could document or support such beliefs. 
The belief seemed to be based on a professional judgment (Gjelstrup, 1992). The key reasons for 
private sector involvement were at that time provision of tasks in demand of ‘specialized’ expertise 
or equipment which could not be provided immediately by municipal service departments as well as 
a ‘buffer’ for municipal service departments in peak work periods (e.g. snow clearing).  
According to later survey data on the use of procurement in local government in the last half 
of the 1990s (Kommunernes Landsforening, 2001) the overriding political reason for using public 
procurement (but not necessarily contracting out) by the end of the 1990s was cost efficiency 
concerns in terms of providing services ‘best and cheapest’ as well as the involvement of private 
contractors in itself was a main reason. A comparison of findings from the early 1990s with 
findings from the late 1990s indicates that a major shift in the motives for involving private 
contractors has taken place within this period. 
The 2015-data from the INOPS survey provide information on municipal park and road 
managers’ evaluation of the importance of various purposes for using private contractors as well as 
in-house provision for park and road maintenance in Danish municipalities. In the survey the 
respondents were asked to rate on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 = not at all and 10 = very high 
degree, how important altogether seven purposes were for their municipality’s use of private 
contractors for provision of park and road maintenance. The question was asked separately to those 
who respectively used private contractors and those who used in-house providers.  
 
Table 8.  
Importance of purposes for using in-house provision and private contractors 
Importance of purpose 
a
 
Mean score (standard deviations)  
 
Using private  
contractors (N=67) 
Using in-house  
providers (N=61) 
Mean score  
difference 
b
 
  High maintenance quality 5.1 (2.7) 7.6 (2.1) 2.5 ** 
 
Low maintenance costs 7.5 (2.0) 7.3 (2.2) 0.2 
ns
 
 Effective management of maintenance 5.2 (2.8) 7.7 (2,3) 2.5 ** 
 Test and benchmark prices 7.5 (2.2) 6.8 (2.6) 0.7 ** 
 Provide work the municipality/private cannot do 6.7 (3.0) 6.6 (2.9) 0.1 
ns
 
 
Develop and renew areas and services 4.6 (2.3) 6.5 (2.4) 1.9 ** 
 
Develop internal organization and work routines 5.0 (2.3) 7.1 (2.3) 2.1 ** 
Source: INOPS survey data  
a
 All items based on responses to the question: “In what degree do you find the following purposes a key part of your municipality’s considerations for 
using private contractors to provide maintenance (in the areas your department has responsibility for)”. Items measured by an 11-point response-scale 
with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘Very high degree’).  
b
 Score differences evaluated with one sample T-tests at significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. One sample T-test is 
chosen as preferred method for evaluation of the difference in mean scores as the two groups are only partially overlapping (i.e. some municipalities 
only use private contractors or in-house providers while other municipalities rely on both type of provision).  
 
INOPS  Technical report 
 
97 
The data presented in Table 8 show the average scores for the seven different purposes for using 
private contractors and in-house provision for park and road maintenance in the Danish 
Municipalities. In addition, Figure 7 shows the same data in boxplots for the importance of the 
seven purposes for using private contractors.   
According to the data the two most important purposes for using private contractors among 
Danish Municipalities by the mid2010s are, economic considerations in term of ‘test and 
benchmark prices’ as well as ‘low costs’ (mean scores = 7.5). Getting (specialized) tasks done 
which the municipality cannot do itself are also a relatively important purpose (mean score = 6.7) 
for using private contractors. The mean scores for the remaining four purposes are just around the 
mean scale score of 5 which can be interpreted as an indication of these as less important (but still 
not unimportant). The figures for standard deviations show that the inter-municipal differences in 
general are high. The highest level of inter-municipal differences is for ‘Provide work the 
municipality cannot do’ (S.D. = 3.0) which indicates that the scores for 66 % of the municipalities 
is likely to lie between 3.7 and 9.7.
49
   
 
Figure 7. Importance of purposes for using private contractors (boxplot). 
 
The information given by the boxplots in Figure 7 provide more detailed information on the high 
levels of inter-municipal differences reported in Table 8. Similar to the figures on standard 
                                                 
49
 The likelihood assumes a normal distribution.  
Note: Boxplot (SPSS output) illustrating the distribution of quartiles and outliers. The filled box 
represents 50 % of the cases, the top of the box represent the 75 % quartile and the bottom the 25 
% quartile. The middle of the box represents the median value (or the 50 % quartile). 95 % of all 
cases are expected to lie between the two whiskers extending from the box. Data source: INOPS 
data 2015. 
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deviations, the boxplot shows least variation among the municipalities for the importance of ‘test 
and benchmark prices’ and ‘low costs’ [in the figure labeled as: ‘private: purpose: cost effective 
maintenance’] compared to the other five purposes. This indicates that there is relatively higher 
agreement (less difference) among the municipalities for the importance of these purposes than the 
remaining five purposes. Some ‘outliers’, i.e. strongly deviating municipalities, account for most of 
the variance for these two purposes.  
The boxplot also shows that although the average scores for some purposes are relatively low 
still some municipalities find these of higher importance. For example, 25 % of the municipalities 
score the purpose of ‘high quality maintenance’ between 8 and 10, i.e. find this purpose of very 
high importance. Similarly, while the mean score for the two purposes related to development are 
centered around the mid-score (5) on the scale 25 % of the municipalities score ‘development and 
renewal of areas’ between 6 or higher while other 25 % of the municipalities score ‘development of 
internal organization and work routines’ between 7 or higher. In other words, significant groups of 
municipalities evaluate these purposes as being of relatively high importance. Likewise, the 
boxplots also shows that for several purposes significant groups of municipalities find these of no or 
little importance (i.e. scores for the first quartile range between 0 and 3 or 4). Similar low rankings 
for significant groups of municipalities are true for five out of the seven purposes.  
Table 8 also shows an analysis of the differences in respondents’ evaluation of the importance 
of the various purposes between private contractors and in-house providers. In the interpretation of 
this analysis it should be noted that the respondents are employed in the municipalities and to an 
unknown degree are suspect to favor the importance of their own organization. In other words, we 
would expect the respondents not to overestimate the importance of private contractors as well as 
not to underestimate the importance of their own organizations. Further analysis in the sections 
below shows, for example, that characteristics related to organizational responsibilities have 
significant effects on the evaluation of the importance of the purposes for using private contractors 
(see Table 11).  
The statistics on differences in the importance of purposes between contractors and in-house 
provision in Table 8 shows that the importance of the various purposes for using private contractors 
by the mid2010s differs in key aspects from the importance of the purposes for using in-house 
provision. Firstly, the various purposes for using in-house providers are on the average evaluated as 
more important (by comparatively higher mean scores) than the purposes for using private 
contractors. The difference is statistically significant for four out of the seven purposes. Only for the 
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purpose of ‘Test and benchmark prices’ the use of private contractors is evaluated as (significantly) 
more important than the use of in-house contractors. Secondly, all other purposes for using in-house 
provision of maintenance is evaluated as having relatively high importance measured on the 
response scale where ‘0’ indicates no importance at all and ‘10’ indicates a very high degree of 
importance. Mean scores varies between 6.5 for ‘develop and renew areas and services’ and 7.7 for 
‘effective management of maintenance’.  
The findings clearly point to the overriding importance of using private contractors to serve 
economic purposes as well as to a lesser, but still important, degree to use private contractors in the 
‘historical’ role for providing services which cannot immediately be provided in-house. Another 
clear finding is that private contractors are involved for a narrower set of purposes compared to the 
relatively high importance of multiple purposes for using in-house provision. In comparison with 
earlier studies, the analysis shows that the leading motives for using private contractors in terms of 
provision of ‘specialized tasks’ and as a ‘buffer’ in the early 1990s are still important, but now 
overshadowed by economic concerns regarding efficiency and economic accountability.  
5.1.3 Comparing purposes between Denmark, Sweden, Norway and UK 
This section compares the importance of seven purposes for using private contractors across 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway and UK. Table 9 shows key statistics generated from the INOPS survey 
data (number of municipalities, mean scores and standard deviations). The weighted average scores 
for municipalities in all countries are also shown in Figure 8.   
 
Table 9.  
Importance of purposes for using private contractors in four countries 
Importance of purpose 
a
 
Mean scores (standard deviations) 
Denmark  
(N=67) 
Sweden  
(N=65) 
Norway  
(N=68) 
UK  
(N=52) 
Weighted mean 
scores 
b
 
  High maintenance quality 5.1 (2.0) 5.6 (2.9) 5.1 (2.8) 6.3 (2.8) 5.5 
 
Low costs 7.5 (2.2) 7.4 (2.0) 5.8 (3.1) 7.7 (2.2) 7.1 
 Effective management of maintenance 5.2 (3.0) 5.9 (2.5) 5.4 (2.7) 6.1 (2.6) 5.6 
 Test and benchmark prices 7.5 (2.8) 6.2 (2.7) 5.4 (2.8) 6.2 (2.7) 6.3 
 Provide work the municipality/private cannot do 6.7 (2.7) 7.0 (3.0) 8.0 (2.1) 5.7 (3.8) 6.9 
 
Develop and renew areas and services 4.6 (2.3) 4.4 (2.7) 4.2 (2.8) 4.6 (3.3) 4.4 
 
Develop internal organization and work routines 5.0 (2.3) 4.0 (2.7) 3.9 (2.4) 4.1 (3.1) 4.3 
Source: INOPS survey data  
a
 All items measured by an 11-point response-scale with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘Very high degree’).  
b 
The number of cases for each country is used as weights.  
 
The analysis shows both differences and similarities among the countries in the purposes for using 
private contractors. Across all four countries, ‘low costs’ and ‘‘provide work the municipality 
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cannot do’ are the highest scoring purposes (weighted mean scores = 7.1 and 6.9) while ‘develop 
and renew areas and services’ and ‘develop internal organization and work routines’ are the lowest 
scoring purposes (weighted mean scores = 4.4 and 4.3).  
The data indicates that municipalities in Denmark in comparison with the three other 
countries in particular put greater emphasis on ‘test and benchmark prices’ as purpose for using 
private contractors (mean score = 7.5). The difference is greatest in comparison with Norway (mean 
score = 5.8). Similarly, but to a lesser extent, the municipalities in Denmark also stand out by a 
relatively higher emphasis on ‘develop internal organization and work routines’ (mean score = 5.0) 
compared to the three other countries. The purposes for using private contractors in Denmark seems 
very similar to the purposes for using private contractors in Sweden except for a lower emphasis on 
‘test and benchmark prices’ in Sweden (mean score = 6.2 in Sweden and 7.5 in Denmark). In sum, 
the profile of the importance of the seven purposes for using private contractors in Denmark differs 
in various degrees from the profiles in the three other countries.  
 
Figure 8.  
Comparison of seven purposes for using private contractors for road and park maintenance across Denmark, Sweden, Norway and UK 
All items based on responses to the question: “In what degree do you find the following purposes a key part of your municipality’s considerations for using 
private contractors to provide maintenance (in the areas your department has responsibility for)”. Items measured by an 11-point response-scale with 
anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘Very high degree’).  
 
Municipalities in Norway stand on the average out as being most different from the 
municipalities in the three other countries. Mean scores for municipalities in Norway are in 
particular low for all purposes except for ‘provide work the municipality cannot do’ (mean score = 
8.0) which is the highest score among the four countries for this purpose. The difference for this 
purpose is most notable compared to the lower mean score for UK (mean score = 5.7). 
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Municipalities in Norway also stand out for the relatively low mean score for ‘low costs’ (mean 
score = 5.8) which is significantly lower than the mean scores for all other countries. UK also 
stands out with the highest emphasis on high maintenance quality (mean score = 6.3) as well as the 
lowest mean score for ‘provide work the municipality cannot do’ (=5.7). For three particular 
purposes there are also very high variations among UK municipalities (measured by values for 
standard variations) compared to variations in the three other countries. This is particular for 
‘provide work the municipality cannot do’ (S.D. = 3.8), ‘develop and renew areas and services’ 
(S.D. = 3.3) and ‘develop internal organization and work routines’ (S.D. = 3.1).   
5.2 Explanations for variations in purposes  
Table 8 showed the average scores for seven different purposes for using private contractors and in-
house provision in Denmark. However, there are significant variations between the municipalities in 
how important they find the various purposes (measured by standard deviations which range from 
2.0 to 3.0). This section explores the variations among the Danish municipalities further as well as 
providing some explanation for the variations.   
5.2.1 Regional differences in Denmark 
Some research has shown that geographical differences, such as urban-rural status, matters for the 
use of contracting out. In a Danish context municipalities are geographically organized in five 
administrative regions. The five regions differ in size and population density. For example, the 
Region of North Denmark is less densely populated than the Capital Region. The importance of the 
purposes for using private contractors across the five administrative regions in Denmark is explored 
in Table 10 and Figure 9. The data shows that the importance of particular purposes on the average 
varies across the five administrative regions in Denmark.  
‘High maintenance quality’ is least important in Region Central Denmark and most important 
in Region Zealand. ‘Low costs’ is least important in Region North Denmark while most importance 
in Region Zealand. ‘Effective management’ is least important in North Denmark and most important 
in Region Zealand. The purposes of ‘test and benchmark prices’ is least important in Region South 
Denmark and most important in Region Zealand. The purpose of ‘provide work the municipality 
cannot do’ is most important in Region North Denmark and least important in Central Denmark 
Region.  
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Table 10.  
Differences in purposes of the importance of the purposes for using private contractors across five administration regions 
Importance of purpose 
a
 
Municipalities within regions  
Mean scores (standard deviations) 
b
 
South 
Denmark  
(N = 17) 
North  
Denmark  
(N = 8) 
Central 
Denmark 
(N = 15) 
Capital of 
Denmark  
(N = 17) 
Zealand 
(N = 10) 
Denmark 
(N = 67) 
 
High maintenance quality 5,2 (3.0) 4.3 (3.1) 4.1 (2.5) 5.1 (2.7) 6.6 (2.2) 5.1 (2.7) 
 
Low costs 7,8 (1.4) 5.5 (2.3) 7.3 (2.5) 7.7 (1.8) 8.3 (1.1) 7.5 (2.0) 
 
Effective management of maintenance 5.4 (2.9) 3.3 (2.3) 4.3 (2.8) 5.2 (2.6) 7.5 (1.5) 5.2 (2.7) 
 
Test and benchmark prices 6.9 (2.1) 8.0 (2.8) 7.5 (2.1) 7.2 (2.5) 8.7 (1.3) 7.5 (2.3) 
 
Provide work the municipality cannot do 6.3 (3.6) 7.4 (2.9) 6.2 (3.1) 7.2 (2.9) 6.5 (2.7) 6.7 (3.0) 
 
Develop and renew areas and services 5.1 (2.7) 4.4 (2.4) 4.2 (2.2) 4.3 (2.2) 5.1 (2.2) 4.6 (2.3) 
 
Develop internal organization and work routines 4.8 (2.8) 4.3 (2.3) 5.3 (2.3) 5.2 (2.4) 5.2 (1.6) 5.0 (2.3) 
PPI (N=98, all municipalities) 49 % (15%) 38 % (8%) 47 % (17%) 38 % (17%) 46 % (16%) 43 % (16%) 
PPI (N=75, with survey data) 50 % (16%) 38 % (9%) 47 % (18%) 40 % (19%) 48 % (18%) 45 % (17%) 
Source: INOPS survey data and Statistic Denmark.  
a
 All items measured by an 11-point response-scale with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘Very high degree’). 
b 
The number of cases is relatively low in each category (e.g. N = 8 for North Denmark) and differences between groups should be interpreted with 
caution.  
 
 
Figure 9.  
Differences in purposes of the importance of the purposes for using private contractors across five administration regions 
All items based on responses to the question: “In what degree do you find the following purposes a key part of your municipality’s considerations for using 
private contractors to provide maintenance (in the areas your department has responsibility for)”. Items measured by an 11-point response-scale with 
anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘Very high degree’). 
 
The ranking of the importance of the purposes are also different within each Region. In four 
Regions the purposes of ‘low costs’ and ‘test and benchmark prices’ are among the two to three 
most important purposes. In Region North Denmark, however, ‘low costs’ are of less importance 
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compared to the two most important purposes in this region, which are: ‘test and benchmark prices’ 
and ‘provide work the municipality cannot do’. 
 
5.2.2 Importance of operational responsibilities 
A key characteristic in the organization of road and park departments in Danish municipalities since 
the municipal reform in 1970 has been whether operational responsibilities for maintenance is 
organized together with or separated from administrative and planning responsibilities (Gjelstrup, 
1991; 1992). Later, the public reforms of the 1980s and 1990s emphasized a separation between 
purchaser and provider responsibilities in order to enhance internal management and accountability 
as well as introducing competitive pressures to in-house provision by use of public procurement and 
contracting out (Nuppenau, 2009).  
 
Table 11.  
Differences in purposes for using private contractors for road and park maintenance between respondents with and without 
operational responsibilities 
Importance of purpose 
a
 
Mean scores 
 
Without operational 
responsibilities (N=20) 
With operational 
responsibilities (N=47) 
Mean score  
difference 
b
 
ETA SQ 
  High maintenance quality 5.9 4.7 1.2
 ns (but p = .107)
 .041 
 
Low costs 8.4 7.1 1.3 ** .097 
 Effective management of maintenance 6.3 4.7 1.6 * .073 
 Test and benchmark prices 7.9 7.4 0.5 
ns
 .012 
 Provide work the municipality cannot do 5.0 7.4 2.4 ** .125 
 
Develop and renew areas and services 4.7 4.6 0.1 
ns
 .001 
 
Develop internal organization and work routines 4.7 5.1 0.4 
ns
 .008 
 Level of contracting out (PPI) 
C
 52 % 41 % 11 % * .081 
Sources: INOPS survey data (N = 67) and Statistics Denmark. 
a 
All items measured by an 11-point response-scale with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘Very high degree’).  
b
 Score differences evaluated with two sample t-test at significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
C
 PPI = Private Purchasing Index. Only data for municipalities which use private contractors. 
 
Table 11 shows an analysis of differences in the importance of purposes for using private 
contractors between road and park managers (respondents) which are located in departments with 
and without operational responsibilities. Managers in departments without operational 
responsibilities put in particular greater emphasis on ‘low costs’ (mean score = 8.4) as well as 
‘effective management of maintenance’ (mean score = 6.3) in comparison with managers in 
departments with operational responsibilities (comparable mean scores = 7.1 and 4.7). On the other 
hand, managers in departments with operational responsibilities put greater emphasis on ‘provide 
work the municipal cannot do’ as purpose for using private contractors (mean score = 7.4) than 
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managers in departments without these responsibilities (mean score = 5.0). For the group of 
departments with operational responsibilities the findings indicate that private contractors are used 
in particular for provision of services which cannot readily be provided in-house as well as for 
economic purposes in terms of ‘test and benchmark of prices’ as well as ‘low costs’. For the group 
of departments without operational responsibilities the findings indicate that private contractors are 
used in particular for economic purposes, but also for the purposes of ‘effective management of 
maintenance’ (mean score = 6.3) and ‘high maintenance quality’  (mean score = 5.9). 
Table 12 shows an analysis of differences in the importance of purposes for using in-house 
provision between road and park managers (respondents) which are located in organizations with 
and without operational responsibilities. In general, managers in departments with operational 
responsibilities put greater emphasis on all but one purpose (test and benchmark prices) for using 
in-house provision compared to managers in departments without operational responsibilities. This 
finding indicates that managers in departments with operational responsibilities are involved with 
the in-house provider for a broader range of purposes and utilize the in-house provider to a greater 
extend for serving these purposes. Managers in departments without operational responsibilities still 
find in-house provision relatively important for various purposes but to a lesser extent which 
indicates that these managers are less dependent on in-house provision for serving the various 
purposes. This conclusion is also supported by the difference in mean scores between the two 
groups for the purpose ‘provide work private contractors cannot do’ (difference = 1.6, statistically 
significant at p-level = .1). 
 
Table 12.  
Differences in purposes for using in-house provision for road and park maintenance between respondents with and without 
operational responsibilities  
Importance of purpose 
a
 
Mean score 
 
Without operational 
responsibilities (N=16) 
With operational 
responsibilities (N=45) 
Score  
difference 
b
 
ETA SQ 
  High maintenance quality 6.3 8.1 1.8 ** .142 
 
Low costs 6.3 7.6 1.3 * .067 
 Effective management of maintenance 6.3 8.2 1.9 ** .145 
 Test and benchmark prices 6.1 7.1 1.0 
ns
 .030 
 Provide work private contractors cannot do 5.4 7.0 1.6 
†
 .059 
 
Develop and renew areas and services 5.6 6.8 1.2 
†
 .046 
 
Develop internal organization and work routines 6.1 7.4 1.3 * .068 
 Level of contracting out (PPI) 
 C
 46 % 39 % 7 % * .081 
Sources: INOPS survey data (N = 61) and Statistics Denmark 
a
 All items measured by an 11-point response-scale with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘Very high degree’).  
b
 Score differences evaluated with two sample t-test at significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
C
 PPI = Private Purchasing Index. Only data for municipalities which use in-house providers  
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5.2.3 Importance of political and administrative support 
Political and administrative support in terms of the degree it is a political and administrative aim to 
contract out park and road maintenance services varies among Danish municipalities. On the 
average we find a general support for contracting out at both the political and administrative level in 
Danish municipalities. The mean scores for political and administrative support are 6.8 and 6.1 
respectively on a scale where ‘0 = not at all’ and ’10 = very high degree’. Higher levels of political 
and administrative support are furthermore positively correlated with higher levels of contracting 
out (see plot A and plot B in Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10. Scatterplots and correlations between administrative and political support and the level of contracting out 
Plot A Plot B 
  
Source: INOPS data 2015.  
 
Table 13 shows an analysis of the importance of higher and lower levels of political support 
for the emphasis on different purposes for contracting out road and park maintenance services in 
Danish municipalities. If we divide the municipalities in two groups based on the median value for 
political support we get two roughly equal numbered groups. The group with scores above the 
median value (N=38) has higher political support on the average (mean score = 8.6) while the group 
with values below the median value (N=30) has lower political support on the average (mean score 
= 4.6).  
The analysis of differences in the importance of purposes between the two groups finds that 
they mainly differ in the importance of ‘test and benchmark prices’ where the average score is 
significantly higher in group with higher political support compared to the group with lower 
political support. Higher political support is also associated with higher levels of contracting out. 
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For both groups, economic concerns in terms of the purposes ‘test and benchmark prices’ and ‘low 
costs’ as well as the purpose ‘provide work private contractors cannot do’ are amongst the most 
important (and highly supported). 
    
Table 13.  
Differences in purposes for using private contractors between municipalities with higher and lower levels of political support for 
contracting out road and park maintenance 
Importance of purpose 
a
 
Mean scores 
 
Higher political 
support (N=38) 
c
 
Lower political support 
(N=30) 
c
 
Score  
difference 
b
 
Pearson’s r 
d
 
  High maintenance quality 5.5 4.5 1.0 
ns
 .081 
ns
 
 
Low costs 7.4 7.6 ÷ 0.2 
ns
 .123 
ns
 
 Effective management of maintenance 5.6 4.6 1.0 
ns
 .102 
ns
 
 Test and benchmark prices 8.1 6.7 1.4 
†
 .237 
†
 
 Provide work the municipality cannot do 6.5 7.0 ÷ 0.5 
ns
 ÷ .153 
ns
 
 
Develop and renew areas and services 4.9 4.2 0.6 
ns (p = .125)
 .059 
ns
 
 
Develop internal organization and work routines 5.4 4.5 0.9 
ns
 .173 
ns
 
 Level of political support  8.6 4.6 4.0 * - 
 Level of contracting out (PLI) 49 % 39 % 10 % 
†
 .336 ** 
Source: INOPS survey data (N = 65) 
a
 All items measured by an 11-point response-scale with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘Very high degree’).  
b
 Score differences between the two groups are evaluated with two sample t-tests at significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant.  
c
 Groups based on median value for political support (median value = 7).  
d
 Test for bivariate correlation (Pearson’s r) use the continuous variable for political support (scale: 0-10) to test the associations with purposes (two-
tailed significance levels). 
 
Table 14 shows an analysis of the importance of administrative support similar to the analysis 
shown in Table 13. There are significant differences among the municipalities in the level of 
administrative support for contracting out. The mean score for administrative support in the group 
with higher administrative support is 7.9 while the mean score in the group with lower 
administrative support is 4.3. Test shows that the difference is statistically significant. The analysis 
shows that higher administrative support is significantly associated with higher importance of five 
out of the seven purposes for using private contractors. 
In addition, the importance of the various purposes within each group seems to differ in key 
aspects. In the group with lower administrative support the least important purposes seem to be of 
even lesser importance than in the group with higher administrative support. In the group with 
lower administrative support, mean scores are only above the midscale score of 5 for the three 
‘standard’ purposes of ‘test and benchmark prices’, ‘low costs’ and ‘provide work private 
contractors cannot do’. In the group with higher administrative support, on the other hand, we find 
that scores for all purposes are above the midscale score of 5. This comparison indicates that a 
INOPS  Technical report 
 
107 
greater range of purposes are found important in municipalities with higher administrative support 
for contracting out than in municipalities with lower administrative support.  
  
Table 14.  
Differences in purposes for using private contractors between municipalities with higher and lower levels of administrative support for 
contracting out road and park maintenance 
Importance of purpose 
a
 
Mean scores 
 
Higher administrative 
support (N=34) 
c
 
Lower administrative 
support (N=31) 
c
 
Score  
difference 
b
 
Pearson’s r 
d
 
  High maintenance quality 6.4 3.4 3.0 ** .413 ** 
 
Low costs 7.2 7.7 ÷ 0.6 
ns
 ÷ .139 
ns
 
 Effective management of maintenance 6.6 3.6 3.0 ** .471 ** 
 Test and benchmark prices 8.0 7.1 0.9 
†
 .237 
†
 
 Provide work the municipality cannot do 6.9 6.5 0,4 
ns
 .034 
ns
 
 
Develop and renew areas and services 5.4 3.7 1.8 ** .282 * 
 
Develop internal organization and work routines 5.7 4.2 1.5 * .304 * 
 Level of administrative support 7.9 4.3 3.3 ** - 
 Level of contracting out (PPI) 51 % 39 % 13 % ** .415 ** 
Source: INOPS survey data (N = 65) 
a
 All items measured by an 11-point response-scale with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘Very high degree’).  
b
 Score differences evaluated with two sample t-test at significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant.  
c
 Groups based on median value for administrative support (median value = 7).  
d
 Test for bivariate correlation (Pearson’s r) use the continuous variable for administrative support (scale: 0-10) to test the associations with purposes 
(two-tailed significance levels). 
 
The analysis of the importance of political and administrative support for contracting out shows that 
for both higher political and administrative support ‘test and benchmark prices’ is more pronounced 
purpose than for the groups with lower political and administrative support. Both analyses highlight 
the importance of overall political and administrative support for exploring differences in the 
relative importance of different purposes for using private contractors. This is in particular true for 
the level of administrative support where the importance of five out of seven purposes are different 
between the groups with respectively lower and higher administrative support for contracting out. 
However, despite differences, it should be noted that the level of political and administrative 
support for contracting out park and road maintenance services in general are high among Danish 
municipalities.  
 
5.2.4 Importance of contractual framework 
Analysis of the importance of the design of the contractual framework for the emphasis of the 
purposes for using private contractors is shown in Table 15 and Table 16. Overall, the analysis 
investigates differences in the emphasis on the seven purposes that between municipalities with 
respectively higher and lower levels in the formalization of the transactional as well as the 
INOPS  Technical report 
 
108 
collaborative contractual framework. While some differences in the mix of purposes are found 
between municipalities with higher and lower degrees of formalization of the transactional 
contractual frameworks (Table 15) the differences in the mix of purposes are more striking between 
municipalities with higher and lower degrees of formalization of the collaborative contractual 
frameworks (Table 16). Figure 11 illustrates the differences in the mix of purposes between 
municipalities with higher and lower degrees of formalization of the collaborative contractual 
frameworks in a bar chart. The tests for the linear associations in Table 15 shows that the findings 
based on the split into two groups based on the median value for the level of transactional contract 
framework is not corresponding with findings in a bivariate analysis based on the continuous 
variables. In particular, the tests for linear association find that emphasis on ‘test and benchmark 
prices’ (as well as the level of contracting out) is positively associated (p-level < .1) with higher 
levels of transactional contract framework. The analysis based on group comparisons does not 
indicate any association in these cases. For the analysis of the association between the purposes 
‘high maintenance quality’ and ‘effective management of maintenance’ and the level of 
transactional contract framework both tests shows a (positive) statistical significant association.  
Table 15.  
Differences in purposes for using private contractors for road and park maintenance between respondents with high and low levels of 
formalized transactional contractual frameworks 
Importance of purpose 
a
 
Mean scores 
 
High level  
(N=35) 
Low level  
(N=30) 
Mean score  
difference 
b
 
ETA SQ Pearson’s r 
d
 
  High maintenance quality 5.9 4.1 1.8
 
** .112 .405 ** 
 
Low costs 7.8 7.2 0.6 
ns
 .024 .073 
ns
 
 Effective management of maintenance 5.9 4.3 1.6 * .073 .346 ** 
 Test and benchmark prices 7.8 7.5 0.3 
ns
 .007 .246 
†
 
 Provide work the municipality cannot do 6.6 6.8 ÷ 0.2 
ns
 .001 ÷ .136 
ns
 
 
Develop and renew areas and services 5.0 4.2 0.8 
ns
 .029 .178 
ns
 
 
Develop internal organization and work routines 5.2 4.8 0.4 
ns
 .005 .133 
ns
 
 Level of transactional framework 8.9 5.2 3.7 ** .686 - 
 Level of contracting out (PPI) 
C
 47 % 43 % 4 % 
ns
 .013 .215 
†
 
Sources: INOPS survey data (N = 67) and Statistics Denmark. 
a 
All items measured by an 11-point response-scale with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘Very high degree’).  
b
 Score differences evaluated with two sample t-test at significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
C
 PPI = Private Purchasing Index. Only data for municipalities which use private contractors. 
d
 Test for bivariate correlation (Pearson’s r) use the continuous variable for transactional contract framework (scale: 0-10) to test the associations with 
purposes (two-tailed significance levels). 
 
In particular, those municipalities which have a higher degree of formalization of a ‘collaborative 
framework’ (in terms of requirements for competence, joint planning and close collaboration, 
user/citizen involvement and financial incentives) put greater emphasis on high quality, effective 
management, development and renewal of areas and services and development of organization and 
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work routines as purposes for using private contractors in comparison with those municipalities 
which have a lower degree of formalization of the collaborative framework. Those municipalities 
which have a higher degree of formalization of the collaborative framework also put greater 
emphasis on multiple purposes than those municipalities with a lower degree of formalization of the 
collaborative framework. 
 
Table 16.  
Differences in purposes for using private contractors for road and park maintenance between respondents with high and low levels of 
formalized relational contract frameworks (RCF) 
Importance of purpose 
a
 
Mean scores 
 
High level  
(N=38) 
Low level  
(N=27) 
Mean score  
difference 
b
 
ETA SQ Pearson’s r 
d
 
  High maintenance quality 5.8 3.8 2.0
 
** .121 .304 * 
 
Low costs 7.5 7.6 ÷ 0.1 
ns
 .001 ÷ .156 
ns
 
 Effective management of maintenance 6.4 3.3 3.1 ** .300 .444 ** 
 Test and benchmark prices 7.8 7.3 0.5 
ns
 .016 .192 
ns
 
 Provide work the municipality cannot do 6.6 6.7 ÷ 0.1 
ns
 .001 ÷ .118 
ns
 
 
Develop and renew areas and services 5.5 3.2 2.3 ** .229 .402 ** 
 
Develop internal organization and work routines 5.8 3.8 2.0 ** .174 .374 ** 
 Level of RCF 6.0 2.6 3.4 ** .628 - 
 Level of contracting out (PPI) 
C
 47 % 42 % 5 % 
ns
 .023 .236
 †
 
Sources: INOPS survey data (N = 67) and Statistics Denmark. 
a 
All items measured by an 11-point response-scale with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘Very high degree’).  
b
 Score differences evaluated with two sample t-test at significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
C
 PPI = Private Purchasing Index. Only data for municipalities which use private contractors. 
d
 Test for bivariate correlation (Pearson’s r) use the continuous variable for collaborative contract framework (scale: 0-10) to test the associations with 
purposes (two-tailed significance levels). 
 
Municipalities with a lower degree of formalization of the collaborative framework mainly put 
emphasis on ‘low costs’, ‘test and benchmark prices’ as well as ‘provide work the municipality 
cannot do’. This group of municipalities puts (very) low emphasis on all other purposes. The 
differences in level of contracting out between the groups with high and low formalization of 
collaborative framework are furthermore statistically insignificant. This finding indicates that the 
‘market’ for contracting out of parks and road services is managed through two very different 
contractual frameworks and under two different mixes of purposes.  
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Figure 11. 
Differences in purposes for using private contractors for road and park maintenance between respondents with high and low levels of 
formalized RCF. 
All items based on responses to the question: “In what degree do you find the following purposes a key part of your municipality’s considerations for using 
private contractors to provide maintenance (in the areas your department has responsibility for)”. Items measured by an 11-point response-scale with 
anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘Very high degree’). 
 
5.2.5 Importance of contracting levels and municipal size 
Municipal size and the level of contracting out can also be expected to have importance for the 
purposes for using private contractors. Larger municipalities may, for example, have a larger 
capacity for organizing more specialized tasks in-house and ensure economy of scale for more 
specialized machinery. However, the importance may be subtle as a high level of contracting out 
may reduce the in-house capacity and increase dependency of private contractors. Low levels of 
contracting out may also be associated with a more pronounced use of markets for test and 
benchmark of internal cost levels.  
Table 17 shows an analysis of differences in the importance of seven purposes for using 
private contractors between municipalities with low (0 – 33 %), medium (33 – 66 %) and high (66 – 
100 %) levels of contracting out of road and park maintenance. The level of contracting out is 
measured by calculation based on available municipal statistics of a Private Purchaser Index (PPI) 
for road and park maintenance services. A comparison is also provided in Figure 12. The analysis 
shows that there are statistically significant differences (at p-level < .1) for the purposes of ‘low 
costs’ and ‘provide work the municipal cannot do’ between the groups with low, medium and high 
level of contracting out. In particular, the group with high contracting levels puts less importance 
(mean score = 3.3) for the purpose of ‘provide work the municipal cannot do’ than the groups with 
medium and low contracting levels (mean scores = 7.3 and 6.3). Furthermore, the statistics indicate 
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‘close to significant’ differences (indicated by p-values just above .1) for the purposes of ‘high 
maintenance quality’ and ‘effective management of maintenance’. No differences are indicated in 
the analysis between the three groups of different sized municipalities and the purposes of ‘test and 
benchmark prices’, ‘develop and renew areas and services’ and ‘develop internal organization and 
routines’.  
 
Table 17.  
Analysis of differences in purposes for using private contractors between municipalities with low, medium and high levels of 
contracting out of road and park maintenance 
Importance of purpose 
a
 
Mean scores 
c
  Test of associations
 b
 
Low level  
(N=15)  
Medium level  
(N=46)  
High level  
(N=7) 
 ETA SQ 
Test for linearity 
(R
2
) 
  High maintenance quality 4.3 5.1 6.5  .043
 ns
 .041
 ns
 
(P =.113)
  
 
Low costs 6.4 7.7 8.7  .106 * .105 ** 
 Effective management of maintenance 4.7 5.0 7.3  .065 
ns (p = .121)
 .038 
ns
 
(P =.114)
 
 Test and benchmark prices 7.5 7.6 7.0  .005
 ns
 .002
 ns
 
 Provide work the municipal cannot do 6.3 7.3 3.3  .142 ** .017
 ns
 
 
Develop and renew areas and services 4.6 4.6 4.7  .000 
ns
 .000
 ns
 
 
Develop internal organization and work routines 5.6 4.8 5.2  .024 
ns
 .010 
ns
 
 Level of contracting out (PPI, 2014) 25 % 46 % 85 %  .815 ** .760 ** 
Source: INOPS survey data (N = 68) and Statistics Denmark.  
a
 All items measured by an 11-point response-scale with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘Very high degree’).  
b
 Score differences between groups (ETA SQ and test of linearity) are evaluated at significance levels (SPSS ANOVA): 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = 
non-significant. 
c
 Level of contracting out for parks and roads combined (measured by PPI, 2014): low = 0-33%, medium = 33-66% and high = 66-100%  
 
Figure 12.  
Comparison of differences in purposes for using private contractors between Danish municipalities with low, medium and high levels of 
contracting out  
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Although the differences between the contracting levels for the groups are not strictly a continuous 
scale (formally it is an ordinal scale) measures for linearity indicate that the purposes of ‘high 
maintenance quality’, ‘low costs’ and ‘effective management of maintenance’ are increasingly 
important when contracting levels increases. Additional correlational analysis of bivariate relations 
finds that the relation between contracting level and the three purposes all are positively and 
significantly correlated (p < .1).
50
 Visual inspection of Figure 12 supports this finding. 
 
Table 18.  
Analysis of differences in purposes for using private contractors between municipalities in three different size categories 
Importance of purpose 
a
 
Mean scores 
 
Test of associations 
b
 
< 30,000 30,000 - 90,000 > 90,000 
 
ETA SQ 
Test for linearity 
(R
2
) 
(N=14) (N=45) (N=8) 
 
High maintenance quality 4.3 4.8 7.0 
 
.074 
†
 .040 
ns (p = .111)
 
 
Low costs 7.8 7.4 7.4 
 
.007 
ns
 .005 
ns
 
 
Effective management of maintenance 5.0 4.8 7.4 
 
.091 * .038 
ns (p = .109)
 
 
Test and benchmark prices 7.3 7.4 8.8 
 
.042 
ns
 .023 
ns
 
 
Provide work the municipal cannot do 7.4 6.8 4.6 
 
.070 
ns (p = .107)
 .055 
†
 
 
Develop and renew areas and services 5.0 4.3 5.6 
 
.041 
ns
 .002 
ns
 
  Develop internal organization and work routines 5.0 4.8 6.4  .053 
ns
 .018 
ns
 
  Level of contracting out (PPI, 2014) 
c
 42% 44% 42% 
 
.005 
ns
 .001 
ns
 
Source: INOPS survey data (N = 65) and Statistics Denmark.  
a
 All items measured by an 11-point response-scale with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘Very high degree’). 
b
 Score differences evaluated at significance levels (SPSS ANOVA): 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant 
c 
PPI = Private Purchase Index (Share of total municipal operational budgets spend on private vendors/contractors) 
 
Table 18 shows an analysis of differences in the importance of seven purposes for using private 
contractors between municipalities with less than 30,000 inhabitants, 30,000–90,000 inhabitants 
and more than 90,000 inhabitants. The main findings in the analysis shown in Table 18 are 
supported by analysis of underlying bivariate correlations between municipal size and the seven 
purposes for all purposes except for ‘low costs’.
51
 The analysis of the bivariate correlation shows 
                                                 
50
 Values for Pearson’s and significance in the bivariate analysis for the correlations between contracting levels 
(measured by PPI as a continuous variable) and ’high maintenance quality’, ’low costs’  and ’effective management of 
maintenance’ are .209 (p = .097), .270 (p = .027) and .255 (p = .039). Bivariate correlations between contracting level 
and remaining purposes are all insignificant. However, the correlation between contracting levels and ‘provide work the 
municipal cannot do’ are almost significant at p-level < .1, where Pearson’s = -.201, p = .108. This indicates that this 
purpose is likely to be less important (i.e. the sign is negative for the correlation) for municipalities which contract out a 
larger percentage of their overall park and road maintenance budget.   
51
 Values for Pearson’s and significance in the bivariate analysis for the correlations between municipal size and ’high 
maintenance quality’, ’low costs’, ’effective management of maintenance’ and ‘provide work the municipality cannot 
do’ are .230 (p = .067), -.247 (p = .044), .234 (p = .059) and -.273 (p = .028). Bivariate correlations between contracting 
level and remaining purposes are all insignificant. In the bivariate analysis, municipal size is transformed to natural 
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that ‘low costs’ has a decreasing importance for increasingly larger municipalities (Pearson’s = -
.247, p = .044). This finding indicates that the chosen categories for municipal size in the analysis 
shown in Table 18 are not properly ‘portraying’ the underlying bivariate relationship for this 
particular purpose (‘low costs’).  
 
5.2.6 Explanatory analysis of purposes for using private contractors 
Table 19 provides an explanatory analysis (based on OLS regression analysis) of the differences in 
the emphasis of seven purposes for using private contractors. Overall, the analysis shows that the 
emphasis on the various purposes is associated in various degrees with different strategic (the level 
administrative and political support for contracting out), organizational (organization of operational 
responsibilities and level of contracting out) and general municipal (size measured by number of 
inhabitants) characteristics. By inspecting and comparing the sizes of R
2
 associated with models A - 
G it is clear that the analysis is better at predicting the purposes in model A to E and less so in 
predicting the purposes in model F and G (i.e. emphasis on respectively ‘development of services / 
areas’ and ‘develop organization’). The low values of R
2 
in model F and G indicate that other 
factors (not included in the model) might be expected to be better at predicting the two purposes 
related to development. 
In particular, the analysis finds that the degree whether the use of contracting out is a political 
and / or administrative aim (strategic characteristics) is associated in different ways with the seven 
specific purposes for using private contractors. The importance of contracting out as an 
administrative aim is positively associated with the importance of ‘high quality’, ‘effective 
management’, ‘test and benchmark prices’, ‘development of areas and services’, and finally 
‘develop internal organization and routines’ as purposes for using private contractors. The degree 
whether contracting out is an administrative aim is furthermore negatively associated with the 
importance of ‘low costs’ as the purpose for using private contractors i.e. the stronger contracting 
out is an administrative aim the less importance is ‘low costs’ as a purpose for using private 
contractors.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
logarithm due to strong skewness in the dataset, i.e. a few very large municipalities deviate from the average municipal 
size.   
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Table 19.  
OLS regressions: Importance of seven purposes for using private contractors 
  Importance of purposes (model A-G) for using private contractors (scale 0-10) 
Predictor variables 
Model A  
High 
maintenance 
quality 
Model B  
Low costs 
Model C  
Effective 
management 
Model D  
Test/benchmark 
prices 
Model E 
Work municipal 
cannot do 
Model F  
Develop  
services / areas 
Model G 
Develop 
organization 
Unstandardized beta-coefficients 
a
 
Contract out is a political aim  
(scale: 0-10) 
÷.119 (.151)
ns
 .043 (.107)
ns
 ÷.126 (.141)
ns
 .219 (.125)
†
 -.109 (.165)
ns
 ÷.018 (.136)
ns
 .179 (.132)
ns
 
Contract out is an 
administrative aim (scale: 0-10) 
.553 (.176)** ÷.232 (.127)
†
 .637 (.166)** .311 (.148)* .254 (.195)
ns
 .407 (.161)* .351 (.156)* 
Contracting level, measured by 
PPI (scale: 0 – 100) 
b
 
.190 (2.122)
ns
 3.448 (1.535)* .446 (.2.018)
ns
 ÷4.209 (1.789)* ÷3.127 (2.372)
ns
 ÷1.903 (1.967)
ns
 2.763 (1.901)
ns
 
Direct operational responsibility 
(yes=1 / no= 0) 
÷1.348 (.742)
†
 ÷.858 (.531)
ns
 ÷1.729 (.698)* ÷.557 (.619)
ns
 1.867 (.821)* ÷.439 (.677)
ns
 .445 (.654)
ns
 
Municipal size, inhabitants  
(natural log.) 
.627 (.484)
ns
 ÷.547 (.348)
ns
 .595 (.458)
ns
 .426 (.406)
ns
 ÷1.292 (.542)* ÷.347 (.447)
ns
 .504 (.431)
ns
 
N 63 65 65 65 64 63 63 
VIF Max 1.332 1.324 1.324 1.324 1.329 1.306 1.306 
Adjusted R
2
 .180 .147 .269 .115 .167 .027 .094 
Data sources; INOPS survey data for Denmark and Statistics Denmark.  
Legend: 
†
 p < .1 (two-tailed). * p < .05 (two-tailed), ** p < .01 (two-tailed).
 
ns = non-significant (p >.1) 
a 
Coefficients
 
indicate the level of change in the dependent variable by a one unit scale increase in a predictor variable.  
b 
PPI = Private Purchase Index (Share in % of total municipal operational budgets spend on private vendors/contractors) 
R
2 
= the degree (ranging from 0 to 1) in which predictor variables ‘explain’ the variance in the dependent variable.  
 
The degree whether contracting out is a political aim is only associated (positively) with ‘test and 
benchmark prices’. The degree whether contracting out is a political aim is neither positively or 
negatively associated with the importance of the six remaining purposes. A higher degree of 
contracting out (measured by PPI) is positively associated with the importance of ‘low costs’ as 
purpose while negatively associated with the importance of ‘test and benchmark prices’ as purpose. 
Whose municipalities where the primary road and/or park manager has direct responsibilities for 
operational maintenance has less emphasis on ‘high quality’ and ‘effective management’ and more 
emphasis on the provision of ‘work the municipal cannot provide’ as purposes for using private 
contractors.   
The explanatory analysis in Table 19 furthermore shows that those municipalities where ‘high 
quality’ is emphasized the use of private contractors is more important as an administrative aim and 
are more widespread in the group of municipalities where the primary road and/or park manager has 
no direct operational responsibilities (i.e. the manager is organizationally/administratively separated 
from in-house provision or no in-house provision exists).  
Those municipalities where ‘low costs’ is emphasized the use of private contractors has lesser 
importance as an administrative aim, but has more importance in municipalities which contract out 
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a larger share of their maintenance services (measured as PPI). Those municipalities where 
‘effective management’ is emphasized the use of private contractors has more importance as an 
administrative aim and the importance of ‘effective management’ is higher in the group that has no 
direct operational responsibilities. Those municipalities where ‘test and benchmark of prices’ has 
higher importance the purpose for using private contractors is more important as both a political and 
administrative aim as well as the importance of ‘test and benchmark of prices’ is higher in 
municipalities which contract out to a lesser degree. The importance of the purpose of ‘provide 
work the municipal cannot do’ is more pronounced in the group of municipalities where the 
manager has direct operational responsibilities as well as among smaller municipalities (measured 
by population size). Finally, the analysis shows that the importance of the purposes of ‘development 
of areas and services’ as well as the ‘internal organization and routines’ are more pronounced in 
municipalities where the use of private contractors is more important as an administrative aim.  
In general the explanatory analysis shows that when the administrative level in the 
municipalities more strongly supports contracting out they also emphasize the use of private 
contractors for a range of particular and distinct purposes. Stronger support from the political level 
in the municipalities does not seem to result in a more refined or distinct emphasis in the use of 
private contractors expect for the purpose of ‘test and benchmark prices’.  
Overall, the result from the explanatory analysis indicates that the administrative level uses 
contracting out for a refined set of purposes and this dependent on key organizational and municipal 
characteristics. The political level seems more ‘singular’ in the view on how private contractors 
should be used. The main political interest in the support for using private contractors is ‘test and 
benchmark prices’ which indicate that they are primarily concerned with getting services provided 
by the organizational arrangement which is economically most efficient. The more refined 
definition of the use of private contractors are delegated – or left – to the administrative level.  
 
5.2.7 Alternative explanatory analysis of purposes 
Ideological orientation has been found in several studies to be an important predictor of the 
propensity to contracting out. Table 20 shows a hierarchical OLS regression analysis which 
includes the variables in model B in Table 19 and adds a new variable for the influence of rightwing 
parties in the city council. The new variable is a composite construct based on the percentage of 
rightwing city councilors in the three foregoing election periods (weighted average for years 2005, 
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2009 and 2013).
52
 The similar analysis run (not shown) for all other purposes as response variable 
did not find any significant correlations between ideological orientation in the city council and the 
emphasis on purpose for using private contractors.  
The results of the alternative analysis are somehow surprising.
53
 In short the analysis finds 
that right-wing dominated city councils put less emphasis on low maintenance cost as purpose for 
contracting out than left-wing dominated city councils. The finding is stable across various models 
where additional variables are entered in the regression analysis (model A to F in Table 20). The 
finding may be interpreted in different ways.  
 
Table 20.  
Hierarchical OLS regression: Importance of low maintenance cost for the use of private contractors 
  Importance of low maintenance cost as purpose for the use of private contractors 
Predictor variables 
Model A Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E Model F   
Unstandardized beta-coefficients (standard errors) 
a
 
Right-wing influence in city 
council (0-100 pct.) 
÷5.889 (2.028) ** ÷7.278 (2.068) ** ÷7.128 (2.045) ** ÷7.426 (1.921) ** ÷7.304 (1.905) ** ÷7.228 (1.874) **  
Contract out is a political aim  
(scale: 0-10) 
 .224 (.102) * .260 (.104) * .196 (.099) 
†
 .161 (.101) 
ns
 .148 (.100)
 ns
  
Contract out is an 
administrative aim (scale: 0-10) 
  ÷.162 (.114) 
ns
 ÷.283 (.113) * ÷.257 (.114) * ÷.221 (.114) 
†
  
Contracting level, measured by 
PPI (scale: 0 – 100 pct.) 
b
 
   4.336 (1.377) ** 3.849 (1.404) ** 3.761 (1.381) **  
Direct operational responsibility 
(yes=1 / no= 0) 
    .708 (.484) 
ns
 .776 (.478) 
ns (p =.109)
  
Municipal size, inhabitants  
(natural log.) 
     ÷.541 (.313) 
†
  
N 65 65 65 65 65 65  
VIF Max 1.000 1.103 1.172 1.252 1.327 1.329  
R
2 
/
 
Adjusted R
2
 .118 / .104 .182 / .155 .208 / .169 .320 / .275 .344 / .288 .376 / .312  
Data sources; INOPS survey data for Denmark and Statistics Denmark.  
Legend: 
†
 p < .1 (two-tailed). * p < .05 (two-tailed), ** p < .01 (two-tailed).
 
ns = non-significant (p >.1) 
a 
Coefficients
 
indicate the level of change in the dependent variable by a one unit scale increase in a predictor variable.  
b 
PPI = Private Purchase Index (Share in % of total municipal operational budgets spend on private vendors/contractors). 
 
One interpretation of the results could be that right-wing dominated city councils put relatively 
more emphasis on other purposes for using private contractors. A second interpretation could be 
that right-wing dominated city councils are better off (e.g. has a better tax base) and therefore do 
                                                 
52
 The percentage of ‘right-wing city councillors’ include members from the political parties which traditionally 
supports neoliberal economic policies: Venstre, Konservative, Liberal Alliance, Dansk Folkeparti og Det Radikale 
Venstre. The variable can also be interpreted as the percentage which excludes left-wing city councillors including 
member from the political parties: Socialdemokratiet, Socialistisk Folkeparti, Enhedslisten / De Rød-Grønne as well as 
independent city councillors. Data source: DST.DK. 
53
 Due to the unexpected findings the construction of the variable for ideological orientation of the city council was 
doubled checked.  
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not need to emphasize low maintenance cost as much as left-wing dominated city councils. An 
additional analysis including a variable for the tax base per inhabitant for various years did not, 
however, alter any of the results. A third interpretation could be that when left-wing dominated city 
councils use private contractors as alternative to in-house provision it need to have substantial 
benefits. For right-wing dominated city councils the use of private contracts may have a value in 
itself and do not depend so much upon whether it leads to substantial economic gains (i.e. lower 
cost).  
In addition it is found in the analysis shown in Table 20 that controls for respectively the 
contracting level and the implementation of a disaggregated organization (measured as ‘no direct 
operational responsibilities’) – which both are two hall-mark characteristics of NPM-reforms – 
weakens the association between level of political support for contracting out and low maintenance 
cost as purpose for contracting out (the beta-coefficient is decreased and the association become 
non-significant at p-level < .1 in model C to E). In other words, political support for contracting out 
as a mean for achieving lower costs is higher in municipalities with lower degrees of contracting out 
and low organizational disaggregation.  
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6 ANALYSIS – ORGANIZING CONTRACTING OUT  
6.1 Managing and organizing contracting out 
This chapter investigates how contracting out of park and road maintenance services is managed 
and organized in Danish municipalities and delivers both country specific and comparative analysis 
across Denmark, Sweden, Norway and England. The chapter investigates both the organization of 
the formalized dimensions of contractual frameworks as well as ‘informal’ aspects related to 
behavioral norms between municipalities and their private contractors.  
 
The chapter addresses the following four main questions: 
 
A. Are there differences in the procurement planning and management of maintenance 
contracts between Denmark, England, Sweden and Norway? 
B. How are contractual relations formally organized in Denmark, England, Sweden and 
Norway? 
C. What are the level of (informal) collaborative norms in contractual relations in Denmark, 
England, Sweden and Norway? 
D. Which factors explains inter-municipal differences in formal contractual frameworks?  
 
6.1.1 Key findings 
6.1.1.1 Procuring and managing contracts 
The analysis finds several significant differences among the countries. The organizational capacity 
for contract management is found to be substantial higher in the UK and Denmark than in Sweden 
and Norway. The use of various types of analysis in procurement planning is furthermore 
significantly lower in Norway than in Denmark and Sweden. In particular, external consultants are 
used to a higher degree in Denmark than in Sweden and Norway. The use of control bids / 
calculation are furthermore widely used in Denmark compared to Sweden and Norway.  
In the approach to managing contracts, municipalities in Denmark and Sweden put a 
significantly higher emphasis on operational specifications than Local Authorities in the UK and 
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municipalities in Norway. Local Authorities in the UK, on the other hand, have a higher degree of 
face-to-face meetings and communications with their contractors than municipalities in all 
Scandinavian countries. Overall, Local Authorities in the UK appear best adapted to managing 
contractual relations, followed by municipalities in Denmark, next to Sweden while municipalities 
in Norway, lastly, seem the least adapted.   
6.1.1.2 Formal contract relations 
Features in formal contracts implemented by Danish municipalities in their exchange relations with 
private contractors appear to be organized along two main dimensions. The first dimension 
concerns standard ‘transactional’ contract features such as juridical matters, service specification 
and access to economic sanctions. The second dimension concerns more innovative ‘relational’ 
contract features such as close collaboration and joint planning, contact with and involvement of 
users, competence requirements and specialized economic incentives. The transactional contract 
framework is in general more important than the relational contract framework in Danish 
municipalities’ exchange relations with their private contractors. However, there is a high degree of 
variations among municipalities in the relative importance they put on the two kinds of contract 
frameworks and relational contract features are commonly used.    
  Separate country analyses find that almost similar organizations of the formal contract are 
found in the UK, Sweden and Norway. However, each country has some minor variations compared 
to Denmark. In Norway, for example, competency requirements are not associated with any 
particular groups of contract features, while in Sweden; competency requirements are found to be 
associated with the group of transactional contract features. In the UK, some features are clearly 
associated with a core set of transactional features; a few features can be grouped as part of a core 
relational framework while other features are more loosely interrelated. In comparison with the 
three Scandinavian countries, the findings for UK indicate a more rich and varied landscape in how 
Local Authorities design formal contracts for regulating exchange relations with private contractors.  
 
6.1.1.3 Informal contract relations 
In earlier studies informal behavioral norms have been found to play an important for overall 
contractual performance. In Denmark, municipalities tend to score the institutionalization of mutual 
behavioral norms within their contractual relations with private contractors relatively high. In 
particular, the belief that ‘collaboration’ is necessary for both parties to be successful is found to be 
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highly institutionalized and widespread. ‘Flexibility’ in terms of the readiness of both parties to 
change circumstances for service provision to make work easier for one part is also a highly 
institutionalized behavioral norm. On the other hand, a more generative or ‘friendly’ trust-related 
norm in terms of the belief that it is alright to own one another a favor is less and more uneven 
institutionalized. However, a more passive trust-related norm in terms refraining from exploiting a 
partner’s weakness or mistake for own advantages is relatively highly institutionalized.  
Across the four countries – UK, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, the analysis finds only small 
and insignificant differences in the level of institutionalization of behavioral norms. Only for 
Norway, the analysis indicates a notable difference for one out of six items measuring the informal 
norms. Trust, in terms of the belief that it is alright to own one another a favor is found to be 
substantially lower in Norway than in the three other countries.  
 
6.1.1.4 Determinants of contract design  
The analysis shows that contract design varies among Danish municipalities. In an analysis of the 
determinants of respectively transactional and relational features it is found that Danish 
municipalities deliberatively design their contracts according to strategic purpose, contracting 
capacity, the scale of the tasks and the comparative advantages of relying on both internal (in-
house) and external (private) provision.  
Relational contract features are in particular emphasized in contract design when the 
contracting purpose is related to development of services and organizational. The finding indicates 
that contracts are designed for complementary purposes and not only for cost minimizing concerns. 
On the other hand, relational contract features are less emphasized when a municipality has an in-
house provider hierarchical organized within the park and road administration. The finding 
indicates that some municipalities use contracting out for tasks requiring only little adaptation in 
combination with an in-house provision while municipalities which relies mainly on contracting out 
(or have a strong internal disaggregation of client and provider responsibilities) incorporates 
relational contract features to a greater extent in order to enable a capacity for continuous adaption 
within the contractual relationship.  
Greater emphasis on transactional contract features is mainly associated with the scale of 
tasks (measured by the economic value). Contracts involving larger economic engagements rely on 
transactional contract features to a greater extent than contracts encompassing smaller economic 
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engagements. The use of external advice, such as consultants, in procurement processes is also 
associated with greater emphasis on transactional contract features as well as relational contract 
features. The finding indicates that involvement of external advice is used for designing contracts as 
well as the involvement results in more formalized exchange relations. In addition it is found that 
municipalities which have a higher contract management capacity also rely on more formal 
transactional contract features.  
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6.2 Managing contracting out 
This section explores key aspects of how contracting out is managed in Denmark, Sweden, Norway 
and the UK. The section explores differences in analysis used in procurement planning, 
organizational capacity for contract management as well as approaches in contract management.  
 
6.2.1 Use of analysis in procurement planning  
Table 21 shows the importance of five types of analysis when municipalities procure park and road 
maintenance services in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Denmark is used in the analysis as a 
reference country for comparison of means and test of the statistical significance of inter-country 
differences. 
 
Table 21. 
Scandinavian countries: The use of different types of analysis / instruments in public procurement of park and road maintenance 
services 
Type of analysis 
a
 
Mean scores (standard deviations)  
Denmark 
(N=61) 
b
 
Sweden  
(N=69) 
Norway  
(N=60) 
Three countries 
(N=189) 
c
 
Equality of 
variance 
d
 
Analysis of markets 5.5 (2.7) 5.6 
ns
 (2.1) 3.8 ** (2.8) 5.0 ** (2.5) No 
Analysis of own experiences 6.9 (2.3) 7.8 *  (1.3) 6.1 
†
  (1.9) 7.0 ** (2.0) No 
Advice / use of external consultants 6.3 (2.4) 4.3 **
 
 (2.9) 3.3
 
** (3.4) 4.6 ** (3.1) No 
Analysis of other municipalities experiences 5.9 (2.5) 6.0 
ns
 (2.4) 3.9 **  (2.6) 5.3 ** (2.6) Yes 
Analysis of legal and procurement options 7.0 (2.1) 7.0 
ns
 (2.5) 4.6 ** (2.9) 6.2 ** (2.7) no 
Source: INOPS survey data (no available data for UK).  
a
 All items measured by the respondent’s agreement with the statement on an 11-point response scale with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘very high 
degree’). 
b 
Denmark is used as a ‘benchmark country‘ for comparison of differences with two other countries (ONE-WAY ANOVA with Tukey and Games-Howell 
post hoc test). Significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
c 
Test for significance of differences between at least one country and the others (ONE-WAY ANOVA). 
d 
Levene’s test for equality of variance, p-level = .05.  
 
Within all three countries, municipalities use ‘analysis of own experiences’ and ‘analysis of legal 
and procurement options’ to a higher degree than the three other type of analysis. This indicates a 
relatively ‘inward’ orientation as well as the importance of compliance with legal regulations for 
public procurement (governed by national implementation of EU-laws) in the three countries. In 
Norway, however, the emphasis on analysis of: ‘legal and procurement options’ is significant lower 
than the emphasis in Denmark and Sweden. The mean score difference for ‘legal and procurement 
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options’ is 2.4 and statistically significant at p-level < .01 in comparison with both Denmark and 
Sweden.   
In comparison, municipalities in Denmark use all types of analysis to a greater degree than 
municipalities in Norway. In a comparison between Denmark and Sweden, three out of five types of 
analysis are used to the same extent in the two countries. However, Danish municipalities use 
external consultants to a greater degree while Swedish municipalities put greater emphasis on own 
experiences in comparison with Denmark (as well as Norway). Municipalities in Sweden are the 
more ‘introvert’ in terms of the degree they use analysis of ‘own experiences’ compared to 
municipalities in Denmark (mean score difference = .9, p = .025) as well as Norway (mean score 
difference = 1.7, p < .01). While Swedish municipalities seem more introvert and self-sufficient, 
Danish municipalities seems more ‘extrovert’ by their higher reliance on external consultants.  
The lesser use of the various types of analysis among Norwegian municipalities in the 
comparison between Denmark and Norway is also found to be statistically significant in the 
comparison between municipalities in Sweden and Norway for all types of analysis except for 
‘advice / use of external consultants’ (mean score difference = 1.0, p = .184). Norwegian 
municipalities seems to be the most introvert by their high reliance on ‘own experiences’ (mean 
score = 6.1), compared to other types of analysis, in particular the use of external consultants (mean 
score = 3.3), in their procurement planning. 
Overall, the level of analysis in procurement planning can be said to be equal among Danish 
and Swedish municipalities while only differing in degree of the type of analysis they rely on. 
Municipalities in Norway clearly rely less on analysis in procurement planning compared to 
municipalities in Denmark and Sweden. One particular finding is that the use of external 
consultants is significantly higher in Denmark than in Sweden (mean score difference = 2.0) and 
Norway (mean score difference = 3.0).  
 
6.2.2 Use of control bids in public procurements 
Table 22 shows data for the use of control bids in public procurement of park and road maintenance 
services in the three Scandinavian countries. The number of valid replies was very low for Norway. 
The very low number of replies in Norway is interpreted as an indication of a very low use of 
control bids / calculations among Norwegian municipalities. For Sweden, a relative high number of 
respondents provided a valid reply. Only a fraction of the replies from Swedish municipalities 
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indicated that they used control bids / calculations. For Denmark, the data indicates that control bids 
/ calculation is used by approximately one half of all municipalities when they procure park and/or 
road services. Overall the data indicates that control bids / calculations are mostly used in Denmark, 
while only used by a minority in Sweden and finally rarely used in Norway.  
 
Table 22. 
Scandinavian countries: Use of control bids / calculations in public procurements 
 
Number of municipalities 
using procurement 
Valid N (replied 
on question) 
a
 
Number of municipalities 
indicating use of control bids 
Interpretation  
Norway 
(N=95) 
56 8 5 Control bids is not commonly used 
Denmark 
(N=75) 
58 46 28 Control bids is used on one half of all cases 
Sweden 
(N=115) 
72 65 14 Control bids is used in a minority of cases 
Scandinavia 
(N=285) 
186 118 47 
The use of control bids differs across the three 
Scandinavian countries 
Source: INOPS survey data (no available data for UK).   
a 
The respondents were asked to indicate (‘yes’ or ‘no’) whether their municipality used control bid/calculation last time they procured park and/or road 
maintenance services.  
 
6.2.3 Managing maintenance contracts  
Table 23 shows a comparison of the importance of four different aspects in the management of 
parks and road maintenance contracts in the UK, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The UK is used in 
the analysis as a reference country for comparison of means and test of the statistical significance of 
inter-country differences. 
 
Table 23.  
Four countries: Managing maintenance contracts 
Aspect 
a
 
Means (standard deviations) 
c
 
 
UK  
(N=56) 
b
 
Sweden  
(N=75) 
Norway  
(N=74) 
Denmark  
(N=67) 
Four countries  
(N=271) 
c
 
Equality of 
variance 
d
 
Adherence to ‘hard sanctions’ for non-
compliance 
5.0 (3.1) 4.3
 ns
 (2.5) 3.7 *  (2.8) 4.9 
ns
 (2.3) 4.4 * (2.7) Yes 
Use of face-to-face meetings / 
communications 
8.4 (1.8) 7.0 ** (2.5) 6.0 ** (2.4) 7.3 **
 
 (1.8) 7.1 ** (2.3)  No 
Focus on operational specifications 7.1 (1.9) 8.2 ** (1.9) 7.6 
ns
 (2.0) 8.3 **  (1.3) 7.8 * (1.8) Yes 
Focus on strategic and long-term aims 7.8 (2.1) 7.2 
ns
 (2.1) 6.8 
†
 (2.3) 7.3
 ns
 (1.9) 7.3 
†
 (2.1) Yes 
Source: INOPS survey data   
a
 All items measured on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 = ‘not at all’, 10 = ‘very high degree’).  
b 
UK is used as a ‘benchmark country‘ for comparison of differences between the four countries (ONE-WAY ANOVA with Tukey and Games-Howell post 
hoc test). Significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
c 
Test for significance of differences between at least one country and the others (ONE-WAY ANOVA). 
d 
Levene’s test for equality of variance, p-level = .05.  
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The comparison finds several significant differences between the countries. In particular, 
Local Authorities in the UK use ‘face-to-face meetings / communications’ to a higher degree than 
the municipalities in Denmark, Sweden and Norway. The differences in mean scores for: ‘face-to-
face meetings / communications’ are statistically significant (p < .01) in comparison between the 
UK and all three Scandinavian countries. On the other hand municipalities in both Denmark and 
Sweden have a greater emphasis on ‘focus on operational specifications’ than Local Authorities in 
the UK. The differences in mean scores for: ‘focus on operational specifications’ are statistically 
significant (p < .01) in comparisons between the UK and Denmark and Sweden, but not in 
comparison with Norway. 
The comparison also shows that municipalities in Denmark compared to municipalities in 
Norway to a greater extent use ‘adherence to hard sanctions for non-compliance’ (mean difference 
= 1.15, p = .059), ‘face-to-face meetings / communications’ (mean difference = 1.3, p < .01) and a 
‘focus on strategic and long-term aims’ (mean difference = .7, p = .107). On the other hand, the 
emphasis on the four aspects in the management of contracts is very similar in Denmark and 
Sweden. 
6.2.4 Organizational capacity for contracting out  
Table 24 shows a comparison of the organizational capacity for contracting out in Local Authorities 
in the UK and municipalities in Denmark, Sweden and Norway. The UK is used in the analysis as a 
reference country for comparison of means and test of the statistical significance of inter-country 
differences. 
 
Table 24.  
Four countries: Organizational capacity for contracting out 
Aspect 
a
 
Means (standard deviations) 
c
 
UK  
(N=55) 
b
 
Sweden  
(N=68) 
Norway  
(N=71) 
Denmark  
(N=65) 
Four countries  
(N=259) 
d
 
Equality of 
variance 
d
 
Sufficient organizational resources (time and staff) 5.7 (2.6) 
4.6 
ns 
(p=.107)
 
(2.8) 4.1 ** (2.9) 5.7 
ns
 (2.5) 5.0 ** (2.8) Yes 
Sufficient knowledge and experience  8.0 (1.9) 6.9 * (2.0) 6.6 ** (2.5) 7.4 
ns
 (1.8) 7.2 ** (2.1) No 
Sufficient methods and systems (IT, GIS) 7.0 (1.9) 6.6 
ns
 (2.5) 5.4 ** (2.8) 7.3 
ns
 (1.8) 6.5 ** (2.5) No 
Sufficient routines and procedures  7.5 (1.5) 6.2 ** (2.3) 5.4 ** (2.4) 7.0 
ns
 (1.9) 6.5 ** (2.2) No 
Source: INOPS survey data   
a
 All items measured on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 = ‘not at all’, 10 = ‘very high degree’).  
b 
UK is used as a ‘benchmark country‘ for comparison of differences between the four countries (ONE-WAY ANOVA with Games-Howell post hoc test). 
Significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
c 
Test for significance of differences between at least one country and the others (ONE-WAY ANOVA). 
d 
Levene’s test for equality of variance, p-level = .05.  
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For all countries, ‘organizational resources’ are less sufficient than the three other organizational 
aspects. The statistics for standard deviations furthermore indicate that the organizational resources 
are very insufficient for substantial groups of municipalities / Local Authorities in all countries. The 
mean scores for sufficiency of ‘organizational resources’ are furthermore significantly higher 
among Local Authorities in the UK (mean score = 5.7) and municipalities in Denmark (mean score 
= 5.7) than among municipalities in Norway (mean score = 4.1) and Sweden (mean score = 4.6).  
The comparison shows that the Local Authorities in the UK have an overall greater capacity 
for managing contracts than municipalities in Sweden and Norway. The mean differences are 
greatest between the UK and Norway. No statistically significant differences are found in the 
capacity between municipalities in Denmark and Local Authorities in the UK. The mean differences 
between municipalities in Denmark and municipalities in Norway are statistically significant (p 
<.01) for ‘organizational resources’, ‘methods and systems’, and ‘routines and procedures’. 
However, the difference for ‘knowledge and experience’ is not significant (p = .153). The mean 
differences between municipalities in Denmark and municipalities in Sweden are statistically 
significant for ‘organizational resources’ (p <.091). The mean differences are not significant for 
‘knowledge and experience’ (p = .485), ‘methods and systems’ (p = .216), and ‘routines and 
procedures’. (p = .127). The mean differences between municipalities in Sweden and Norway are 
only significant for ‘methods and systems’ (p = .061). 
In general, the comparison indicates than the sufficiency of organizational capacities for 
managing maintenance contracts are highest among Local Authorities in the UK and municipalities 
in Denmark while the sufficiency is a little less among municipalities in Sweden and lowest among 
municipalities in Norway.  
 
6.3 Organization of contractual relations 
The first parts of this section explore the levels and variations in formal and informal organization 
of contractual relations used managing private providers of park and road maintenance in Danish 
municipalities. The end of section explores variations in the formal organization of contractual 
relations in respectively Sweden, Norway and the UK.  
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6.3.1 Formal contract relations in Danish municipalities 
Earlier research shows that contractual frameworks used for provision of park maintenance vary in 
their formalized characteristics. Lindholst (2009) found that the ‘contractual infrastructure’ in park 
maintenance contracts broadly relied on more than 40 different ‘instruments’ which could be 
grouped into about 15 different approaches for managing different contractual functions, e.g. 
‘monitoring’ and ‘specification’. The variations in ‘instruments’ and ‘approaches’ were 
furthermore found to be aligned with three different types of overall ‘contractual arrangements’. 
The general literature highlights two key types of relations with the private sector. One 
characterized as ‘partnerships’ and one characterized as ‘transactional contracts’ (e.g. Sullivan and 
Skelcher, 2002). 
The INOPS survey provides insights into the importance of the use of eight key contract 
dimensions which covers key features from the different types of contractual arrangements, 
including standard as well as more collaborative approaches to contracting out.  
 
Table 25. 
Denmark: Formal contract dimensions for managing and organizing provision of park and road maintenance services by 
private contractors 
Importance of formal dimension 
a
 
Descriptive statistics 
N  Mean S.D. 
Juridical clauses / agreement (§§) 67 7.8 2.3 
Service specification based on quantities, instruction and 
performance measures 
67 7.7 2.3 
Formal sanctions in case of non-compliance 67 6.7 2.9 
Competence requirements  67 6.6 2.4 
Service specification based on functionality and purpose 66 6.4 3.0 
Formal collaboration and joint planning  66 6.0 3.0 
Contractor’s involvement / contact with users 65 2.9 2.8 
Economic incentives for investment, improvements and optimization 66 2.8 2.8 
a
 All items measured on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 = ‘not at all’, 10 = ‘very high degree’) on the question. “On a scale from 0 to 10, please indicate in 
which degree the following content is a central part of your department’s arrangements with private contractors”.  
 
Table 25 shows the importance of eight formal contract dimensions in Danish municipalities’ 
relations with private providers of park and road maintenance. Two dimensions are generally found 
to be very important. These dimensions include ‘juridical clauses / agreement (§§)’ (mean score = 
7.8) and ‘service specification based on quantities, instruction and performance measures’ (mean 
score = 7.7). Four other dimensions are found to be of medium importance. These dimensions 
include ‘formal sanctions in case of non-compliance’ (mean score = 6.7), ‘competence 
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requirements’ (mean score = 6.6), ‘service specifications based on functionality and purpose’ 
(mean score = 6.4) and ‘formal collaboration and joint planning’ (mean score = 6.0). Dimensions 
related to alternative contractual approaches, including ‘contractor’s involvement / contact with 
users’ and ‘Economic incentives for investment, improvements and optimization’ are on the average 
found of less importance (both mean scores below 3.0).  
The figures for standard deviations in Table 25 show that the inter-municipal differences in 
general are high (ranging from 2.3 to 3.0). The highest levels of inter-municipal differences are 
found for ‘formal collaboration and joint planning’ (S.D. = 3.0) which indicates that the scores for 
66 % of the municipalities lies between 3.0 and 9.0 and for ‘service specifications based on 
functionality and purpose’ (S.D. = 3.0) which indicates that the scores for 66 % of the 
municipalities lies between 3.4 and 9.4.The inter-municipal differences are smallest for ‘juridical 
clauses / agreement (§§)’ (S.D. = 2.3) and ‘service specification based on quantities, instruction 
and performance measures’ (S.D. = 2.3). 
 
 
Figure 13. Formal contract dimensions for managing and organizing provision of park and road maintenance  
by private contractors in Denmark (boxplots) 
 
 
The information given by the boxplots in Figure 13 provide further insights into the high levels of 
inter-municipal differences reported in Table 25. Similar to the figures on standard deviations, the 
Note: Boxplot (SPSS output) illustrating the distribution of quartiles and outliers. The filled boxes represents 50 % of the 
cases, the top of the box represent the 75 % quartile and the bottom the 25 % quartile. The middle of the box represents 
the median value (or the 50 % quartile). 95 % of all cases are expected to lie between the two whiskers extending from the 
box. Data source: INOPS data 2015. 
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boxplot shows least variation among the municipalities for the importance of ‘juridical clauses / 
agreement (§§)’ and ‘service specification based on quantities, instruction and performance 
measures’ compared to the other six other contract dimensions. This indicates that there is relatively 
higher agreement (less difference) among the municipalities on the importance they put on these 
contract dimensions than the other six contract dimensions. A few ‘outliers’, i.e. municipalities 
which strongly deviate from the median value, contribute to some of the variance in the importance 
of ‘service specification based on quantities, instruction and performance measures’ as well  
‘competency requirements’. 
The boxplots also show that although the average scores for some contract dimensions are 
relatively low still some municipalities scores these dimensions higher. For example, 25 % of the 
municipalities give score between 6 and 10 for ‘contractor’s involvement / contact with users’ and 
‘Economic incentives for investment, improvements and optimization’. In other words, substantial 
groups of municipalities evaluate these dimensions as having relatively high importance in their 
contractual frameworks. Likewise the boxplots also shows that significant groups of municipalities 
finds some contract dimensions, e.g. ‘service specifications based on functionality and purpose’, of 
less importance (i.e. scores for the first quartile range between 0 and 4 or 5).   
Overall, the analysis shows a large degree of inter-municipal differences in the importance of 
the eight contract dimensions. In particular, the analysis shows that all contract dimensions are 
important for either smaller or larger groups of municipalities. However, some contract dimensions 
are clearly more widespread and the importance of these dimensions varies less among the 
municipalities. The findings also indicate that more complex contractual arrangements haven’t 
found a widespread use for private provision of park and road maintenance services (at the sector 
level). The dominant features in the contractual frameworks engaging with private providers for 
provision of road and park maintenance relies on well-tried contractual features, though a minor 
group of municipalities have adopted more ‘alternative’ contract features. 
 
6.3.1.1 Two types of formal frameworks 
Further statistical analysis (factor analysis) of data for Denmark shows that the eight contract 
dimensions can be grouped into two more general ‘factors’, i.e. some dimensions can be said to be 
‘belong’ or ‘go’ together when they are used by the Danish municipalities.  
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Factor analysis 
An explorative factor analysis was carried out with the aim of identifying any potential ‘factors’ 
which could be used for constructing composite scores for the eight items measuring the level of 
formalized contract framework.  
The ‘factorability’ of the eight items, i.e. suitability of factor analysis, was initially assessed 
by standard criteria. Diagnosis statistics indicate that factor analysis is appropriate. The ratio 
between the total number of available cases for factor analysis (N = 64, listwise) and the number of 
items (8) is reasonable for explorative factor analysis (a ratio > 5) but not ideal (a ratio > 20). All 
items are correlated to several other items in some degree (>.4), indicating that all items share some 
common variance with other items, and anti-image correlations (diagonals) are all well above the 
recommended minimum of .500 (>= .746). Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin of sampling adequacy is .833 (well 
above the recommend minimum value of .500) and Barlett’s test of sphericity is also significant (x
2
 
(28) = 228.216, p < .001). The factor analysis was run as a principal component analysis (PCA) 
with direct oblimin rotation. The PCA method is suitable for explorative factor analysis where the 
purpose is to identify composite constructs for further analysis. The chosen rotation method allows 
correlations to co-exist between extracted factors. Main results from the factor analysis are shown 
in Table 26.  
 
Table 26. 
Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal component analysis with oblimin rotation for 8 survey items on 
formalized contract features 
Items  
Primary factor loadings and communalities 
a
 
Formalized transactional 
contract framework (TCF) 
Formalized relational contract 
framework (RCT) 
Communalities 
 Juridical clauses / agreement (§§) .930  .791 
 
Service specification based on functionality and 
purpose 
.679  .650 
 
Service specification based on quantities, instruction 
and performance measures  
.917  .771 
 Formal sanctions in case of non-compliance  .777  .749 
 Formal collaboration and joint planning  (.301) .562 .577 
 Contractor’s involvement / contact with users  .774 .600 
 
Economic incentives for investment, improvements 
and optimization  
 .898 .710 
 Competence requirements  .668 .523 
a
 N = 64 (list wise) Two factors extracted (Eigenvalues > 1). Factor loadings below .3 are suppressed. Solution extracted in 6 iterations. 
Secondary factor loadings in brackets.  
 
Two factors with Eigenvalues above 1 were extracted. The two extracted factors explain a total of 
67 % of the total inter-item variance. The first factor, labeled ‘formalized transactional contract 
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framework’, explains approximately 53 % of the variance while the second factor, ‘formalized 
relational contract framework’, explains approximately 14 % of the variance. The correlation 
between the two factors is .501. The internal consistency (reliability) of the underlying items in the 
two factors was checked by analysis of values for Cronbach’s Alpha. The Alpha value was good for 
items included in the first factor (Alpha = .870) while moderate for items included in the second 
factor (Alpha =.764). Values for Alpha could furthermore not be improved by removing any items 
included in the two extracted factors.   
The theoretical interpretation of the two factors was assisted by research reported in Lindholst 
(2009) and the general literature on contracting out and public-private collaboration in the public 
sector. The first factor is clearly related with the standard contract features of transactional (or 
‘discrete’) economic exchange. The second factor is similarly clearly associated with newer (or 
‘extended’) contract features introduced as part of new public governance reforms which has 
emphasized partnerships and collaboration as key features in public-private relations. As also 
suggested by Lindholst (2009) the formal features are not mutual exclusive and in practice they are 
combined and integrated in contract frameworks in various degrees.  
Composite scores were created for both factors, based on simple summative scores for the 
corresponding items which had their primary loading on the respective factor.  Descriptive statistics 
for the composite (index) constructs are shown in Table 27.  
 
Table 27. 
Descriptive statistics for index constructs: formalized transactional and relational contract framework (TCF and RCF) 
Constructs 
a
 
Descriptives 
No. of 
items 
Mean 
(S.D) 
b
 
Min-Max 
value 
Skewness Kurtosis Alpha 
Formalized transactional contract framework (TCF) 4 7.17 (2.25) 1.25-10.00 -.607 -.326 .870 
Formalized relational contract framework (RCT) 4 4.60 (2.10) .50-10.00 .158 -.075 .764 
a
 N = 65 
b 
Scale: 0-10 (where 0=’not at all’ and 10=’in very high degree’ in the scales used in the original items). 
 
The correlation (Pearson’s) between the two composite constructs (TCF and RCF) is .602 (p < .001, 
two tailed). Values for skewness and kurtosis indicate whether the two constructs can be regarded 
as approximately normal distributed. The construct for the level of formalized transactional contract 
framework is strongly left skewed (skewness = -.607), e.g. has a long ‘thick’ left tail and cannot be 
regarded as normally distributed around the mean value. The construct for the level of formalized 
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relational contract framework is right skewed in some degree (Skewness = .158) but can still be 
regarded as normally distributed.
54
  
 
6.3.1.2 Inter-municipal variations in formal contract framework 
The levels of formalized transactional and relational contract frameworks used for organizing 
relations with private providers of park and road maintenance vary across Danish municipalities 
(see also Table 27). Figure 14 shows a graphical presentation of the inter-municipal variations. The 
presentation orders the cases (municipalities) from left to right by the level of formalized 
transactional contract framework.  
 
Figure 14.  
Graphical presentation of variations in the level of formalized transactional and relational contract frameworks used by Danish 
municipalities for organizing relations with private providers of park and road maintenance 
Visual inspection of the graphical presentation in Figure 14 shows that only for few cases (7 out of 
64 municipalities) the scores for the level of formalized relational contract framework are higher 
than or equals the scores for the level of formalized transactional contract framework. The 
graphical presentation in Figure 14 also shows that in most cases the formalized transactional 
                                                 
54
 Tests for normality (Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk) support conclusions on normality. Both tests are 
significant for TCF and insignificant for RCF.  
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Graphical presentation of variations in the level of formal contract framework (transactional and relational) in Danish 
municipalities' relations with private contractors delivering road and park maintenance services. Cases organized by their overall 
level of contract framework (from low to high). N=64. 
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contract framework is substantially more important than the formalized relational contract 
framework and the level of formalized relational contract framework varies to a good extent for 
groups of cases with approximately the same level of formalized transactional contract framework. 
However, a high correlation (Pearson’s = .602, p < .001) between the two types of frameworks for 
all cases is also evident in the graphical presentation. The tendency (marked by the linear trend line 
for RCF in Figure 14) shows that on the average, a higher level of formalized transactional contract 
framework also involves a higher level of formalized relational contract framework (and vice 
versa).  
Overall the analysis highlights that the formalized relational contract framework partly is an 
‘add on’ to the formalized transactional contract framework, and partly that the level of formalized 
relational contract framework increases with higher levels of formalized transactional contract 
framework (a degree of co-variation).  
 
6.3.2 Informal contractual relations in Denmark 
Theory and extensive research has highlighted the importance of informal relations and norms, 
including trust, for the performance of contractual governance and relations (Macneil, 1980; 
Cannon et al, 2000; Campbell, 2001; Poppo et al, 2002; Brown and Potoski, 2007, Fernandez, 2007; 
2009).  
The INOPS survey used altogether six items for measurement of the degree of the mutual 
institutionalization of behavioral (informal) norms in relations between municipalities and their 
private contractors which provide park and road maintenance services. The respondents were asked 
to indicate the degree they agreed with six different statements. The degree of mutual 
institutionalization was measured on an 11-point response scale where 0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = 
‘very high degree’. Table 28 shows the operationalization of the six behavioral norms as well as key 
statistics for the six items. Operationalization of the six items is based on an adaption of measures 
used in earlier research. The six dimensions are for convenience labeled to more shorthand terms: 
‘collaboration’, ‘mutuality’,  ‘flexibility’, ‘lack of opportunism’, ‘trust’, and ‘solidarity’. It should 
be noted that the item ‘lack of opportunism’ can be interpreted as a second measure for trust (see 
also discussion below).  
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Table 28. 
The degree of institutionalization of behavioral norms in relations with private contractors (Denmark) 
Dimension of behavioral norms 
a
  Descriptives 
Construct Operationalization N Mean S.D. 
      
‘Collaboration’  “We both believe that collaboration is necessary for each of us can be successful” 68 8.1 1.4 
‘Mutuality’  “We are both concerned whether our partner achieves her aims”,  
 
66 6.6 2.2 
‘Flexibility’  ”We are both ready to change circumstances for service provisions if it makes the 
work easier for one part” 
66 7.5 1.7 
‘Lack of opportunism’ “None of us would exploit a weakness or mistake by the other for own advantage” 64 6.8 2.2 
‘Trust’ “We both think it is alright to own one another a favour” 
 
64 5.4 2.7 
‘Solidarity’  ”We both believe that problem-solving is a joint responsibility regardless who of us 
that has the blame”.  
66 6.8 2.3 
      
N = 68 
 
a
 All items measured by the respondent’s agreement with the statement on an 11-point response scale with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = 
‘very high degree’).  
 
The analysis shows that ‘collaboration’ (mean score = 8.1) and ‘flexibility’ (mean score = 7.5) 
characterize the relations with private contractor in relatively high degrees while ‘trust’ (mean score 
= 5.4) characterize the relations in a lower degree. The analysis furthermore shows relatively little 
variation among the municipalities in the institutionalization of the norm for ‘collaboration’ (S.D. = 
1.4) while relatively high level of variation is found for ‘trust’ (S.D. = 2.7). However, theoretically, 
the measure for ‘lack of opportunism’ (mean score = 6.8, S.D. = 2.2) may also be interpreted as an 
expression of trust in terms of a willingness to be vulnerable to another party (see Rousseau et al., 
1998: 395).
55
 
The information given by the boxplots in Figure 15 provide further information on inter-
municipal differences reported by standard deviations in Table 28. Similar to the figures on 
standard deviations, the boxplot shows least variation among the municipalities for the importance 
of ‘need for collaboration’ and ‘flexibility’ compared to the other four other norms. This indicates 
that there is relatively lesser difference among the municipalities (and their private providers) in the 
level of institutionalization of these two norms compared to the other four norms. A few ‘outliers’, 
i.e. municipalities which strongly deviate from the median value, contribute to some of the variance 
in the level of institutionalization of norms related to ‘collaboration’, ‘mutuality’, ’flexibility’ as 
well  ‘solidarity’. 
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 After reviewing research on trust in a number of different fields Rousseau et al. (1998) found that many definitions of 
trust center on a person’s willingness to be vulnerable to another party. Rousseau et al. proposed a 'cross-disciplinary' 
definition of trust, which states that “trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based  
upon positive expectations of the intentions of another" (Rousseau et al., 1998: 395). 
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Figure 15. Level of institutionalization of informal contract norms in contractual relations  
between Danish municipalities and private providers of park and road maintenance (boxplots) 
 
 
The boxplots also show that although the average scores for some informal norms are relatively low 
still some municipalities score the institutionalization of these norms higher. For example, 25 % of 
the municipalities give scores between 7 and 10 for ‘trust’ while the median value is 5. In other 
words, significant groups of Danish municipalities evaluate this norm as being relatively more 
institutionalized in their contractual relations with private providers. Likewise the boxplots also 
shows that significant groups of municipalities find some norms, e.g. ‘trust’, less institutionalized 
(i.e. scores for the first quartile range between 0 and 4).   
 
6.3.2.1 Two set of informal norms 
Further statistical analysis (factor analysis) of the data from Danish municipalities shows that the 
six contractual norms can be grouped into two more general ‘factors’, i.e. some norms are ‘bundled’ 
together.  
 
Factor analysis 
An explorative factor analysis was carried out with the aim of identifying any potential ‘factors’ 
which could be used for constructing or validate composite scores for the six items measuring the 
level of institutionalization of informal contractual norms.  
Note: Boxplot (SPSS output) illustrating the distribution of quartiles and outliers. The filled boxes represents 50 % of the 
cases, the top of the box represent the 75 % quartile and the bottom the 25 % quartile. The middle of the box represents 
the median value (or the 50 % quartile). 95 % of all cases are expected to lie between the two whiskers extending from the 
box. Data source: INOPS data 2015. 
INOPS  Technical report 
 
136 
The ‘factorability’ of the six items, i.e. suitability of factor analysis, was initially assessed by 
standard criteria. Diagnosis statistics indicate that factor analysis was appropriate. The ratio (> 10) 
between the total number of available cases for factor analysis (N = 61, listwise) and the number of 
items (6) is reasonable for explorative factor analysis (which should be a ratio > 5) but not ideal 
(which should be a ratio > 20). All items are correlated to several other items in some degree (p > 
.4), indicating that all items share some common variance with other items, and anti-image 
correlations (diagonals) are all above the recommended minimum of .500 (all expect one are > 
.700). Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin of sampling adequacy is .678 (above the recommend minimum value of 
.500) and Barlett’s test of sphericity is also significant (x
2
 (15) =126.316, p < .001).  
The factor analysis was run as a principal component analysis (PCA) with oblimin rotation. 
The PCA method is suitable for explorative factor analysis where the purpose is to identify 
composite constructs for further analysis. The chosen rotation method allows correlations to co-
exist between extracted factors. Main results from the factor analysis are shown in Table 29. Two 
factors with Eigenvalues above 1 were extracted. The two extracted factors explain a total of 69 % 
of the total inter-item variance. The first factor, labeled ‘proactive contract norms’ explains 
approximately 51 % of the variance while the second factor, reactive contract norms, explains 
approximately 18 % of the variance. The correlation between the two extracted factors is .373. The 
relatively low level of communality, i.e. variance explained by the factors, for ‘solidarity’ (.585) 
and its relatively high secondary factor loading (.384) might raise a little concern regarding the 
reliability of the second factor (reactive collaborative norms).  
 
Table 29. 
Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal component analysis with oblimin rotation for 6 survey items on 
informal contractual norms 
Items  
Primary factor loadings and communalities 
a
 
Proactive collaborative norms  Reactive collaborative norms Communalities 
 ‘Collaboration’  .980  .850 
 ‘Mutuality’  .735  .632 
 ‘Flexibility’  .736  .713 
 ‘Lack of opportunism’  .717 .621 
 ‘Trust’  ..890 .716 
 ‘Solidarity’  (.384) .533 .585 
a
 N = 61 (list wise) Two factors extracted (Eigenvalues > 1). Factor loadings below .3 are suppressed. Solution extracted in 7 iterations. 
Secondary factor loadings larger than .3 are shown in brackets.  
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The internal consistency (reliability) of the underlying items in the two factors was checked by 
analysis of values for Cronbach’s Alpha. The Alpha value was good for items included in the first 
factor (.790) while acceptable for items included in the second factor (.676). Values for Alpha could 
be slightly improved by removing the item of ‘mutuality’ (resulting in an increase to .804) in the 
first factor (proactive collaborative norms) while no improvements would accrue from removing 
any items included in the second factor (reactive collaborative norms).  
Overall, the factor analysis shows that the six items can be grouped into two composite 
constructs each based on three survey items. However, an index variable based on all six items are 
also found to have a good internal consistency (Cronbach Alpha = .784). The internal consistency 
could be slightly improved (Alpha = .793) by removing one item (‘trust’). Factor analysis (PCA, 
direct oblimin, Eigenvalues > .1) based on the five remaining items did only extract one underlying 
factor which explained 57 % of the total variance.    
Earlier studies of collaborative norms in the context of contractual relations have not reported 
on any underlying factors in composite constructs based on roughly similar worded and number of 
items (Cannon et al, 2000, Poppo and Zinger, 2002, Fernandez, 2007). The interpretation of the two 
factors (based on three items each) is therefore explored post hoc (retrospectively). In a 
retrospective interpretation the items in the two composite constructs can be argued to be 
expressions of respectively a more ‘proactive’ set of behavioral norms and a more ‘reactive’ set of 
behavioral norms in a contractual relationship. The three items in the proactive set can be argued to 
be oriented to more initiating, forward-looking and active behaviors toward improvement while the 
three items in the reactive set can be argued to be more oriented toward past actions, status quo, 
refrain from action (non-action) and addressing failure. Furthermore, two items in the reactive set of 
norms may both be interpreted as different expressions of trust (see above). This interpretation may 
also involve an assumption on the dynamics between the two constructs. In particular, reactive 
norms may be institutionalized through successful enactment of proactive norms (e.g. active 
collaboration with satisfactory outcomes will built up trust between two contracting parties). 
However, the nature of the data (cross-sectorial survey data) allows only for explorative test of this 
assumption. A more robust test design would require truly time-ordered (longitudinal) data for each 
case. However, a short explorative test is provided in Table 30. The test is based on the procurement 
history, in terms of the number of procurements rounds in last ten years within either parks or roads, 
as an indicator for a time effect. The test does not control for other potentially influential factors 
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(which also might explain the differences in the level of norms) such as the level of contracting out 
or contracting purposes for the various groups with difference procurement histories.  
 
Table 30. 
Comparisons of the levels of proactive and reactive collaborative norms at different numbers of past procurements.  
 Proactive collaborative norms Reactive collaborative norms 
 
Number of procurements 
in the last ten years 
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N 
Mean  
difference 
a
 
All  7.5 1.5 108 6.4 1.9 102 1.1 (p < .001) 
1 8.6 1.0 17 7.2 1.9 15 1.4 (p < .001) 
2  7.8 1.6 13 6.9 1.8 13 0.9 (p = .070) 
3 7.0 1.5 15 6.9 1.6 12 0.1 (p = .891) 
4 or more 7.3 1.4 63 6.0 1.9 62 1.3 (p < .001) 
Linearity (R
2
) .090 (p = .004) .067 (p = .009)  
ETA SQ .122 (p = .001) .075 (p = .054)  
Note: Analysis run with pooled dataset (i.e. a municipality is divided into a case for roads and a case for parks) as data for the number of past procurements 
is separate for parks and roads.   
a 
Mean differences between proactive and reactive collaborative norms evaluated with one sample t-tests (similar results for significance levels are obtained 
by running the analysis with paired t-tests).  
 
At face-value the tests provided in Table 30 shows an overall decline in the level of 
institutionalization for both types of collaborative norms when the number of procurement rounds 
increases. The linear association of the declining effects are statistical significant for both set of 
norms (p < .01). This could be interpreted as a tendency that municipalities start out with high 
expectations and levels of trust which eventually deteriorates over time (or at least differ between 
groups with different procurement histories). It should be noted that the change in level of 
collaborative norms from 3 to 4 (or more) procurements is non-significant for proactive 
collaborative norms and significant for reactive collaborative norms (one-way anova with post hoc 
tests, statistics not shown).  
In sum, the analysis in the level of both set of norms between the groups with different levels 
of procurement history in the range 1 to 3 past procurements rounds supports the conclusion that 
differences between the levels of the two set of norms should diminish over time. However, the 
change in the difference in the level of the two set of norms between the groups with 3 and 4 past 
procurement rounds (which change from statistically non-significant, p = .891, for the group with 3 
past procurement rounds to statistically significant, p < .001, for the group with 4 or more past 
procurement rounds) run counter to the overall conclusion.  
Composite scores were created for both extracted factors, based on simple summative scores 
for the corresponding items which had their primary loading on the respective factor (i.e. each 
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construct is based on three items). In addition a composite score was created for a six items index 
construct. Descriptive statistics for the composite (index) constructs are shown in Table 31.  
 
Table 31. 
Descriptive statistics for index constructs: level of institutionalization of informal collaborative norms (proactive and reactive) 
Constructs 
a
 
Descriptives 
No. of 
items 
Mean 
(S.D) 
b
 
Min-Max 
value 
Skewness Kurtosis Alpha 
Proactive collaborative norms 3 7.67 (1.48) 3.67-10.00 -.455 -.209 .790 
Reactive collaborative norms  3 6.33 (1.86) 1.67-10.00 -.209 -.216 .676 
Six item construct for collaborative norms 6 6.87 (1.46) 4.17-10.00 .006 -.755 .784 
Five item construct for collaborative norms 5 6.90 (1.41) 4.00-10.00 .064 -.712 .793 
a
 N = 65 
b 
Scale: 0-10 (where 0=’not at all’ and 10=’in very high degree’ in the scales used in the original items). 
 
The correlation between the two ‘three item’ composite constructs (proactive and reactive 
collaborative norms) is high (Pearson’s = .527, N=61, p < .001, two tailed). Values for skewness 
and kurtosis indicate whether the constructs can be regarded as approximately normal distributed. 
The constructs based on six and five items shows very little deviance from a normal distribution 
(skewness = .006 and .064). The construct for the level of institutionalization of proactive norms is 
left skewed (skewness = -.455), i.e. has a long ‘thick’ left tail and cannot be regarded as normally 
distributed around the mean value. The construct for the level of institutionalization of proactive 
norms is left skewed in some degree (skewness = -.209), but can still be regarded as normally 
distributed according to further statistical tests.
56
  
 
6.3.2.2 Inter-municipal variations in informal contractual norms 
The levels of institutionalization of proactive and reactive norms in contractual relationships with 
private providers of park and road maintenance are found to vary across Danish municipalities (see 
also Table 31). Figure 16 shows a graphical presentation of the inter-municipal variations. The 
presentation orders the cases (municipalities) from left to right by the level of institutionalized 
proactive collaborative norms (from low to high).  
 
                                                 
56
 Tests for normality (Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk) support conclusions on normality for three item 
constructs. Statistics for both tests are significant for proactive norms (p <.100) and insignificant for reactive norms (p 
>.200). Statistics for both tests are insignificant (p >.200) for the six and five item constructs. 
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Figure 16. 
Graphical presentation of variations in the level of formalized transactional and relational contract frameworks used by Danish 
municipalities for organizing relations with private providers of park and road maintenance. 
 
 
The graphical presentation shows that in most cases (39 out of 61) the level of institutionalization of 
proactive collaborative norms is substantially higher than the level of institutionalization of reactive 
collaborative norms. The graphical presentation also shows that for some cases (22 out of 61 
municipalities) the scores for the level of institutionalization of reactive collaborative norms are 
higher than or equals the scores for the level of institutionalization of proactive collaborative norms.  
The level of institutionalization of reactive collaborative norms varies to a substantial extent 
for groups of cases with approximately the same levels of institutionalization of proactive 
collaborative norms (e.g. by visually inspecting variations for scores between approximately 7 and 
8). However, the general tendency of a close association (correlation = .527, p < .001) between the 
levels of institutionalization of the two types of collaborative norms is also evident in the graphical 
presentation. The tendency (marked by the linear trend line for reactive collaborative norms in 
Figure 16) shows that on the average, a higher level of institutionalization of proactive collaborative 
norms also involves s higher level of institutionalization of reactive collaborative norms. 
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Graphical presentation of variations in the level of institutionalization of proactive and reactive collaborative norms in 
Danish municipalities' contractual relations with private providers of road and park maintenance services. Cases organized 
by the level of institutionalization of proactive collaborative norms (from low to high). N=61. 
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6.3.3 Formal contract frameworks in Norway, Sweden and the UK 
 
6.3.3.1 Norway 
Table 32 shows the importance of eight formal contract dimensions in Norwegian municipalities’ 
relations with private providers of park and road maintenance. Two dimensions are generally found 
to be very important. These dimensions include ‘juridical clauses / agreement (§§)’ (mean score = 
8.3) and ‘service specification based on quantitates, instruction and performance measures’ (mean 
score = 7.0). Three other dimensions are found to be of medium importance. These dimensions 
include ‘competence requirements’ (mean score = 6.4), ‘service specifications based on 
functionality and purpose’ (mean score = 6.3) and ‘formal sanctions in case of non-compliance’ 
(mean score = 6.1). Dimensions related to alternative contractual approaches, including ‘formal 
collaboration and joint planning’ (mean score = 4.8), ‘contractor’s involvement / contact with 
users’ (mean score = 2.8) and ‘economic incentives for investment, improvements and optimization’ 
(mean score = 2.6) are on the average found to be of less importance. 
 
Table 32. 
Norway: Formal contract dimensions for managing and organizing provision of park and road maintenance services by private 
contractors 
Importance of formal dimension 
a
 
Descriptive statistics 
N  Mean S.D. 
Juridical clauses / agreement (§§) 73 8.3 2.4 
Service specification based on quantities, instruction and 
performance measures 
72 7.0 2.9 
Competence requirements  73 6.4 2.9 
Service specification based on functionality and purpose 70 6.3 3.2 
Formal sanctions in case of non-compliance 72 6.1 3.0 
Formal collaboration and joint planning  70 4.8 3.2 
Contractor’s involvement / contact with users 70 2.8 2.9 
Economic incentives for investment, improvements and optimization 69 2.6 2.9 
a
 All items measured on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 = ‘not at all’, 10 = ‘very high degree’) on the question. “On a scale from 0 to 10, please indicate in 
which degree the following content is a central part of your department’s arrangements with private contractors”.  
 
The figures for standard deviations in Table 32 show that the inter-municipal differences in general 
are high (ranging from 2.4 to 3.2). The highest levels of inter-municipal differences are found for 
‘formal collaboration and joint planning’ (S.D. = 3.2) which indicates that the scores for 66 % of 
the municipalities lies between 1.6 and 8.4 and for ‘service specifications based on functionality 
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and purpose’ (S.D. = 3.2) which indicates that the scores for 66 % of the municipalities lies 
between 2.8 and 9.5 as well as for ‘formal sanctions in case of non-compliance’ (S.D. =3.0) which 
indicates that the score for 66 % of the municipalities lies between 3.1 and 9.1. The inter-municipal 
differences are smallest (but still relatively high) for ‘juridical clauses / agreement (§§)’ (S.D. = 
2.4).  
The information given by the boxplots in Figure 17 provide further information on the high 
levels of inter-municipal differences reported in Table 32. Similar to the figures on standard 
deviations, the boxplot shows a relatively high variation among all the Norwegian municipalities 
with the exception of ‘juridical clauses / agreement (§§)’ which has a lower variance than the other 
seven contract dimensions. However, it is worth noting that this variable has seven outliers which 
strongly deviate from the median value and contributes to some of the variance in the importance of 
the contract dimension. 
 
Figure 17.  
Formal contract dimensions for managing and organizing provision of park and road maintenance  
by private contractors in Norway (boxplots) 
 
 
 
Note: Boxplot (SPSS output) illustrating the distribution of quartiles and outliers. The filled boxes represent 50 % of the 
cases, the top of the box represent the 75 % quartile and the bottom the 25 % quartile. The middle of the box represents 
the median value (or the 50 % quartile). 95 % of all cases are expected to lie between the two whiskers extending from the 
box. Data source: INOPS data 2015. 
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The boxplots also show that although the average scores for some contract dimensions are relatively 
low still some municipalities score these dimensions higher. For example, the boxplot shows that 
25% of the municipalities give scores between 6 and 10 for ‘contractor’s involvement / contact with 
users’ and 25% of the municipalities give scores between 5 and 10 for ‘economic incentives for 
investment, improvement and optimization’. In other words, the boxplot illustrates that significant 
groups of municipalities evaluate these dimensions as having relatively high importance in their 
contractual frameworks. Likewise, the boxplots also show that significant groups of municipalities 
find some contract dimensions, e.g. ‘service specification based on quantitates, instruction and 
performance measures’, of less importance (i.e. scores for the first quartile range between 0 and 4).   
Overall, the analysis shows a large degree of inter-municipal differences in the importance of 
the eight contract dimensions. In particular, the analysis shows that all contract dimensions are 
important for either smaller or larger groups of municipalities. However, some contract dimensions 
are more widespread across the sector and the importance of these dimensions varies less among the 
municipalities. 
6.3.3.2 Two types of formal frameworks 
Further statistical analysis (factor analysis) shows that the eight contract dimensions can be grouped 
into two more general ‘factors’, i.e. some dimensions can be said to be ‘bundled’ together when 
they are used by the municipalities.  
 
Factor analysis 
An explorative factor analysis was carried out with the aim of identifying any potential ‘factors’ 
which could be used for constructing composite scores for the eight items measuring the level of 
formalized contract framework.  
The ‘factorability’ of the eight items, i.e. suitability of factor analysis, was initially assessed 
by standard criteria. Diagnosis statistics indicate that factor analysis is appropriate. The ratio 
between the total number of available cases for factor analysis (N = 64, listwise) and the number of 
items (8) is reasonable for explorative factor analysis (a ratio > 5) but not ideal (a ratio > 20). All 
items are correlated to several other items in some degree (>.4), indicating that all items share some 
common variance with other items, and anti-image correlations (diagonals) are all well above the 
recommended minimum of .500 (>= .686). Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin of sampling adequacy is .778 (well 
above the recommend minimum value of .500) and Barlett’s test of sphericity is also significant (x
2
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(28) = 267.657 p < .001). The factor analysis was run as a principal component analysis (PCA) with 
direct oblimin rotation. The PCA method is suitable for explorative factor analysis where the 
purpose is to identify composite constructs for further analysis. The chosen rotation method allows 
correlations to co-exist between extracted factors. Main results from the factor analysis are shown 
in Table 33.  
 
Table 33. 
Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal component analysis with oblimin rotation for 8 survey items on 
formalized contract features 
Items  
Primary factor loadings and communalities 
a
 
Formalized transactional 
contract framework (TCF) 
Formalized relational contract 
framework (RCT) 
Communalities 
 Juridical clauses / agreement (§§) .930  .760 
 
Service specification based on functionality and 
purpose 
.662 (.352) .734 
 
Service specification based on quantities, instruction 
and performance measures  
.884  .775 
 Formal sanctions in case of non-compliance  .872  .757 
 Formal collaboration and joint planning   .688 .685 
 Contractor’s involvement / contact with users  .741 .678 
 
Economic incentives for investment, improvements 
and optimization  
 .895 .708 
 Competence requirements 
b
 .447  (.353) .440 
a
 N = 64 (list wise) Two factors extracted (Eigenvalues > 1). Factor loadings below .3 are suppressed. Solution extracted in 6 iterations. 
Secondary factor loadings in brackets.  
b 
Factor loadings are relatively low and approximately similar for both factors. The item also has a relatively low degree of communality (= .440). 
The item is therefore not included in index constructs.  
 
Two factors with Eigenvalues above 1 were extracted. The two extracted factors explain a total of 
69 % of the total inter-item variance. The first factor, labeled ‘formalized transactional contract 
framework’, explains approximately 53 % of the variance while the second factor, ‘formalized 
relational contract framework’, explains approximately 16 % of the variance. The correlation 
between the two factors is .367.  
One item (competency requirements) was evaluated as inappropriate for inclusion in 
subsequent index constructs based on the division into two separate dimensions for the contract 
framework in Norway. The factor analysis shows that the single item ‘competency requirements’ 
loads relatively low and approximately with the same value on both factors. The communality was 
furthermore relatively low. The item did not contribute to a separate measurement of one factor 
relatively to the other factor. The subsequent construction of index was therefore based on the 
remaining 7 single items.  
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The internal consistency (reliability) of the underlying items in the two factors was checked 
by analysis of values for Cronbach’s Alpha. The Alpha value was good for items included in the 
first factor (.882) while moderate for items included in the second factor (.766). Values for Alpha 
could furthermore not be improved by removing any items included in the two extracted factors.   
Composite scores were created for both factors, based on simple summative scores for the 
corresponding items which had their primary loading on the respective factor.  Descriptive statistics 
for the composite (index) constructs are shown in Table 34.  
 
Table 34. 
Descriptive statistics for index constructs: formalized transactional and relational contract framework (TCF and RCF) 
Constructs 
a
 
Descriptives 
No. of 
items 
Mean 
(S.D) 
b
 
Min-Max 
value 
Skewness Kurtosis Alpha 
Formalized transactional contract framework (TCF) 4 6,9 (2.52) 00.00-10.00 -.949 .169 .882 
Formalized relational contract framework (RCT) 3 3,4 (2.50) 00.00-9.00 .293 -.946 .766 
a
 N = 70 (TCF), 64 (RCT) 
b 
Scale: 0-10 (where 0=’not at all’ and 10=’in very high degree’ in the scales used in the original items). 
 
The correlation (Pearson’s) between the two composite constructs (TCF and RCF) is .532 (p < .001, 
two tailed). Values for skewness and kurtosis indicate whether the two constructs can be regarded 
as approximately normal distributed. The construct for the level of formalized transactional contract 
framework is strongly left skewed (-.949), e.g. has a long ‘thick’ left tail and cannot be regarded as 
normal distributed around the mean value. The construct for the level of formalized relational 
contract framework is slightly right skewed (.293) and has a noteworthy kurtosis value (-.946) and 
therefore it cannot be regarded as normal distributed. 
 
6.3.3.3 Inter-municipal variations in formal contract framework in Norway 
The levels of formalized transactional and relational contract frameworks used for organizing 
relations with private providers of park and road maintenance vary across Norwegian municipalities 
(see also Table 32). Figure 18 shows a graphical presentation of the inter-municipal variations. The 
presentation orders the cases (municipalities) from left to right by the level of formalized 
transactional contract framework.  
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Figure 18.  
Graphical presentation of variations in the level of formalized transactional and relational contract frameworks used by Norwegian 
municipalities for organizing relations with private providers of park and road maintenance 
 
The graphical presentation in Figure 18  shows that only for few cases (4 out of 64 municipalities) 
the scores for the level of formalized relational contract framework are equal or higher than the 
scores for the level of formalized transactional contract framework. The graphical presentation in 
Figure 18 also shows that in most cases the formalized transactional contract framework is 
substantially more important than the formalized relational contract framework and the level of 
formalized relational contract framework varies to a good extent for groups of cases with 
approximately the same level of formalized transactional contract framework. However, the 
correlation (Pearson’s = .532 p < .001) between the two types of frameworks for all cases is also 
evident in the graphical presentation. The tendency (marked by the linear trend line for RCF in 
Figure 18) shows that on the average, a higher level of formalized transactional contract framework 
also involves a higher level of formalized relational contract framework.  
 
6.3.3.4 Sweden 
Table 35 shows the importance of eight formal contract dimensions in Swedish municipalities’ 
relations with private providers of park and road maintenance. Two dimensions are generally found 
to be very important. These dimensions include ‘juridical clauses / agreement (§§)’ (mean score = 
7.8) and ‘competence requirements’ (mean score = 7.1). Three other dimensions are found to be of 
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Graphical presentation of variations in the level of formal contract framework (transactional and relational) in Swedish 
municipalities' relations with private contractors delivering road and park maintenance services. Cases organized by their overall 
level of contract framework (from low to high). N=64. 
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medium importance. These dimensions include ‘service specification based on quantitates, 
instruction and performance measures’ (mean score = 6.7), ‘service specifications based on 
functionality and purpose’ (mean score = 6.1) and ‘formal sanctions in case of non-compliance’ 
(mean score = 5.7). Dimensions related to alternative contractual approaches, including ‘formal 
collaboration and joint planning’ (mean score = 4.3), ‘contractor’s involvement / contact with 
users’ (mean score = 3.0) and ‘economic incentives for investment, improvements and optimization’ 
(mean score = 2.1) are on the average found of less importance. 
 
Table 35. 
Sweden: Formal contract dimensions for managing and organizing provision of park and road maintenance services by private 
contractors 
Importance of formal dimension 
a
 
Descriptive statistics 
N  Mean S.D. 
Juridical clauses / agreement (§§) 81 7.8 2.8 
Competence requirements  80 7.1 2.6 
Service specification based on quantities, instruction and 
performance measures 
79 6.7 2.9 
Service specification based on functionality and purpose 77 6.1 3.1 
Formal sanctions in case of non-compliance 77 5.7 3.1 
Formal collaboration and joint planning  80 4.3 3.2 
Contractor’s involvement / contact with users 78 3.0 2.9 
Economic incentives for investment, improvements and optimization 74 2.1 2.8 
a
 All items measured on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 = ‘not at all’, 10 = ‘very high degree’) on the question. “On a scale from 0 to 10, please indicate in 
which degree the following content is a central part of your department’s arrangements with private contractors”.  
 
The figures for standard deviations in Table 35 show that the inter-municipal differences in general 
are high (ranging from 2.6 to 3.2). The highest levels of inter-municipal differences are found for 
‘formal collaboration and joint planning’ (S.D. = 3.2) which indicates that the scores for 66 % of 
the municipalities lies between 1.1 and 7.5 and for ‘service specifications based on functionality 
and purpose’ (S.D. = 3.1) which indicates that the scores for 66 % of the municipalities lies 
between 3.0 and 9.2 as well as for ‘formal sanctions in case of non-compliance’ (S.D. =3.1) which 
indicates that the score for 66 % of the municipalities lies between 2.6 and 8.8. The inter-municipal 
differences are smallest, but still high, for ‘competence requirements’ (S.D. = 2.6).   
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Figure 19.  
Formal contract dimensions for managing and organizing provision of park and road maintenance  
by private contractors in Sweden (boxplots) 
 
 
 
The information given by the boxplots in Figure 19 provide further information on the high levels 
of inter-municipal differences reported in Table 35. Similar to the figures on standard deviations, 
the boxplot shows a relatively high variation among the Swedish municipalities. The boxplot 
illustrates that ‘competency requirements’ has a slightly lower variance than the other seven 
contract dimensions, however it is worth noting that this variable has three outliers which strongly 
deviate from the median value and contributes to some of the variance in the importance of the 
contract dimension. 
The boxplots also show that although the average scores for some contract dimensions are 
relatively low still some municipalities score these dimensions relatively high. For example, the 
boxplot shows that 25% of the municipalities give scores between 6 and 10 for ‘contractor’s 
involvement / contact with users’ and 25% of the municipalities give scores between 5 and 10 for 
‘economic incentives for investment, improvement and optimization’. In other words, the boxplot 
illustrates that significant groups of municipalities evaluate these dimensions as having relatively 
high importance in their contractual frameworks. Likewise, the boxplots also show that significant 
Note: Boxplot (SPSS output) illustrating the distribution of quartiles and outliers. The filled boxes represent 50 % of the 
cases, the top of the box represent the 75 % quartile and the bottom the 25 % quartile. The middle of the box represents 
the median value (or the 50 % quartile). 95 % of all cases are expected to lie between the two whiskers extending from the 
box. Data source: INOPS data 2015. 
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groups of municipalities find some contract dimensions, e.g. ‘juridical clauses / agreement (§§)’, of 
less importance (i.e. scores for the first quartile range between 0 and 5).   
Overall, the analysis shows a large degree of inter-municipal differences in the importance of 
the eight contract dimensions. In particular, the analysis shows that all contract dimensions are 
important for either smaller or larger groups of municipalities. However, some contract dimensions 
are more widespread across the sector and the importance of these dimensions varies less among the 
municipalities. 
 
6.3.3.5 Two types of formal frameworks in Sweden 
Further statistical analysis (factor analysis) shows that the eight contract dimensions can be grouped 
into two more general ‘factors’, i.e. some dimensions can be said to be ‘bundled’ together when 
they are used by the municipalities.  
 
Factor analysis 
An explorative factor analysis was carried out with the aim of identifying any potential ‘factors’ 
which could be used for constructing composite scores for the eight items measuring the level of 
formalized contract framework.  
The ‘factorability’ of the eight items, i.e. suitability of factor analysis, was initially assessed 
by standard criteria. Diagnosis statistics indicate that factor analysis is appropriate. The ratio 
between the total number of available cases for factor analysis (N = 68, listwise) and the number of 
items (8) is reasonable for explorative factor analysis (a ratio > 5) but not ideal (a ratio > 20). All 
items are correlated to several other items in some degree (>.4), indicating that all items share some 
common variance with other items, and anti-image correlations (diagonals) are all well above the 
recommended minimum of .500 (>= .771). Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin of sampling adequacy is .834 (well 
above the recommend minimum value of .500) and Barlett’s test of sphericity is also significant (x
2
 
(28) = 229,189 p < .001). The factor analysis was run as a principal component analysis (PCA) with 
direct oblimin rotation. The PCA method is suitable for explorative factor analysis where the 
purpose is to identify composite constructs for further analysis. The chosen rotation method allows 
correlations to co-exist between extracted factors. Main results from the factor analysis are shown 
in Table 36.  
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Table 36. 
Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal component analysis with oblimin rotation for 8 survey items on 
formalized contract features in Sweden 
Items  
Primary factor loadings and communalities 
a
 
Formalized transactional 
contract framework (TCF) 
Formalized relational contract 
framework (RCT) 
Communalities 
 Juridical clauses / agreement (§§) .890  .707 
 
Service specification based on functionality and 
purpose 
.630 (.329) .670 
 
Service specification based on quantities, instruction 
and performance measures  
.826  .614 
 Formal sanctions in case of non-compliance  .755  .766 
 Formal collaboration and joint planning   .744 .713 
 Contractor’s involvement / contact with users  .754 .605 
 
Economic incentives for investment, improvements 
and optimization  
 .847 .651 
 Competence requirements .611  .561 
a
 N = 68 (list wise) Two factors extracted (Eigenvalues > 1). Factor loadings below .3 are suppressed. Solution extracted in 6 iterations. 
Secondary factor loadings in brackets.  
 
Two factors with Eigenvalues above 1 were extracted. The two extracted factors explain a total of 
66 % of the total inter-item variance. The first factor, labeled ‘formalized transactional contract 
framework’, explains approximately 51 % of the variance while the second factor, ‘formalized 
relational contract framework’, explains approximately 15 % of the variance. The correlation 
between the two factors is .399. The internal consistency (reliability) of the underlying items in the 
two factors was checked by analysis of values for Cronbach’s Alpha. The Alpha value was good for 
items included in the first factor (.856) while moderate for items included in the second factor 
(.745). Values for Alpha could furthermore not be improved by removing any items included in the 
two extracted factors.   
Composite scores were created for both factors, based on simple summative scores for the 
corresponding items which had their primary loading on the respective factor.  Descriptive statistics 
for the composite (index) constructs are shown in Table 37.  
 
Table 37. 
Descriptive statistics for index constructs: formalized transactional and relational contract framework (TCF and RCF) 
Constructs 
a
 
Descriptives 
No. of 
items 
Mean 
(S.D) 
b
 
Min-Max 
value 
Skewness Kurtosis Alpha 
Formalized transactional contract framework (TCF) 5 6.6 (2.32) 0.60-10.00 -.585 -.209 .856 
Formalized relational contract framework (RCT) 3 3.1 (2.38) 0.00-9.33 .647 -.471 .745 
a
 N = 75 (TCF), 72 (RCT) 
b 
Scale: 0-10 (where 0=’not at all’ and 10=’in very high degree’ in the scales used in the original items). 
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The correlation (Pearson’s) between the two composite constructs (TCF and RCF) is .550 (p < .001, 
two tailed). Values for skewness and kurtosis indicate whether the two constructs can be regarded 
as approximately normal distributed. The construct for the level of formalized transactional contract 
framework is strongly left skewed (-.585), e.g. has a long ‘thick’ left tail and cannot be regarded as 
normally distributed around the mean value. The construct for the level of formalized relational 
contract framework is strongly right skewed (.647) and cannot be regarded as normally distributed. 
 
6.3.3.6 Inter-municipal variations in formal contract framework in Sweden 
The levels of formalized transactional and relational contract frameworks used for organizing 
relations with private providers of park and road maintenance vary across Swedish municipalities 
(see also Table 35). Figure 20 shows a graphical presentation of the inter-municipal variations. The 
presentation orders the cases (municipalities) from left to right by the level of formalized 
transactional contract framework.  
 
Figure 20.  
Graphical presentation of variations in the level of formalized transactional and relational contract frameworks used by Swedish 
municipalities for organizing relations with private providers of park and road maintenance 
 
The graphical presentation in Figure 20 shows that only for few cases (2 out of 68 municipalities) 
the scores for the level of formalized relational contract framework are higher than the scores for 
the level of formalized transactional contract framework. The graphical presentation in Figure 14 
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Graphical presentation of variations in the level of formal contract framework (transactional and relational) in Swedish 
municipalities' relations with private contractors delivering road and park maintenance services. Cases organized by their overall 
level of contract framework (from low to high). N=68. 
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also shows that in most cases the formalized transactional contract framework is substantially more 
important than the formalized relational contract framework and the level of formalized relational 
contract framework varies to a good extent for groups of cases with approximately the same level of 
formalized transactional contract framework. However, the correlation (Pearson’s = .550 p < .001) 
between the two types of frameworks for all cases is also evident in the graphical presentation. The 
tendency (marked by the linear trend line for RCF in Figure 20) shows that on the average, a higher 
level of formalized transactional contract framework also involves a higher level of formalized 
relational contract framework.  
 
6.3.3.7 The UK 
Table 38 shows the importance of nine formal contract dimensions in Local Authorities’ relations 
with private providers of park and road maintenance in the UK. The single most important 
dimension is ‘juridical clauses / agreement (§§)’ (mean score = 8.8).  Four dimensions can be 
regarded of almost similar importance including: ‘service specification based on functionality and 
purpose’ (mean score = 7.7), ‘service specifications based on quantities, instruction and 
performance measures’ (mean score = 7.5), ‘formal collaboration and joint planning’ (mean score 
= 7.2) and ‘competence requirements’ (mean score = 7.0). Dimensions related to alternative 
contractual approaches, including ‘requirements for delivering local benefits’ (mean score = 4.5) 
and ‘economic incentives for investment, improvements and optimization’ (mean score = 2.8) are on 
the average found of less importance. 
 
Table 38. 
UK: Formal contract dimensions for managing and organizing provision of park and road maintenance services by private 
contractors 
Importance of formal dimension 
a
 
Descriptive statistics 
N  Mean S.D. 
Juridical clauses / agreement (§§) 57 8.8 1.8 
Service specification based on functionality and purpose 57 7.7 2.6 
Service specification based on quantities, instruction and performance 
measures 
57 7.5 2.8 
Formal collaboration and joint planning  55 7.2 2.8 
Competence requirements  55 7.0 2.8 
Formal sanctions in case of non-compliance 55 5.8 3.3 
Contractor’s involvement / contact with users 56 5.6 3.3 
Requirements for delivering local benefits. 56 4.5 3.6 
Economic incentives for investment, improvements and optimization 54 2.8 3.2 
a
 All items measured on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 = ‘not at all’, 10 = ‘very high degree’) on the question. “On a scale from 0 to 10, please indicate in which 
degree the following content is a central part of your department’s arrangements with private contractors”.  
 
INOPS  Technical report 
 
153 
With the exception of ‘juridical clauses / agreement (§§)’, the figures for standard deviations in 
Table 38 show that the inter-municipal differences in general are high (ranging from 2.6 to 3.6). 
The highest levels of differences among Local Authorities are found for ‘requirements for 
delivering local benefits’ (S.D. = 3.6) which indicates that the scores for 66 % of the Local 
Authorities lies between 0.9 and 8.1. The variation among Local Authorities’ assessment of the 
importance of ‘formal sanctions in case of non-compliance’ and ‘contractor’s involvement / contact 
with users’ is found to be relatively high as well (S.D. = 3.3 for both dimensions) which indicates 
that the scores for 66% of the Local Authorities lies between 2.5 and 9.1 in the case of ‘formal 
sanctions in case of non-compliance’ and between 2.3 and 8.9 in the case of ‘contractor’s 
involvement / contact with users’. The differences among Local Authorities are smallest for 
‘juridical clauses / agreement (§§)’ (S.D. = 1.8).  
 
Figure 21. Formal contract dimensions for managing and organizing provision of park and road maintenance  
by private contractors in the UK (boxplots) 
 
 
 
The information given by the boxplots in Figure 21 provides further insights on the high levels of 
differences reported among Local Authorities in Table 38. Similar to the figures on standard 
deviations, the boxplot shows relatively high variations among all Local Authorities in the UK with 
the exception of ‘juridical clauses / agreement (§§)’ which has a lower variance than the other eight 
contract dimensions. It is noteworthy that the three items with the lowest variation all have outliers 
Note: Boxplot (SPSS output) illustrating the distribution of quartiles and outliers. The filled boxes represent 50 % of the 
cases, the top of the box represent the 75 % quartile and the bottom the 25 % quartile. The middle of the box represents 
the median value (or the 50 % quartile). 95 % of all cases are expected to lie between the two whiskers extending from the 
box. Data source: INOPS data 2015. 
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which strongly deviate from the median value and contributes to some of the variance in the 
importance of the contract dimension. 
The boxplots also show that although the average scores for some contract dimensions are 
relatively low still some Local Authorities score these dimensions higher. For example, the boxplot 
shows that 25% of the Local Authorities give scores between 6 and 10 for ‘economic incentives for 
investment, improvements and optimization’. In other words, the boxplot illustrates that significant 
groups of Local Authorities evaluate this dimensions as having relatively high importance in their 
contractual frameworks. Likewise, the boxplots also show that significant groups of Local 
Authorities find some contract dimensions, e.g. ‘formal collaboration and joint planning’, of less 
importance (i.e. scores for the first quartile range between 0 and 4). Furthermore, the boxplot shows 
that 25% of Local Authorities in the UK gives the score 10 for ‘juridical clauses / agreement (§§)’ 
which indicates that this contract dimension is of very high importance among a significant amount 
of Local Authorities.  
Overall, the analysis shows a large degree of differences among Local Authorities in the 
importance of the eight contract dimensions. In particular, the analysis shows that all contract 
dimensions are important for either smaller or larger groups of Local Authorities. Only very few 
Local Authorities have scored the contract dimensions ‘juridical clauses / agreement (§§)’, ‘service 
specification based on functionality and purpose’ and ‘service specifications based on quantities, 
instruction and performance measures’ below 3 which indicates that these contract dimensions are 
particularly important among Local Authorities in the UK.  
 
6.3.3.8 Two main types of formal contract frameworks in the UK 
Further statistical analysis (factor analysis) shows that the nine contract dimensions can be grouped 
into several more general ‘factors’, i.e. some dimensions can be said to be ‘bundled’ together when 
they are used by the Local Authorities.  
 
Factor analysis 
An explorative factor analysis was carried out with the aim of identifying any potential ‘factors’ 
which could be used for constructing composite scores for the nine items measuring the level of 
formalized contract framework.  
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The ‘factorability’ of the eight items, i.e. suitability of factor analysis, was initially assessed 
by standard criteria. Diagnosis statistics indicate that factor analysis is appropriate. The ratio 
between the total number of available cases for factor analysis (N = 47, listwise) and the number of 
items (9) is just acceptable for explorative factor analysis (a ratio > 5) but far from ideal (a ratio > 
20). All items are correlated to one or more other items in some degree (p-values >.3), indicating 
that most items share some common variance with other items, and anti-image correlations 
(diagonals) are all above the recommended minimum of .500 (>= .592). Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin of 
sampling adequacy is .672 (above the recommend minimum value of .500) and Barlett’s test of 
sphericity is also significant (x
2
 (36) = 118.570 p < .001).  
 
Table 39. 
Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal component analysis with oblimin rotation for 9 survey items on formalized 
contract features in the UK 
Items  
Primary factor loadings and communalities 
a
 
Formalized relational and 
performance-oriented 
contract framework 
Formalized 
transactional contract 
framework 
Formalized 
incentive-centered 
contract framework 
Communalities 
Juridical clauses / agreement (§§)  .587  .509 
Service specification based on functionality and 
purpose 
.538   .450 
Service specification based on quantities, instruction 
and performance measures  
 .946  .834 
Formal sanctions in case of non-compliance   .836  .774 
Formal collaboration and joint planning  .882   .744 
Contractor’s involvement / contact with users .789   .624 
Economic incentives for investment, improvements 
and optimization  
  .794 .708 
Competence requirements (.352) (.464) (-.355) .553 
Requirements for delivering local benefits (.648)  (.504) .662 
a
 N = 64 (list wise) Two factors extracted (Eigenvalues > 1). Factor loadings below .3 are suppressed. Solution extracted in 7 iterations. Secondary 
factor loadings in brackets.  
 
The factor analysis was run as a principal component analysis (PCA) with direct oblimin rotation. 
The PCA method is suitable for explorative factor analysis where the purpose is to identify 
composite constructs for further analysis. The chosen rotation method allows correlations to co-
exist between extracted factors. Main results from the factor analysis are shown in Table 39. Three 
factors with Eigenvalues above 1 were extracted, a fourth factor scored an Eigenvalue of .933 and 
would have explained approximately 10% of the variance but was not extracted due to standard 
criteria not being met (Eigenvalue >= 1). The three extracted factors explain a total of 65 % of the 
total inter-item variance. The first factor, labeled ‘formalized relational and performance-oriented 
contract framework’, explains approximately 35 % of the variance, the second factor, ‘formalized 
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transactional contract framework’, explains approximately 17 % of the variance and the third 
factor, ‘formalized incentive-centered contract framework’, explains approximately 12% of the 
variance. The correlation between factor 1 and factor 2 is .296, the correlation between factor 1 and 
factor 3 is -.006 and the correlation between factor 2 and factor 3 is .033. The internal consistency 
(reliability) of the underlying items in the three factors was checked by analysis of values for 
Cronbach’s Alpha. The Alpha value was moderate for items included in the first factor (.652) while 
being of a higher value for items included in the second factor (.763). Values for Alpha could 
furthermore not be improved by removing any items included in the two extracted factors.  The 
third factor, ‘formalized incentive-centered contract framework’, only loaded a single item 
unambiguously and therefore an analysis of Cronbach’s Alpha was not necessary.  
Composite scores were created for factor 1 and factor 2, based on simple summative scores 
for the corresponding items which had their primary loading on the respective factor.  Descriptive 
statistics for the composite (index) constructs are shown in Table 40.  
 
Table 40. 
Descriptive statistics for index constructs: formalized relational and performance-oriented contract framework & formalized 
transactional contract framework. 
Constructs 
a
 
Descriptives 
No. of 
items 
Mean 
(S.D) 
b
 
Min-Max 
value 
Skewness Kurtosis Alpha 
Formalized relational and performance-oriented contract 
framework 
3 6.9 (2.23) 0.67-10.00 -,552 -.279 .652 
Formalized transactional contract framework 3 7.4 (2.3) 2.67-10.00 .518 -.981 .736 
a
 N = 54 (formalized relational and performance-oriented contract framework), 55 (formalized transactional contract framework) 
b 
Scale: 0-10 (where 0=’not at all’ and 10=’in very high degree’ in the scales used in the original items). 
 
The correlation (Pearson’s) between the two composite constructs is .298 (p < .005, two tailed). 
Values for skewness and kurtosis indicate whether the two constructs can be regarded as 
approximately normal distributed. The construct for the level of formalized relational and 
performance-oriented contract framework is moderately left skewed (-.552), e.g. has a long ‘thick’ 
left tail and cannot be regarded as normally distributed around the mean value. Likewise, the 
construct for the level of formalized transactional framework is moderately left skewed as well 
(.518) and has a noteworthy kurtosis value (-0.981), therefore it cannot be regarded as normally 
distributed. 
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6.3.3.9 Variations in formal contract framework among UK Local Authorities 
The levels of formalized relational and performance-oriented contract frameworks as well as 
formalized transactional contract frameworks used for organizing relations with private providers of 
park and road maintenance vary across Local Authorities in the UK. Figure 22 shows a graphical 
presentation of the inter-municipal variations. The presentation orders the cases (Local Authorities) 
from left to right by the level of formalized transactional contract framework.  
 
Figure 22.  
Graphical presentation of variations in the level of formalized relational and performance-oriented frameworks & formalized transactional 
contract frameworks used by Local Authorities for organizing relations with private providers of park and road maintenance in the UK. 
 
The graphical presentation in Figure 22 shows that the linear trend for relational and performance-
oriented contract framework follows the curve for transactional contract framework closely, 
indicating that, on the average, a higher level of formalized transactional contract framework also 
involves a higher level of relational and performance-oriented contract framework. However, the 
correlation (Pearson’s = .299 p < .001) is also evident in the graphical presentation indicating a 
relatively weak correlation between the two frameworks. For a significant amount of cases (26 out 
of 52) the level of relational and performance-oriented contract framework is equal to, or higher 
than the level of transactional contract framework. Likewise, for a significant amount of cases (33 
out of 52) the level transactional contract framework is equal to, or higher than the level of 
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Graphical presentation of variations in the level of formal contract framework (transactional & relational and purpose-oriented) 
among Local Authorities' relations with private contractors delivering road and park maintenance services in the UK. Cases 
organized by their overall level of contract framework (from low to high). N=52. 
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relational and performance-oriented contract framework. Furthermore, the level of relational and 
performance-oriented contract framework varies to a good extent for groups of cases with 
approximately the same level of formalized transactional contract framework. 
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6.4 Explanatory analysis of contract frameworks 
This section explores factors which help explain differences among Danish municipalities in their 
levels of respectively formalized transactional and relational contract frameworks when they 
contract out park and road maintenance. In particular, the section addresses whether the following 
factors makes a difference for the level of respectively formal transactional contract framework 
(TCF) and formal relational contract framework (RCF):  
 
 Transactional complexity measured by the absolute economic value of private sector 
involvement in park and road maintenance in the municipality (combined). 
 Department responsibility as in-house provider. 
 The use of external advice (consultants) in procurement processes in the municipality.  
 The internal contract management capacity.  
 The importance of development as contracting purpose (‘development/learning contracting 
strategy’) for the municipality 
 The importance low cost as contracting purpose (‘low cost contracting strategy’) for the 
municipality 
 
Higher transactional complexity of private sector involvement is expected to be positively 
correlated with higher levels of both TCF and RCF. The degree of transactional complexity in a 
municipality’s relations with its private contractors is operationalized by a register-based measure 
for the absolute economic value of the involvement of private contractors (expenditure on private 
contractors). Larger economic involvements in the park and road sector commonly include a greater 
number of works to be carried out, more work sites distributed across a given geography, needs for 
more unilateral as well as bilateral planning and coordination, greater risks, higher levels of 
required capital investments (staff, site location, machinery, production facilities and so on), a 
greater number of sub-contractors and support functions, a greater number of potential stakeholders, 
more contingencies which need to be addressed and so on – all aspects which adds up to a greater 
transactional complexity which need to be managed and coordinated in the contractual relation.  
Stronger contract management capacity in the municipality as well as greater involvement of 
external advice / consultants are both expected to be positively correlated with the levels of both 
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TCF and RCF.  The department responsibility as in-house provider is expected to be negatively 
correlated with the levels of TCF and RCF. Higher emphasis on a contracting strategy based on a 
low cost rationale is expected to be positively correlated with the level of TCF but negatively 
correlated or un-correlated with the level of RCF. Higher emphasis on a contracting strategy based 
on a learning (development) rationale is expected to be positively correlated with the level of RCF 
as well as the association is expected to be stronger than the association with the level of TCF.  
Table 41 shows construction and simple descriptive statistics for variables used in the 
explanatory analysis. The data shows a huge variation in the size of expenditure among Danish 
municipalities on maintenance services provided by private contractors. The average expenditure is 
DKK 45.2 million (equal to €6 million), but the variation ranges from a minimum of DKK 4.6 
million (equal to €600,000) to a maximum of DKK 271.5 million (equal to €36.4 million). Overall, 
the underlying data for expenditure is characterized by a strong right skewness, i.e. a few 
municipalities have very high values for expenditure compared to the majority. Due to the strong 
skewness the final variable for economic value is based on a logarithmic (natural) transformation of 
the original data.  
 
Table 41. 
Variables used in explanatory analysis of the level of contractual frameworks (Denmark) 
Variable Construction 
Descriptives 
Scale N 
c
 Min-Max Mean S.D. 
TCF (formalized transactional 
contract framework 
Composite, 4 survey items (Alpha = .870) 0-10 
a
 57 2.0–10.0 7.5 2.1 
RCF (formalized relational 
contract framework) 
Composite, 4 survey items (Alpha = .764) 0-10 
a
 57 .5–10.0 4.9 2.0 
Value of economic  
involvement 
Economic value (DKK) of budgets spend on 
private contractors (parks and roads, combined) 
LN 
b
 58 8.4–12.5 10.4 .7 
Dept. responsibilities as 
provider 
Dummy variable 0=no, 1=yes 58 0–1 .67 .5 
Internal contracting capability Composite, 4 survey items (Alpha = .810) 0-10 
a
 58 3.3–10.0 6.9 1.6 
External advice (use of 
consultants) 
Single survey item 0-10 
a
 58 0–10 6.2 2.5 
Contracting purpose: Low 
maintenance costs 
Single survey item 0-10 
a
 58 0–10 7.5 2.0 
Contracting purpose: 
Development of services and 
organization 
Composite, 2 survey items (Alpha = .843) 0-10 
a
 58 0.0–8.5 5.0 2.1 
a
 Item(s) measured on an 11-point response scale with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘very high degree’). 
b 
Data source: Statistics Denmark. Distribution of underlying data is strongly left skewed. Data is transformed into a natural logarithmic (LN) scale.  
c 
Valid N (listwise) = 56  
 
About two-third of the municipalities have park and road departments with direct 
responsibility as internal provider of maintenance services. The other one-third has either no direct 
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responsibility for internal provision or the municipality use private contractors for provision of all 
park and road maintenance services. The underlying survey data also shows that 8 out of the 58 
municipalities (equal to 14 percent) contract out all park and road maintenance services (‘total 
contracting’). The remaining 50 municipalities have a combination of in-house and external service 
provision, i.e. a degree of concurrent contracting.
57
 Only 11 out of the 50 municipalities, which use 
a degree of concurrent contracting, have park and road departments with no direct responsibilities 
as municipal provider of park and road services. Overall, the data indicate that the majority of 
Danish municipal park and road departments have integrated direct operational responsibilities and 
have direct access to internal operational expertise. 
The mean values for the level of internal contracting capabilities and use of external advice / 
consultants are almost similar (respectively 6.9 and 6.2). However, the variation measured by 
standard deviations for the use of external advice / consultants (S.D. = 2.5) are substantial higher 
than for the variations in the level of internal contracting capabilities (S.D. = 1.6). The values for 
the (high) variation in the involvement of external advice / consultants indicates that some 
municipalities only use external advice / consultants in a very limited extent while other 
municipalities relies more heavily on external advice / consultants.  
The mean values for the contracting purposes related to respectively low maintenance costs 
and development/learning differs substantially and on the average low maintenance cost has a 
substantial greater emphasis as contracting purpose compared to development/learning as 
contracting purpose. While, this is unsurprising given the general framing of contracting out in 
public policies as a strategy to reduce costs of public service provision, there are, however, 
substantial variations among municipalities in the emphasis of both purposes as well as the mean 
value for development/learning as contracting purpose indicates that development/learning is not 
unimportant.  
 
6.4.1 Main explanatory analysis  
Table 42 shows the results from two hierarchical OLS regression analyses run with the two index 
variables for respectively formalized transactional and relational contract framework (TCF and 
                                                 
57
 Concurrent sourcing is conceptually defined as sourcing of the same service to both internal and external production 
(Parmaggio, 1997), but has in some studies been operationalized as a percentage of budgets spend on private vendors 
within various service areas. It should be noted, that a service area contains various tasks that might be requiring 
different (i.e. dissimilar) skills and routines. 
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RCF) as response variables. Model A-C explores the importance of the predictors for the level of 
TCF while model D-F explores the importance of the predictors for the level of RCF.  The results 
indicate that five out of six predictors are important in some degree for predicting the level of 
formalized contract framework. The importance furthermore differs between prediction of 
respectively the levels of transactional and adaptive contract features.  
 
Table 42.  
Hierarchical OLS regressions: Level of formal transactional and relational contract frameworks (Denmark)  
 
TCF 
a
 RCF 
b
 
Predictor variables 
Model A (TFC) Model B (TFC) Model C (TFC) Model D (RFC) Model E (RFC) Model F (RFC) 
Unstandardized beta-coefficients (β) and standard errors 
Expenditure on private contractors 
(LN) 
1.020 (.347) ** 1.067 (.331) ** 1.137 (.342) ** .857 (.347) * .939 (.356) * .715 (.334) * 
Department responsibilities  
as provider (0=no, 1=yes) 
÷ .946 (.530) †  ÷ .771 (.479) ns ÷ .599 (.510) ns ÷ 1.019 (.528) † ÷ .918 (.509) † ÷ 1.300 (.493) * 
Internal contracting capabilities 
(0-10) 
– .278 (.144) † .297 (.146) * – .146 (.158) ns .104 (.148) ns 
Advice from external  
consultants (0-10) 
– .311 (.094) ** .311 (.095) ** – .234 (.100) * .225 (.092) * 
Contracting purpose:  
Low cost (0-10) 
– – .134 (.124) ns – – ÷ .184 (.119) ns 
Contracting purpose: 
Development/learning (0-10) 
– – ÷ .008 (.108) ns – – .329 (.105) ** 
N 57 57 57 57 57 57 
VIF MAX 1.002 1.125 1.185 1.003 1.150 1.202 
R
2
 / Adjusted R
2
 .185 / .155 .364 / .315 .379 / .304 .162 / .131 .258 / .201 .400 / .328 
Notes: Significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. No influential outliers detected in any model (cases with standardized residuals 
> 3.00). 
 
Transactional complexity, measured by the absolute level of expenditure on private contractors, is 
found to be important for both types of contract features in all models (A-F). The analysis indicates 
that higher degrees of transactional complexity are associated with higher levels of both 
transactional and adaptive contract features. Comparing the sizes of the beta-coefficients indicates 
that importance of transactional complexity is slightly more pronounced for the level of 
transactional contract features (β = 1.137 in model C) than the level of adaptive contract features (b 
β = .715) in model C). The predictor is measured by a logarithmic (natural scale) which implies that 
the effect from transactional complexity is more pronounced for absolute differences between 
relatively smaller economic involvements (e.g. DKK 1 and 10 mill.) compared to differences 
between relatively larger economic involvements (e.g. DKK 10 and 100 mill.). In other words, the 
effect on the level of contracting framework from transactional complexity is diminishing with 
higher values for economic values. 
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Whether the department had a role as internal service provider (operational responsibilities) 
is found to be important only for the level of adaptive contract features. The analysis indicates that 
municipalities where the park and road department has no role as internal provider of services have 
a higher level of adaptive contract features in their relations with private contractors. Likewise, 
departments which are delegated a role in their municipality, as internal service provider, have 
significantly lower levels of adaptive contract features implemented in their relations with private 
contractors. The average difference of 1.300 (measured on a scale from 0 to 10), found in model F 
can be interpreted as a relative large difference given the mean score of 4.9 for all municipalities.  
Both internal and external expertise for drawing up contracts is found to be important for the 
level of formal contract framework. Greater internal contracting capabilities are found to be 
important for higher levels of transactional contract features but unimportant for differences in the 
level of adaptive contract features. Involvement of external expertise is found to be important for 
higher levels of both transactional and adaptive contract features. The finding indicates that Danish 
municipalities have a degree of internal expertise for setting up transactional contract features, but 
they mainly rely on involvement of external expertise for setting up adaptive contract features.  
Differences in the municipalities’ emphasis on low maintenance cost as purpose for 
contracting out are found to be unimportant for differences in the level of both transactional and 
adaptive features. Higher emphasis on development/learning as contracting purpose is, however, 
found to be important for the level of adaptive contract features. The finding indicates that the level 
of transactional contract features is independent from differences in the emphasis on the two 
contracting purposes while the level of adaptive contract features varies with the emphasis on the 
level of development/learning as contracting purpose. The finding indicates that the level of 
emphasis on contracting purpose in some degree is reflected in formal contract design.  
 
6.4.1.1 Additional explanatory analysis  
In addition to the analysis shown in Table 42 a predictor for the importance of the contracting level 
(percentage of park and road maintenance budget allocated to private contractors) is found 
insignificant in alternative analyses (not shown) of model C and F. The underlying bivariate 
association, however, between the level of contracting out and the level of TCF is positive and 
significantly correlated (analysis not shown). This indicates that without control for / inclusion of 
any other factors, higher levels of contracting out are associated with higher levels of TCF. 
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However, this association is not straightforward and inclusion of the predictors (as found in the 
analysis shown in Table 42) renders the association insignificant. In particular, the additional 
analysis shows that the inclusion of measures for whether the department is responsible for in-house 
operations or not as well as the absolute economic size/value of services contracted out changes the 
correlation from significant to insignificant. One suggested finding is that while economic value 
overall should increase by increasing levels of contracting out it is more important to look at the 
variation in the size of the economic value than looking at the level of contracting out (in terms of a 
percentage of maintenance budgets). The underlying economic value of private sector involvement 
(for parks and roads, combined) in Danish municipalities ranges hugely from figures below DKK 3 
million to figures above DKK 250 million. Intuitively, it makes sense to say that a multi-million 
contract, encompassing a complex organization of service provisions, demands a different 
contractual framework than a single million contract irrespectively of whether this represents, let’s 
say, 10 percent or 75 percent of all maintenance services contracted out in a particular municipality.  
In addition, in bivariate analyses the levels of TCF and RCF are significantly lower for those 
departments with operational responsibilities than those departments without operational 
responsibilities.
58
 Thus, control for the presence of operational responsibilities will weaken the 
bivariate association between the variables for level of contracting out and TCF or RCF. The 
conclusion is that contracting levels, although it is insignificant in an alternative analysis of model 
A-F (see Table 42), still matters for the explanation of variations in the level of contractual 
framework among Danish municipalities; however, the importance is found to be rooted in the 
difference between the group of departments with operational responsibilities and the group without 
operational responsibilities. 
 
                                                 
58
 The mean difference in TCF between departments with operational responsibilities (mean score = 7.1, SD = 2.0) and 
without operational responsibilities (mean score = 8.2, SD = 2.0) is statistical significant (p < .1, ETA SQ = .055). The 
mean difference in RCF between departments with operational responsibilities (mean score = 4.6, SD = 1.8) and 
without departments with operational responsibilities (mean score = 5.6, SD = 2.3) is statistical significant (p < .1, ETA 
SQ = .066).  
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6.5 International Comparisons  
This section explores differences and similarities between England, Sweden, Norway and Denmark 
in formal and informal contractual relations between municipalities and their private providers of 
park and road maintenance services. The UK has internationally been regarded as a ‘benchmark 
country’ in the implementation of new public management reforms (Barzelay, 2001). The UK is 
subsequently used in the main analyses below as a ‘reference country’ for comparison of means and 
test of the statistical significance of inter-country differences.  
 
6.5.1 Formal contract dimensions compared across four countries 
Table 9 shows the importance of 8 (or 9) formal contract dimensions in local authorities / 
municipalities contracts with their private providers of park and road maintenance services in the 
UK, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. 
 
Table 43. 
Four countries: Formal contract dimensions for managing and organizing provision of park and road maintenance services by private 
contractors 
Importance of formal dimension 
a
 
Mean scores (standard deviations)  
UK  
(N=57) 
b
 
Sweden  
(N=81) 
Norway  
(N=73) 
Denmark  
(N=67) 
Four 
countries  
(N = 278) 
d
 
Equality of 
variance 
e
 
  
Juridical clauses / agreement (§§) 
8.8 (1.8) 7.8 
†
 (2.8) 8.3 
ns
 (2.4) 7.8 *  (2.3) 8.1 * (2.4)  No 
Service specification based on functionality and purpose 7.7 (2.6) 6.1 ** (3.2) 6.3 
†
 (3.3) 6.4 
†
 (3.0) 6.6 * (3.1) Yes 
Service specification based on quantities, instruction and 
performance measures  
7.6 (2.8) 6.7
 ns
 (2.9) 7.0 
ns
 (2.9) 7.7
 ns
 (2.3) 7.2 
†
 (2.8) 
Yes  
(p =.093
 
Formal sanctions in case of non-compliance  5.8 (3.3) 5.7
 ns
 (3.1) 6.1 
ns
 (3.1) 6.7
 ns
 (2.9) 6.1 
ns
 (3.1)  Yes 
Formal collaboration and joint planning  7.2 (2.8) 4.3 ** (3.3) 4.8 ** (3.2) 6.0
 ns
 (3.0) 5.4 ** (3.3) Yes 
Contractor’s involvement / contact with users 5.6 (3.3) 3.0 ** (2.9) 2.8 ** (2.9) 2.9 ** (2.8) 3.5 ** (3.2) Yes 
Economic incentives for investment, improvements and 
optimization  
2.8 (3.2) 2.1
 ns
 (2.8) 2.6 
ns
 (2.9) 2.8
 ns
 (2.8) 2.6 
ns
 (2.9) Yes 
Competence requirements 7.0 (2.8) 6.5
 ns
 (2.7) 6.4 
ns
 (2.9) 6.6 
ns
 (2.4) 6.8 
ns
 (2.7) Yes 
Delivering local benefits 
c
 4.5 (3.6) - - - -   - - - 
Source: INOPS survey data  
a
 All items measured on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 = ‘not at all’, 10 = ‘very high degree’) on the question. “On a scale from 0 to 10, please indicate in which 
degree the following content is a central part of your department’s arrangements with private contractors”. 
b 
UK is used as a ‘benchmark country‘ in the table for comparison of differences between the four countries (one-way anova with Tukey and Games-Howell 
post hoc tests, Levene’ test for equality of variance, p <.05). Significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
c 
Item only included in UK survey. 
d 
Test for significance of differences between at least one country and the others (one-way anova). 
e 
Levene’s test for equality of variance, p-level = .05. 
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The UK is used in the main analysis (Table 9) as a reference country for comparison of means and 
test of the statistical significance of inter-country differences. Overall, the mean scores for the four 
countries indicate that substantial differences exist between the countries. In the main analysis, the 
differences are found to be statistically significant for 5 out of 8 formal contract dimensions. In 
addition a ninth item (requirements in the contract for “delivering local benefits”) regarded as 
highly country relevant was included solely in the survey for UK. No statistical significant 
differences is found in the main analysis for the contract dimensions: “formal sanctions in case of 
non-compliance”, “economic incentives for investment, improvements and optimization” and 
“competence requirements”. However, a direct comparison between Denmark and Sweden shows 
that the difference for “formal sanctions in case of non-compliance” is statistically significant (p < 
.05).  
The UK in particular stands out in the comparison with the three Scandinavian countries 
regarding the importance of “formal collaboration and joint planning” and “contractor’s 
involvement / contact with users”. The differences for both dimensions are highest in absolute or 
relative terms (mean differences) and statistically significant (p < .01). In addition the item for 
“delivering local benefits” may also be added to the list of notable differences. The 2 (or 3) 
dimensions can all be associated with ‘collaborative’ or ‘partnership’ approaches to contracting out. 
The findings indicate that municipalities in the UK compared to the three Scandinavian countries 
use the most formalized and complex contractual frameworks including both transactional and 
relational aspects when they contract out park and road maintenance.  
 
6.5.1.1 Differences in Scandinavia 
By inspection of mean scores in Table 9 it is also found that some notable differences exist among 
the three Scandinavian countries. In particular, Danish municipalities have in comparison with 
Swedish and Norwegian municipalities higher mean scores for “Service specification based on 
quantities, instruction and performance measures”, “formal sanctions in case of non-compliance” 
and “formal collaboration and joint planning”. Danish municipalities have also mean scores for the 
remaining formal contract dimensions roughly at level with Norwegian and Swedish municipalities. 
Statistical test of the differences shows that the difference for “formal collaboration and joint 
planning” is more pronounced that for the “Service specification based on quantities, instruction 
INOPS  Technical report 
 
167 
and performance measures” and “formal sanctions in case of non-compliance”.
59
 The differences 
indicate that in Scandinavia Danish municipalities on the average use slightly more formalized and 
complex contractual frameworks including both transactional and relational aspects when they 
contract out park and road maintenance.  
6.5.2 Informal contract relations compared across four countries 
Table 44 shows level of institutionalization of behavioral norms in relations between local 
authorities / municipalities in the UK, Sweden, Norway and Denmark and their private providers of 
park and road maintenance services.  
 
Table 44. 
Four countries: The degree of institutionalization of behavioral norms in relations with private providers of park and road maintenance 
services 
Institutionalization of behavioral norm 
a
 
Mean scores (standard deviations)  
UK  
(N=57) 
b
 
Sweden  
(N=77) 
Norway  
(N=72) 
Denmark  
(N=68) 
Four countries  
(N = 274) 
c
 
Equality of 
variance 
d
 
‘Collaboration’  8.3 (1.9) 7.8 
ns
 (1.9) 8.2 
ns
 (1.7) 8.1 
ns
 (1.4) 8.1
 ns
 (1.7) No 
‘Mutuality’  7.4 (1.8) 6.9 
ns
 (2.3) 7.3 
ns
 (2.2) 
6.6
 ns 
(p=.155)
 
(2.2) 
7.1 
ns 
(p=.119)
 
(2.2) Yes 
‘Flexibility’  7.4 (2.0) 7.1
 ns
 (1.9) 7.4
 ns
 (1.8) 7.5
 ns
 (1.7) 7.3
 ns
 (1.9) Yes 
‘Lack of opportunism’ 7.2 (2.7) 6.2 
ns
 (2.9) 6.8 
ns
 (2.5) 6.8
 ns
 (2.2) 6.7 
ns
 (2.6) No 
‘Trust’ 5.5 (3.4) 5.2 
ns
 (3.0) 4.2 
†
 (3.2) 5.4 
ns
 (2.7) 5.0 
†
 (3.1) Yes 
‘Solidarity’  6.7 (2.8) 6.8
 ns
 (2.4) 7.3
 ns
 (2.2) 6.8
 ns
 (2.3) 6.9
 ns
 (2.4) yes 
Source: INOPS survey data  
a
 All items measured by the respondent’s agreement with the statement on an 11-point response scale with anchors (0 = ‘not at all’ and 10 = ‘very high 
degree’). 
b 
UK is used as a ‘benchmark country‘ for comparison of differences with three other countries (one-way anova with Tukey and Games-Howell post hoc 
tests). Significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
c 
Test for significance of differences between at least one country and the others (one-way anova). 
d 
Levene’s test for equality of variance, p-level = .05. 
 
The UK is used in the main analysis (reported in Table 44) as a reference country for comparison of 
means and test of the statistical significance of inter-country differences. The differences in mean 
scores between the countries for the various items are low. Overall, the main analysis of the 
statistical significance of mean scores shows only a significant difference between the four 
countries in the level of institutionalization of the item for ‘trust’. The level of institutionalization of 
                                                 
59
 ONE-WAY ANOVA with Bonferroni post hoc test. The differences in mean scores between Denmark (benchmark) 
and Norway and Sweden are only statistically significant for ‘formal collaboration and joint planning’ (p = .051 for 
Norway and p = .003 for Sweden). The differences for ‘Service specification based on quantities, instruction and 
performance measures’ is only statistically significant (p = .059) between Denmark and Sweden (and not significant 
between Denmark and Norway). The differences for ‘formal sanctions in case of non-compliance’ are close to being 
statistically significant (p = .117) between Denmark and Sweden (and not significant between Denmark and Norway).  
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‘trust’ in Norway (mean score = 4.2), measured by the item ‘trust’, is found significantly lower (p < 
.1) than in the UK (mean score = 5.5). However, it should be noted that the item for ‘lack of 
opportunism’ can also be interpreted as a measure for trust. No statistical differences among the 
countries are found for this item. This finding indicates that differences in trust levels might be 
lesser than indicated by an analysis of the item for ‘trust’ alone.  
Further analysis (not shown) finds that the difference in ‘mutuality’ between Denmark (mean 
score = 6.6) and the UK (mean score 7.4) are statistically significant (p < .05) if the two countries 
are compared directly (without including Sweden and Norway in the analysis). Similarly, the 
difference between Denmark and Norway in a two country comparison is statistically significant (p. 
< .1) for ‘mutuality’ and ‘trust’. The mean score for ‘mutuality’ is higher for Norway while the 
mean score for ‘trust’ is higher for Denmark.  
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6.5.3 Contract durations compared across four countries 
Table 45 shows the average duration of ordinary contracts and optional extension for contracts used 
by local authorities / municipalities in the UK, Sweden, Norway and Denmark for private provision 
of park and road maintenance services. The UK is used in the analysis as a reference country for 
comparison of means and test of the statistical significance of inter-country differences.  
 
Table 45.  
Four countries: Durations (ordinary and extension) for park and road maintenance contracts 
 
Contract length (in years) 
a
 
Means (standard deviations) 
c
 
 
UK  
(N=51/22) 
b
 
Sweden  
(N=40/56) 
Norway  
(N=9/55) 
Denmark  
(N = 40/56) 
Four countries  
(N = 140/189) 
d
 
Equality of 
variance 
e
 
Parks             
 Ordinary contract length 5.5 (4.3) 3.4 * (2.5) 2.2 *  (.8) 3.2 ** (1.2) 4.1 (3.2) ** No 
 Extension length  3.9 (3.8) 2.8 
ns
 (3.3) 2.4 
**
 (.5) 1.7 **
 
 (.7) 2.7 (3.0) ** No 
Roads            
 Ordinary contract length 7.3 (7.2) 3.2 
†
 (1.7) 3.5 
†
 (1.0) 4.1 
ns
 (2.9) 4.0 (3.3) * No 
 Extension length  5.3 (4.8) 1.9 * (1.7) 1.3 * (.8) 1.6 * (.8) 2.0 (2.2) ** No 
             
Source: INOPS survey data (N=140 for parks, N=189 for roads).  
a
 All items measured in years. Respondents were required to indicate the typical duration (ordinary and extension) of their main 
maintenance contracts for respectively parks and roads.  
b 
UK is used as a ‘benchmark country‘ for comparison of differences between the four countries (ONE-WAY ANOVA with Games-Howell 
post hoc test). Significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
c 
Number of cases (N) for respectively parks and roads in brackets. 
d 
Test for significance of differences between at least one country and the others (ONE-WAY ANOVA). 
e 
Levene’s test for equality of variance, p-level = .05. 
 
 
 
 
The average figures show that the longest contract durations for both parks and road maintenance 
contracts is found in the UK. For parks, the average ordinary contract duration is 5.5 years and the 
average contract extension is 3.9 years. The differences in ordinary contract duration compared to 
Sweden, Norway and Denmark are substantially in terms of years and have statistical significance.   
For roads, the average ordinary contract duration in the UK is found to be 7.3 years and the 
average contract extension is 5.3 years. The differences in ordinary contract duration compared to 
Sweden, Norway and Denmark are substantially in terms of years and have statistical significance.   
For both parks and roads it is indicated that in all four countries it is customary to include an 
optional extension of the ordinary contract duration.  
The inter-municipal differences in contract duration are also (very) large in the UK for both 
park and road maintenance contracts. Figure 23 shows the average duration for ordinary contracts 
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and the included option for extensions in 43 UK local authorities
60
. Most local authorities adopt 
ordinary contract durations between 5 to 7 years, but some municipalities adopt longer durations of 
10 years or more while others retain a very short contract ordinary durations of 1 year only. If the 
total duration for UK local authorities’ park maintenance contracts (ordinary plus extension) is 
calculated for about one half of the local authorities use total contract durations less than 10 years 
while the other half use total contract durations of 10 years or longer.  
 
Figure 23. 
Contract durations in UK local authorities’ park maintenance contracts with private providers.  
 
A few comments in the survey (collected from open ended questions) indicate that contracts of 
shorter duration (e.g. one year) comprise specialized or complementary tasks. In one case from UK 
it was noted that “We only let contracts for specialist areas of work e.g. hedge cutting, tree work, 
grave digging.” Comments from other countries also indicated that the type of service was 
important for the chosen length of contract, e.g.  “[Duration] varies pending on the type of 
service”, or “different durations for asphalt, signage, lighting, …”. One comment indicated that 
contract duration also could dependent on factors not directly associated with the immediate 
characteristics of the service, but on the context of service provision: “we have slightly different 
contract durations which can depend on upcoming changes within an area such as renewals or 
similar.” Further statistical analysis (not shown) shows that contract duration (ordinary and 
                                                 
60
 The figure only includes municipalities which provided data for the duration of both the ordinary contract and 
extension.  
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Source: INOPS survey data. The figure only includes data for municipalities which provided data for both duration of ordinary contract and optional 
contract extension (park maintenance contracts). Case 13 in the figure is strongly deviating in terms of extension duration, but the respondent's 
comments validate its correctness.  
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extension) in all countries is strongly and significantly correlated with the percentages of services 
contracted out for both parks and roads, i.e. longer durations is associated with higher levels of 
contracting out. 
 Figure 24 displays similar data for Danish municipalities that is displayed for UK 
municipalities in Figure 23. If the total duration for Danish municipalities’ park maintenance 
contracts (ordinary plus extension) is calculated for the vast majority of municipalities use total 
contract lengths between 4 to 6 years (31 out of 38 municipalities).  
 
Figure 24. 
Contract durations in Danish municipalities’ park maintenance contracts with private providers 
In Scandinavia, Sweden has the largest inter-municipal variation in ordinary contract duration 
for parks, while Denmark has the highest inter-municipal variation in ordinary contract duration for 
roads. The higher variation in Denmark is partly explained by a number of cases where the contract 
duration is indicated to be 10 years or longer. Comments by several respondents in the Danish 
survey furthermore indicated that long-term performance based contracts for road maintenance is 
more widely used in Denmark than the average mean for ordinary contract duration for roads 
indicates. The data indicates that about one-fifth of all Danish municipalities use contract durations 
for road maintenance of 10 years or longer. In a comparative perspective the analysis of contract 
length sustain the findings from the analysis of formal contract dimensions. In a four country 
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Source: INOPS survey data. The figure includes data only for municipalities which provided data for both duration of ordinary contract and optional 
contract extension (park maintenance contracts).  
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comparison, the municipalities in the UK employ contracts with the longest duration while Danish 
municipalities employ the longest contract durations.  
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7 ANALYSIS – OUTCOMES  
7.1 Outcomes from the use of private contractors 
This chapter delivers an analysis of outcomes from the use of private contractors to provide park 
and road maintenance in Danish municipalities. The analysis explores several outcomes from using 
private contractors. Key outcomes include cost effects from procurement as well as satisfaction with 
performance. Outcomes are furthermore compared across Denmark, Sweden, Norway and UK.  
 
The chapter addresses the following research questions:  
 
A. What are the cost effects from contracting out road and park maintenance services? 
B. What explains differences in cost effects from contracting out road and park maintenance 
services? 
C. What is the satisfaction with private contractors’ performance of road and park maintenance? 
D. What explains differences in satisfaction levels with private contractors’ performance of road 
and park maintenance? 
 
7.1.1 Measures 
The analysis is based on two different key measures for contracting outcomes. Both measures are 
based on responses from municipal park and road managers. The first measure is based on estimates 
for the cost effects from the last round of procurement for contracted out services. The second 
measure is based on evaluations of satisfaction levels with six different performance dimensions.  
7.1.1.1 Performance of private contractors 
For evaluation of performance respondents could indicate their evaluation of altogether six items 
(performance dimensions) on a unipolar 11-point response-scale with two end anchors, where 0 = 
‘very unsatisfactory’ to 10 = ‘very satisfactory’. The question was formulated separately for parks 
and roads and worded as following (example for parks and green spaces):  
 
INOPS  Technical report 
 
174 
Specify on a scale of 0 to 10 your level of satisfaction with the work private contractor(s) have undertaken in parks 
and green spaces in relation to: 
 
 General quality of the service provided  
 General pricing and cost levels of the service provided 
 Flexibility to change and/ or improve services if required 
 Follow up and solving of problems and deficiencies in the service provided 
 Development and innovation of maintenance  
 Fulfilment of long-term objectives for areas and facilities 
 
The question was included in the surveys for Denmark, Sweden, Norway and UK. It should be 
noted that national languages have been used for all surveys. Please see appendices for exact 
formulations in national languages.  
7.1.1.2 Cost effects from public procurement  
For evaluation of cost effects from the use of public procurement respondents in Denmark, Sweden 
and Norway were asked to indicate change in cost/prices levels (in percentage) for services 
contracted out. The question was formulated separately for parks and roads and worded as 
following (Please see appendices for exact formulations in national languages):  
 
To which degree to you estimate in percent that contracted out services have become cheaper or more costly 
after last time they were procured? (Consider changes in the total estimated operational costs before and after 
the procurement)?  
 
Overall, operational maintenance costs for the procured service have approximately become:  
__ pct. more costly 
__ pct. cheaper 
__ either more expensive or cheaper 
__ don’t know 
 
The survey for UK included a different item for measurement of cost effects. The research teams in 
the three Scandinavian countries evaluated a continuous response format to be able to provide valid 
information. However, the research team responsible for the UK survey evaluated the most 
appropriate response option to be a categorical format. In conjunction with the item for cost effects 
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the UK survey furthermore included response options the effect on quality levels. The question was 
formulated separately for parks and roads and worded as following:  
 
What has been the impact, on costs and quality of maintenance work, of the last round of contracting out?   
 
Please tick the most relevant statement.   
 
       no change in cost or quality 
       a cost saving with enhanced quality   
       a cost saving, same quality 
       a cost saving but a loss of quality 
       a cost increase but with enhanced quality  
       a cost increase, same quality 
       a cost increase with loss of quality 
       don’t know. 
 
A subsequent transformation of continuous data into categorical data from Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway allowed for direct comparison of cost effects across all countries.  
 
7.1.2 Key findings and perspectives 
7.1.2.1 Cost effects (question A) 
Cost effects from the use of public procurement when park and road maintenance services are 
contracted out were found to vary greatly. The variation were found both between municipalities 
within a country and between countries. In Denmark, the INOPS study shows that almost one-half 
of all municipalities (45 %) have gained a reduction in operational cost last time they procured a 
park or road maintenance service. The average cost change was found to be a cost reduction around 
5.5 % (un-weighted mean) for parks and roads combined. In Sweden, the average cost change was 
found to be a cost reduction around 2.7 % (un-weighted mean) for parks and roads combined. 33 % 
of Swedish municipalities experienced a cost decrease. In Norway, the average cost change was 
found to be a cost increase around 10.3 % while only 12 % of the municipalities experienced a coat 
decrease. For the UK, it was found that 77 % of all municipalities experienced a cost decrease last 
time they publicly procured a park of road maintenance service.  
7.1.2.2 Explanations of differences in cost effects (question B) 
In Denmark, higher levels of cost reduction in operational costs were found in particular to be 
related to the first or second time (compared to the third time or more) maintenance services were 
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contracted out, an emphasis on a ‘low cost contracting strategy’, as well as more well-developed 
contractual framework (transactional dimension). Also, a larger economic size of private sector 
involvement (adjusted for scale differences between the park and road sector, i.e. ‘frog ponds’ 
effects) was indicated to be related with higher levels of cost reductions.  
In Sweden, higher levels of cost reductions were found to be related to higher levels of 
competition as well as a geographical location in the Southern and Eastern parts of Sweden 
(compared to the Northern parts of Sweden). In Norway, less detrimental cost effects (in terms 
relatively lower degrees of cost increases) were found to be related to higher levels of competition 
established by continued use of public procurement. In other words, municipalities which had used 
public procurements a greater number in the past had ‘generated’ higher levels of competition. In 
the UK, a higher chance of cost reduction in operational costs were found to be related to lowering 
of quality standards (but not with a negative influence on managers’ satisfaction with provided 
quality levels) as well as a greater emphasis on a ‘low cost contracting strategy’. It was also 
indicated that cost reductions has been achieved to a greater extent in the road sector compared to 
the park sector. 
Several contextual characteristics of importance were highlighted when differences in cost 
effects were compared across countries. Denmark was found to be characterized by a relatively 
competitive and ‘matured’ context for contracting out (evenly distributed across the country). 
Sweden was found to be characterized by a longer tradition for contracting out and well-developed 
markets within certain regions while Norway was found to be characterized by generally less well-
developed markets. In comparison, Local Authorities in the UK, Danish municipalities, and 
Swedish municipalities to some extent, have been able to tap directly into already established 
markets when they procured the last time. In contrast, Norwegian municipalities have been 
challenged by using public procurement in poorly functioning markets.  
Across the four country contexts it was found that a ‘low cost contracting strategy’ in general 
has worked out well, i.e. produced cost savings, for municipalities in Denmark and the UK, but not 
for municipalities in Norway and Sweden. Competition, and in particular lack of competition, was 
also found to be important for cost effects. 
7.1.2.3 Satisfaction with performance (question B) 
Satisfaction levels with private contractors’ performance of park and road maintenance services 
were found to differ in some extent between municipalities as well as across the four countries. 
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However, some similarities in satisfaction levels were also found. In general satisfaction levels with 
private contractor’s performance of maintenance services (parks and roads, respectively) was 
highest among Local Authorities in the UK, followed by municipalities in Denmark with the second 
highest overall satisfaction level and municipalities in Sweden with the third highest overall 
satisfaction level. Municipalities in Norway are the least satisfied. The country differences were 
more pronounced for the park sector compared to the road sector. 
7.1.2.4 Explanations of differences in satisfaction with performance (question D)? 
Analysis of factors which help explain differences in satisfaction levels with performance was only 
carried out for Denmark. The most important factors promoting higher satisfaction levels with 
performance were 1) the level of competition, 2) higher levels of collaborative norms as well as 
more 3) elaborative contractual frameworks. The levels of competition and collaborative norms 
were important for the managers’ satisfaction with almost all performance dimensions. Different 
dimensions of the contractual framework, however, were found to be important for satisfaction 
levels of different performance dimensions.  
It was also found that ‘interactions’ between different factors affected the associations with 
the satisfaction with performance. In particular, mutual collaborative behaviours enable the 
contracting parties to enable a more flexible approach to the contract (the TCF dimension) with 
positive effects for some performance dimensions. In other words, when a higher degree of 
collaborative norms are present the parties to the contract can enact and adopt the TCF dimension 
for improved performance. On the other hand, when collaborative norms are lacking it is likely that 
the parties becomes caught in a rigid contractual framework embedded in the juridical clauses, 
detailed technical work description and the procedures for sanctions in case of non-compliance. 
Collaborative behaviours were also found to be ‘nourished’ by a formalized collaborative 
framework (RCF). In other words, then a formal collaborative framework is in place, collaborative 
norms within the relation are (formally) supported and develop within the relations.  
Economic size of the engagement with private contractors was also found important for 
satisfaction levels under certain conditions. In particular a larger economic size was found to 
improve satisfaction with performance regarding development. The effect, however, takes place in 
municipalities which contract out only a smaller share of their maintenance services. The result 
indicates that satisfaction with development mainly is higher in municipalities of a certain size.  
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7.2 Cost effects 
Table 46 shows the cost effects on contracted out services from Danish municipalities’ last round of 
procurement of park and road maintenance services. Estimates for cost effects were provided for 35 
municipalities in the case of park maintenance and for 47 municipalities in the case of road 
maintenance. The data do not specify the subtype(s) of maintenance service(s) within each service 
sector that were included in the procurement.  
 
The un-weighted average cost change is a 5.1 % decrease (i.e. –5.1 %) for park maintenance and a 
5.8 % decrease for road maintenance. The average cost change for both park and road maintenance 
is 5.5 %. Statistical test of the difference between cost effects between parks and roads shows that 
the difference is insignificant. The highest cost decrease is reported to be 50 % while the highest 
cost increase is reported to be 16 %.  
 
Table 46. 
Cost effects from contracting out park and road maintenance after last round of procurement (Denmark). 
 
Change in cost levels 
Parks Roads Parks and Roads 
N  35 47 82 
Mean (un-weighted) - 5.1 % - 5.8 % - 5.5 % 
Std. dev.  10.0 % 11.6 % 10.8 % 
Min. value (decrease) - 30 % - 50 % - 50 % 
Max. value (increase) 16 % 10 %  16 % 
N=82 
The table reports about the quantified economic effects from contracting out after last procurement. 
All data based on cases with self-reported estimates. Respondents were asked to provide estimates on the effect on the total price / cost level for services 
contracted out after the last round of procurement. Negative values indicate cost decrease while positive values indicate cost increase.  
 
Table 47 shows the direction of self-reported estimates for cost change from the municipalities’ last 
round of procurement of park and road maintenance services. The data for the table is based on a 
transformation of self-reported estimates for cost effects into categorical data for the direction of 
cost change (i.e. ‘decreased costs’, ‘no cost change’ and ‘increased costs’). For parks and roads 
combined, cost decreases were reported in altogether 37 cases, cost increases were reported in 5 
cases and no cost changes were reported in 40 cases. Table 47 also includes data for respondents 
answering with a ‘don’t know’ as well as respondents providing no answer. For a relatively high 
frequency of municipalities (21 %), the respondents indicated that they didn’t know whether the last 
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round of procurement of parks and roads has resulted in a cost change. Also, a relatively high 
frequency (15 %) didn’t provide any answer. 
 
Table 47. 
Direction of self-reported estimates on cost change from last times services were contracted out. 
 
Frequencies 
Parks Roads Parks and Roads 
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative 
N 60 100% 69 100% 129 100% 
Decreased costs 15 25% 22 32% 37 28% 
No cost change  18 30% 22 32% 40 31% 
Increased costs 2 3% 3 4% 5 4% 
Don't know 11 18% 16 23% 27 21% 
No answer 14 23% 6 9% 20 15% 
The table reports about the direction of self-reported estimates on cost change from last time services were contracted out. 
Data is based on the number of responses to questions on the effects on the total price and cost level for services contracted out after the last round of 
procurement for park and roads. 
 
Figure 25 shows a visualization of the distribution of cost changes for all cases including reported 
cost effects for procurement of both roads and parks (N = 82).  
 
Figure 25.  
Cost changes from last procurement in 82 cases of contracting out park and road maintenance (N = 82) 
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7.3 Exploring differences in cost effects 
The analysis of reported cost effects found substantial variation among Danish municipalities. The 
following section explores a set of factors which help explain variations in cost effects. The key 
factors include:  
 
 Purpose of contracting out 
 Procurement history 
 The level of contractual framework 
 Economic size of private sector involvement 
 
7.3.1 Importance of low cost as purpose 
This section explores the importance contracting purpose for cost effects from the last round of 
public procurement of park and roads maintenance. Table 48 shows an analysis of the differences in 
cost effects between groups with respectively higher and lower emphasis on cost reduction as the 
purpose for contracting out.  
 
Table 48.  
Differences in cost effects between municipalities with higher and lower emphasis on low cost as purpose for using private 
contractors 
Cost effects 
a
 
Mean scores for low cost as purpose 
d
 
 
Higher emphasis 
c
 Lower emphasis 
c
 Difference 
b 
ETA SQ 
  Cost effects, roads (N =47) - 8.2 % - 2.6 % 5.6 
ns (p = .104)
  .058 
 
Cost effects parks (N=35) - 7.9 % - 0.4 % 7.5 *  .140 
 Cost effects parks AND roads (N=82) - 8.0 % - 1.7 % 6.3 ** .083 
 Emphasis on low cost (N=67) 8.7 5.6 3.1 ** .587 
 Level of contracting out, roads (N=64) 52 % 45 % 7 % 
ns
 .022 
 Level of contracting out, parks (N=66) 35 % 20 % 15 % 
†
 .054 
Source: INOPS survey data (N = 65) 
a
 Data for cost effects based on cases with self-reported estimates. Respondents were asked to provide estimates on the effect on the total price / cost 
level for services contracted out after the last round of procurement. Negative values indicate a cost decrease (i.e. cost saving).  
b
 Score differences evaluated at significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
c
 Groups based on median value for purpose: cost effective maintenance (median value = 8).  
d
 Findings for cost differences are congruent with analysis of the bivariate correlations between continuous data for cost effects and the emphasis on low 
cost as purpose for contracting out. Pearson’s and significance levels for bivariate relations: parks = -.476
**
, roads = -.300*, parks and roads combined = 
-.366**. 
 
Overall the analysis shows that the differences in cost change are statistically different between the 
groups with higher and lower emphasis on low cost as purpose. The group with higher emphasis on 
low cost has obtained an 8.2 % cost decrease for roads, a 7.9 % cost decrease for parks and an 8.0 
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% cost decrease for parks and roads. The group with lower emphasis on low cost has obtained a 2.6 
% cost decrease for roads, a 0.4 % cost decrease for parks and a 1.7 % cost decrease for parks and 
roads. Analysis of the underlying bivariate relationship based on continuous data shows that 
correlations with cost effects for respectively parks, roads and parks and roads combined are all 
strong (measured by Pearson’s correlation coefficients) and statistically significant. In sum, the 
analyses of parks, roads and parks and roads combined indicates that, on the average, high emphasis 
on low cost as purpose is positively associated with cost savings for contracting out of parks and 
roads.  
 
7.3.2 Importance of procurement history 
This section explores the bivariate relationship between the number of past procurement rounds 
(‘procurement history’) and cost effects. Table 49 shows the average cost change for the number of 
procurements in the past ten years. The average cost change is an 11.4 % reduction in cases with a 
single procurement round in the past ten years. The average cost change is a 3.8 % reduction in 
cases where four or more procurements has been carried out within the past ten years. The table 
shows that the average cost reduction becomes significantly lower with an increasing number of 
procurements. Test statistics furthermore shows that the relationship is linear (at p-level < .05). An 
inspection of the underlying data found that the high standard deviation for cases with four or more 
past procurements (S.D. = 11.9) is strongly influenced by a single case which reports a 50-percent 
cost reduction.  
 
Table 49.  
Distribution of average cost changes according to the number of procurements in the past ten years. 
Number of procurements 
in the past ten years 
Mean change N S.D. 
One - 11.4 % 13 10.5  
Two  - 7.9 % 13 9.2 
Three -3.2 % 13 5.9 
Four or more -3.7 % 43 11.9 
All cases -5.5 % 82  10.8 
Note: The linear difference between the four categories is significant at p-level < .05. 
 
Table 50 shows the distribution of the direction in cost change in the last round of procurement of 
roads and parks maintenance according to the number of procurements in the past ten years. This 
analysis is based on a transformation of the underlying continuous data for cost effects into three 
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categories which represent cases with respectively cost decreases, no cost change and cost increases 
in operational cost as a result of the last procurement round in the municipality (for respectively 
parks and roads). Table 50 is based on valid answers from all Danish municipalities which provided 
estimates for the effect from the last round of procurement on costs levels for contracted out parks 
and road maintenance services. Overall, the analysis indicates that the chance of cost savings are 
higher the first or second time a municipality contract out a service compared to the third round or 
more. The finding is also illustrated in Figure 26.  
 
Table 50. 
Distribution of direction in cost change for contracting out roads and parks according to the number of procurements in the past ten years 
Number of 
procurements in the 
last ten years 
Decreased costs No cost change Increased costs Total (row) 
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative Absolute Relative 
Four times or more 13 30 % 25 58 % 5 12 % 43 100 % 
Three times 5 38 % 8 62 % 0 0 % 13 100 % 
Two times 9 69 % 4 31 % 0 0 % 13 100% 
One time 10 77 % 3 23 % 0 0 % 13 100 % 
Total (row) 37 45 % 40 49 % 5 6 % 82 100 % 
N=82 
The table reports about the distribution of direction in cost change for contracting out roads and parks according to the number of procurements in the past 
ten years. 
 
 
Figure 26 provide a visual presentation of the association between the number of past procurements 
and the direction of cost change. Estimates from 45 % of the municipalities (with valid answers) 
indicated a decrease in costs. Estimates from 49 % of municipalities (with valid answers) indicated 
no change in costs while estimates from 6% of the municipalities (with valid answers) indicated a 
cost increase.  
In the group which had one round of procurement in the past ten years the majority (77 %) 
indicated a cost decrease. In the group which had two rounds of procurement in the past ten years 
the majority (69 %) indicated a cost decrease while the remaining (31 %) indicated no cost change. 
In the group which had three rounds of procurement in the past ten years the majority (62 %) 
indicated no cost change while the remaining (38 %) indicated a cost decrease. In the group which 
had four rounds or more of procurement in the past ten years the majority (58 %) indicated a no cost 
change, while 30% indicated a cost decrease and 12 % indicated a cost increase.  
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Figure 26.  
Number of procurements in the past ten years and direction of cost change for services contracted out 
 
7.3.3 Importance of contractual framework 
This section explores the bivariate relationship between the formalized contractual framework and 
cost effects. The relationship is explored in two analyses based on different measurements of cost 
effects. In the first analysis, cost effects are measured by the average size of cost change in percent 
(as continuous data). In the second analysis, cost effects are measured by the direction of cost 
change in individual cases (as categorical data). Overall, the two analyses show that the (bivariate) 
relation between cost savings and a higher level of formalized transactional contractual framework 
is statistically significant while a relation between cost savings and formalized relational contractual 
framework is statistically insignificant. Although the relationship between cost effects and the 
formalized relational contractual framework is found to be statistically insignificant the average 
estimates for cost effects for park maintenance indicates an ‘inclination’ toward cost savings 
(average cost savings is 6.2 % for cases with high level of formalized relational contractual 
framework while average cost savings is 2.7 % for cases with a low level). The inclination is 
opposite for roads. The opposite inclinations for respectively parks and roads indicate that the role 
of formalized relational contractual frameworks might to differ between the park and road sectors. 
The relative low N in the analysis (N = 46 for roads and N = 35 for parks) as well as differences in 
the distribution of cost estimates (e.g. standard deviations) are likely to explain the lack of statistical 
significance in the comparison of otherwise seemingly notable differences in the cost estimates 
shown in the analyses below.   
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Table 51 and Table 52 shows the analysis of the relationship between cost effects and 
formalized contractual frameworks based on measurement of cost effects as the percent of cost 
change in operational costs from the last procurement round. Table 51 shows the analysis of 
importance of the formalized transactional contractual framework (TCF) while Table 52 shows the 
analysis of importance of the formalized relational contractual framework (RCT). Overall, the 
analysis of parks and roads combined shows that a higher level of TCF is significantly correlated (p 
< .05) with a higher level of cost savings on the average. The finding is more pronounced for the 
analysis of roads compared to the analysis of parks. The analysis for parks alone shows no 
significant correlation between the level of TCF and cost effects (p > .1) although a visual 
inspection of the estimates for cost effects for the two groups shows what can be interpreted as 
being of a notable difference (3.5  percent points).   
 
Table 51.  
Differences in cost effects from last procurement between municipalities with high and low levels of formalized transactional 
contractual framework (TCF). 
Cost effect 
a b
 
Mean scores 
 
Higher level of TCF 
c
 Lower level of TCF 
c
 Difference 
d
 ETA SQ 
  Cost effect, roads (N=46) -8.2 % -1.8 % 6.4 
† (p = .067)
 .074 
 
Level of TCF, roads (N=46) 9.0 5.5 3.5 ** .771 
 Level of contracting out, roads (N=46) 56.9 % 50.3 % 6.6 
ns
 .018 
 Cost effect, parks (N=35) -6.5 % -3.0 % 3.5 
ns 
 .031 
 Level of TCF, parks (N=35) 8.9 5.5 3.4 
 
**  .664 
 Level of contracting out, parks (N=35) 44.7 % 38.9 % 37.5 ** .007 
 Cost effect, parks AND roads (N=81) -7.5 % -2.3 % 5.2 
*
 .055 
 Level of TCF, parks AND roads (N=81) 9.0 5.5 3.5 **  .691 
 Level of contracting out, parks AND roads (N=81) 51.6 % 45.3 % 6.3 
ns
 .011 
Source: INOPS survey data  
a
 Data for cost effects based on cases with self-reported estimates. Respondents were asked to provide estimates on the effect on the total price / cost 
level for services contracted out after the last round of procurement. Negative values indicate a cost decrease (i.e. cost saving). 
b
 Findings for cost differences are congruent with analysis of the bivariate correlations between continuous data for cost change and level of 
transactional contractual framework. Pearson’s and significance levels for bivariate relations: parks = -.240
ns
, roads = -.270
†
, parks and roads combined 
= -.258*. 
c
 Groups based on median value for formalized transactional contractual framework for all cases in the dataset with valid entries (median value = 7.5). 
d
 Differences evaluated at significance levels (SPSS ANOVA): 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
 
 
The analysis of the relationship between cost effects and RCF finds no statistically significant 
correlation (p < .1) between the size of cost effects and the level of RCF for either parks, roads or 
park and roads combined. This finding is supported by bivariate correlational analysis (Pearson’s) 
based on the original continuous data for RCF. However, visual inspection of the estimates for the 
average size of cost savings in the two groups indicate that for parks a inclination toward cost 
savings may be associated with higher levels of RCF while the opposite is indicated for roads.  
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Table 52.  
Differences in cost effects from last procurement between municipalities with high and low levels of formalized relational contractual 
framework (RCF). 
Cost effect 
a b
 
Mean scores 
 
Higher level of RCF 
c
 Lower level of RCF 
c
 Difference 
d
 ETA SQ 
  Cost effect, roads (N=46) -5.2 % -7.2 % 2.0 
ns
 .007 
 
Level of RCF, roads (N=46) 6.2 2.7 3.5 ** .609 
 Level of contracting out, roads (N=46) 55.9 % 49.4 % 6.5 
ns
 .016 
 Cost effect, parks (N=35) -6.2 % -2.7 % 3.5 
ns 
 .027 
 Level of RCF, parks (N=35) 6.4 2.9 3.5 
 
**  .583 
 Level of contracting out, parks (N=35) 46.2 % 34.1 % 12.1 
ns
 .027 
 Cost effect, parks AND roads (N=81) -5.7 % -5.4 % 0.3 
ns
 .000 
 Level of RCF, parks AND roads (N=81) 6.3 2.8 3.5 ** .598 
 Level of contracting out, parks AND roads (N=81) 51.6 % 43.2 % 8.4 
ns
 .018 
Source: INOPS survey data  
a
 Data for cost effects based on cases with self-reported estimates. Respondents were asked to provide estimates on the effect on the total price / cost 
level for services contracted out after the last round of procurement. Negative values indicate a cost decrease (i.e. cost saving). 
b
 Findings for cost differences are congruent with analysis of the bivariate correlations between continuous data for cost change and level of relational 
contractual framework. Pearson’s and significance levels for bivariate relations: parks = .022
ns
, roads = .069
ns
, parks and roads combined = .059ns. 
c
 Groups based on median value for formalized relational contractual framework for all cases in the dataset with valid entries (median value = 4.5). 
d
 Differences evaluated at significance levels (SPSS ANOVA): 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
 
 
Table 53 and Table 54 show analysis of the (bivariate) relationship between the level of the 
formalized contract and a categorical variable for cost effects. The analysis is only based on cases 
for parks and roads combined. In the analysis shown in Table 53 and Table 54, the continuous data 
for the size of cost effects (used in the analysis shown in Table 51 and Table 52) has been 
transformed into three categories for respectively cases with decrease in operational costs, no 
change in operational costs and increase in operational costs from the last procurement round.  
 
Table 53.  
Distribution of cost effects from last procurement round of park and road services between municipalities with high and low levels 
of formalized transactional contractual framework (TCF). 
 Level of formalized transactional contract framework (TCF) b   
Cost effect 
a
 
Higher level of TCF 
Count: observed (expected) 
Lower level of TCF 
Count: observed (expected) 
Total   
Decrease 28 (21.8) 8 (14.2) 36  
No change 20 (24.2) 20 (15.8) 40  
Increase 1 (3.0) 4 (2.0) 5  
Total 49 32 81  
a
 Variable based on transformation to categorical data of self-reported estimates on cost effects from last round of procurement of park and road 
maintenance services  
b 
Groups based on median value for formalized transactional contractual framework for all cases in the dataset with valid entries (median value = 
7.5). 
Test statistics for relationship between variables (2 cells has an expected count < 5, minimum expected count = 1.98): Fisher ’s exact test: 9.619, p = 
.006 (two-sided). Cramer’s V = .347. Similar results are found by chi-test. 
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Test statistics (Fisher’s exact test, p < .01) of the relationship between the cases with higher and 
lower level of TCF and cost effects shown in Table 53 confirm the findings from the analysis 
shown in Table 51. The measurement of the size of the effect between the two variables is 
considerable (Cramer’s V = .347). Similarly, test statistics (Fisher’s exact test) of the relationship 
between the cases with higher and lower level of RCF and cost effects shown in Table 54 confirm 
the findings from the analysis shown in Table 52. No statistically significant correlation (p = .166) 
is found between cost effects and the level of RCF. Furthermore, an additional analysis based on 
categorical data for parks alone (not show) also finds no statistically significant correlation (as 
might be expected from visual inspection of the difference in average cost effects for parks shown 
in Table 52).  
 
Table 54.  
Distribution of cost effects from last procurement round of park and road services between municipalities with high and low levels 
of formalized relational contract framework (RCF). 
 Level of formalized relational contract framework (RCF) b   
Cost effect 
a
 
Higher level of RCF 
Count: observed (expected)  
Lower level of RCF 
Count: observed (expected) 
Total   
Decrease 28 (24.7) 9 (12.3) 37  
No change 22 (26.0) 17 (13.0) 39  
Increase 4 (3.3) 1 (1.7) 5  
Total 54 27 81  
a
 Variable based on transformation to categorical data of self-reported estimates on cost from last round of procurement of park and road 
maintenance services.  
b 
Groups based on median value for formalized relational contractual framework for all cases in the dataset with valid entries (median value = 4.5). 
Test statistics for relationship between variables (2 cells has an expected count < 5, minimum expected count = 1.67): Fisher’s exact test: 3.415, p = 
.166 (two-sided). Cramer’s V = .211. Similar results are found by chi-test. 
 
7.3.4 Importance of economic size of private sector involvement 
This section provides an analysis of the bivariate relation between cost effects and economic size of 
overall private contractor involvement. The analysis builds on the assumption that private 
contractors can provide better economy of scale if the economic size of services contracted out is 
larger. The analysis only use cases with valid values for both variables, i.e. ‘cost effects’ and 
‘economic size of overall private sector involvement’ (N=79).  
The figures for overall private contractor involvement are calculated from two survey items 
(reported figures for total operational budgets of the department and the percentage of total 
operational budget spend on private contractors). Figures for overall private contractor involvement 
has been calculated separately for parks, roads and park and roads combined. The municipalities 
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have subsequently been divided into two groups based on the median values for economic size of 
overall private contractor involvement. The two groups have respectively larger and smaller size of 
economic involvement in absolute monetary terms. The average budget for park operations spend 
on private contractors for the groups with smaller economic involvement is, for example, estimated 
to be 1.5 Mill. DKK (based on the 34 cases with valid estimates for both economic size and cost 
effects). The average figures cover large underlying variations among the municipalities as well as a 
general ‘skewness’ due to a few municipalities with very large involvements of private contractors 
measured in absolute economic terms.  
 
Table 55.  
Differences in cost effects from last procurement between departments with larger and smaller absolute economic size of private 
sector involvement. 
Cost effect 
a b
 
Mean scores 
c
 
 
Larger size of economic 
involvement  
Smaller size of economic 
involvement 
Difference 
d
 ETA SQ 
  Cost effect, roads (N=45) -7.7 % -0.7 % 7.0 * .107 
 
Average size of economic involvement, roads (N=45) 34.3 Mill. DKK  10.3 Mill. DKK 20.0 ** .557 
 Level of contracting out, roads (N=45) 59.7 % 40.4 % 19.3 * .094 
 Cost effect, parks (N=34) -7.1 % -0.1 % 7.0 
† (p = .062)
 .105 
 Average size of economic involvement, parks (N=34) 7.3 Mill. DKK 1.5 Mill. DKK 6.8 * .186 
 Level of contracting out, parks (N=34) 55.0 % 17.5 % 37.5 ** .302 
 Cost effect, parks AND roads (N=79) -6.6 % -2.7 % 3.9 
† (p = .086)
 .038 
 
Average size of economic involvement, parks AND roads 
(N=79) 
26.9 Mill. DKK 3.6 Mill. DKK 23.3 ** .524 
 Level of contracting out, parks AND roads (N=79) 58.6 % 35.2 % 23.4 ** .158 
Source: INOPS survey data  
a
 Data for cost effects based on cases with self-reported estimates. Respondents were asked to provide estimates on the effect on the total price / cost 
level for services contracted out after the last round of procurement. Negative values indicate a cost decrease (i.e. cost saving). 
b
 Findings for cost differences are congruent with analysis of the bivariate correlations between continuous data for cost change and economic size 
(transformed to logarithmic values). Pearson’s correlation coefficients and significance levels for bivariate relations: parks = -.394*,  roads = -.376*, parks 
and roads combined = -.243* 
c
 Size of economic involvement calculated from survey items on the percentage of the departments operational budgets allocates to private contractors 
and the total value of the department’s operational budgets. Groups (‘larger’ and ‘smaller’) are based on median value for size of economic involvement 
of private contractors for respectively parks, roads and parks and roads combined (median value for parks = 3.475 Mill. DKK, roads = 20.0 Mill. DKK, 
parks and roads combined = 6.6 Mill. DKK).  
d
 Differences evaluated at significance levels (SPSS ANOVA): 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
 
 
The analysis of the importance of economic size of overall economic involvement and cost effects 
is shown in Table 55. Overall the analysis shows significant differences between the groups with 
larger and smaller size of economic involvement and the cost effects for parks, roads as well as park 
and roads combined. The difference is found to be stronger for respectively roads and parks and 
weaker for parks and roads combined. The weak difference for parks and roads combined can be 
explained by the absolute difference in the size of economic involvement between the two sectors. 
For example, the average economic size of involvement for the group with smaller size of economic 
involvement for the road sector is larger (10.3 mill. DKK) than the average economic size of 
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involvement for the group with larger size of economic involvement in the park sector (7.3 mill. 
DKK). This finding indicates that the importance of economic size cannot be compared directly 
between the two areas by using absolute figures (a parallel to the ‘frog-pond’ effect know from 
social comparison theory). An additional bivariate analysis of correlations based on continuous 
data
61
 supports the conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis shown in Table 55. The results 
from this analysis are (Pearson’s and value for significance): parks = -.394 (.021), roads = -.376 
(.024), parks and roads combined = -.243 (.031). All correlations are found significant at p-level < 
.05.  
An alternative analysis based on calculations of the size of economic involvement of private 
contractors for the whole municipality within the park and road sector (and not estimates for the 
department alone as in the analysis above) shows weak or no significant results (analysis not 
shown).
62
 This difference in findings may indicate that either should the findings in the analysis 
above be interpreted carefully, the contracts and measurements are not optimal for the analysis, or 
the difference in the distribution of budgets at the department compared to the municipal level is 
important due to an unknown factor (e.g. many municipal institutions, such as schools, has separate 
management and budget for outdoor facilities).  
Greater economic size of private sector involvement at the department level may be important 
due to increased capacity to organise and bundle services more effectively for procurement in the 
market. It may also indicate a greater capacity and experience at the department level with public 
procurement and contracting out. The last suggestion is supported by the finding that the group with 
a larger economic involvement of private contractors also relies to a greater extend on formalized 
and more complex contract frameworks than the group with smaller economic involvement 
(analysis shown in earlier chapter). Contractors on the other hand should be able to provide greater 
economies of scale (and lower pricing of services) if the economic size of the involvement in 
particular engagements are larger.  
 
                                                 
61
 The analysis is based on transformed logarithmic values due to strong right skewness in the underlying data, e.g. 
some municipalities have disproportionally large budgets.   
62
 Calculations of operational costs at the municipal level were based on available data from national municipal 
accounts for year 2014 (Statistics Denmark). In general figures for the average operational budget spend on private 
contractors for park and road maintenance at the municipal level (approx. 33.9 mil. DKK) were found higher than the 
estimates for the department level (approx. 28.2 mil. DKK).  
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7.3.5 Cost savings and satisfaction with quality  
Table 56 and Table 57 show two different analysis of the (bivariate) association between cost 
effects from the last round of procurement and the self-evaluated satisfaction with the maintenance 
quality delivered by private contractors. Both analyses indicate no bivariate association for 
respectively parks, roads as well as parks and roads.   
Table 56 shows an analysis of differences in cost change between municipalities with higher 
and lower satisfaction levels with the maintenance quality of delivered by private contractors. The 
individual analysis of respective parks and roads shows that there are no bivariate association 
between satisfaction with maintenance quality and cost savings. The analysis of parks and roads 
combined shows the same result.  
 
Table 56.  
Differences in cost effects between municipalities with higher and lower levels of satisfaction with quality of services delivered by 
private contractors. 
Cost effects 
a
 
Mean scores for satisfaction with quality 
b
 
 
Higher satisfaction 
c
 Lower satisfaction 
c
 
Score  
difference 
d
 
ETA SQ 
  Cost effect, roads (N =45) -6.7 % -4.6 % 2.1 
ns
  .008 
 
Cost effect, parks (N=34) -4.8 % -5.7 % 0.9 
ns
 .002 
 Cost effect, parks AND roads (N=79) -5.6% -5.1% 0.5 
ns
 .002 
 Satisfaction with quality, roads (N=62) 8.5 6.0 2.5 ** .578 
 Satisfaction with quality, parks (N=53) 8.4 5.6 2.8 ** .648 
 Level of contracting out, roads (N=61) 54.3 % 41.6 % 12.7  
†
 .063 
 Level of contracting out, parks (N=53) 33.5 % 35.2 % 2.3 
 ns
 .001 
Source: INOPS survey data  
a
 Data for cost effects based on cases with self-reported estimates. Respondents were asked to provide estimates on the effect on the total price / cost 
level for services contracted out after the last round of procurement. Negative values indicate a cost decrease (i.e. cost saving). 
b
 Based on a bipolar 11-point response scale with end anchors,  where 0 = ‘very unsatisfied’, 10 = ‘very satisfied’. 
c
 Groups based on median value for satisfaction with quality (median value for parks = 8, roads = 8).  
d
 Score differences evaluated at significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
 
 
Table 57 shows an analysis of differences in average satisfaction levels between groups which 
experienced respectively a decrease, no change or an increase in cost levels from the last round of 
procurement. The analyses of roads, parks and roads and parks combined find no statistical 
significant differences (p > .1).  
The statistics provided in Table 57 also shows that cases which experienced a decrease in cost 
levels contract out a larger share of their services (measured by the percentage). The differences in 
contracting levels are statistically significant (p < .1) for parks, roads as well as parks and roads 
combined. The difference in contracting levels between the groups with different cost effects is 
strongest for parks alone (ETA SQ = .183 / Linear R SQ = .133).  
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Table 57.  
Differences in satisfaction with quality of park and road maintenance services delivered by private contractors between municipalities 
with different cost effects from last round of procurement. 
Quality 
a
 
Cost effect 
b
 
 
Decrease 
(saving) 
No effect Increase ETA SQ 
c
 Linear R SQ 
c
 
  Satisfaction with quality, roads (N =44) 7.7 7.5 7.7 .008
 ns
 .002 
ns
 
 
Satisfaction with quality, parks (N=35) 7.3 7.0 7.5 .010 
ns
 .002 
ns
 
 Satisfaction with quality, parks AND roads (N=79) 7.5 7.3 7.6 .006 
ns
 .002 
ns
 
 Level of contracting out, roads (N=47) 62.9 % 46.3 % 51.7 % .106 
†
 .076 
†
 
 Level of contracting out, parks (N=36) 60.0 % 29.6 % 40.0 % .183 * .133 * 
 Level of contracting out, parks AND roads (83) 61.4 % 38.8 % 47.0 % .137 ** .097 ** 
Source: INOPS survey data  
a
 Based on a bipolar 11-point response scale with end anchors,  where 0 = ‘very unsatisfied’, 10 = ‘very satisfied’. 
b
 Based on categorical data.   
c
 Significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
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7.4 Explanatory analysis of cost effects 
The following section provides an explanatory analysis of cost effects from contracting out park and 
road maintenance in Danish municipalities.
63
 The analysis is based on an OLS regression analysis 
and evaluates the importance of sector, contracting purpose, procurement history, contractual 
framework and satisfaction with quality for the size of cost effects (based on continuous data). 
Table 58  provides a summary of descriptive statistics for cases (N = 76) included in the 
explanatory analysis.  
 
Table 58. 
Explaining cost effects in Denmark: Descriptive statistics for variables used in OLS regression. 
 Descriptives 
a
 
Variable Scale Mean Std. Deviation Min–Max value 
Cost effect from last procurement (pct. change) 
b
 % - 5.0 % 9.9 % -.40 – .16 
Sector (binary, park=0, roads=1) 0 – 1 .55 .50 0 – 1 
Procurement history (number of past procurements) 1 – 4 3.1 1.2 1 – 4 
Purpose for contracting out: cost reduction 
c
 0 – 10 7.5 2.0 0 – 10 
Transactional contract dimensions (index) 
c
 0 – 10 7.6 2.0 2.0 – 10.0 
Relational contract dimensions (index) 
c
 0 – 10 5.1 2.1 .8 – 10.0 
Satisfaction with maintenance quality 
d
 0 – 10 7.4 1.7 2 – 10 
a
 All descriptives are calculated from the number of cases included in the OLS regression analysis (N=76).  
 b
 Based on self-reported figures for cost changes from last public procurement of park and road services. Negative signs indicate cost savings.  
 c 
Based on a unipolar 11-point response scale with anchors: 0 = ‘not at all’, 10 = ‘in very high degree’ 
  
 d 
Based on a bipolar 11-point response scale with end anchors,  where 0 = ‘very unsatisfied’, 10 = ‘very satisfied’.
 
 
The analysis, based on an OLS regression analysis, of the importance of various explanatory 
variables for cost effects is shown in Table 59. The analysis shows that three out of the six 
explanatory variables help explain differences in cost effects. The statistic for R
2
 in the model 
shows that the explanatory variables account for around 20 percent of the variance in the dependent 
variable (size of cost effects).  
Sector (park or road), the level of relational contract framework and managers’ satisfaction 
with service quality are all insignificantly correlated with the size of cost effects (p >.1). In other 
words, the regression analysis shows that cost effects are alike in the two sectors, the level of 
relational contract framework is unimportant for cost effects as well as the level of satisfaction with 
service quality is unaffected by the size of the cost effect.  
Three variables are found important for explaining differences in cost effects: procurement 
history, contracting purpose and the level of transactional contract framework. The analysis shows 
                                                 
63
 The section is based on an analysis of cost effects from contracting out of park and road maintenance based on 
INOPS survey data presented in Lindholst, Petersen & Houlberg (2015).  
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that a higher number procurement rounds in the past within the particular sector is associated with a 
diminishing level of cost reduction. The beta-coefficient for procurement history (+.029) indicates 
that in the range from 1 to 4 past procurement rounds the level of cost reduction is reduced with 
around 3 percent points on the average each subsequent time a service is procured.  
 
Table 59. 
Explaining cost effects from contracting out park and road maintenance in Denmark: OLS Regression.  
Explanatory variables (scales) Unstandardized beta-coefficients (standard errors) 
a
 
Sector (roads=1, parks=0)  ÷ .009 
ns
 (.021) 
Procurement history (1-4) + .029 ** (.010) 
Purpose: Low maintenance cost (0-10) ÷ .011 * (.005) 
Transactional contract framework (0-10) ÷ .012 
†
 (.006) 
Relational contract framework (0-10)  + .007 
ns
 (.006) 
Satisfaction with service quality (0-10)  + .001 
ns
 (.007) 
N 76 
Max VIF  1.676 
R
2  
/
 
Adjusted R
2 b
  .264 / .200 
Data sources: INOPS survey  
Legend: Beta-coefficients in bold indicate a statistical significant correlation. Negative sign (÷) indicates a cost decrease. Positive sign (+) 
indicates a cost increase. Significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. Diagnosis for outliers (cases with std. residuals 
>= 3.00). One influential outlier detected and removed.  
a 
Coefficients
 
indicate the level of change in the dependent variable (.01 = 1 %) by changing one scale unit in an explanatory variable.  
b
 R
2 
= the degree (ranging from 0 to 1) in which the ‘explanatory’ variables account for the variance in the dependent variable. 
 
The degree a municipality puts emphasis on ‘low maintenance cost’ as contracting purpose also 
helps explain differences in cost effects. The beta-coefficient for ‘low maintenance cost’ as 
contracting purpose (÷ .011) indicate that a one-point increase (e.g. from 6 to 7) in the score 
(ranging from 0 to 10) is associated with a cost reduction around 1 percent. This finding indicates 
that municipalities are able to use public procurement and contracting out as a deliberate strategy 
for reducing operational costs within the park and road sector. This finding also indicates that it is 
not always relevant to evaluate the success of contracting out by its effect on cost levels alone as 
cost reductions not always are the primary purpose for contracting out.  
Furthermore, higher levels of transactional contract framework are also indicated to be 
associated with larger cost reductions. The beta-coefficient for transactional contract framework (÷ 
.012) indicates that a one-point increase in the score is associated with a cost reduction around 1 
percent. This finding indicates that the features associated with a transactional contract framework 
are important for the level of operational costs when park and road services are contracted out. 
These features include the degree the services in question are specified, the degree of specification 
of formal agreements as well as the degree ‘hard’ safeguards (i.e. economic sanctions in case of 
non-compliance) are specified in the contract. Overall, the regression analysis finds that higher 
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degrees of specification of these features are associated with a higher degree of cost reduction when 
services are contracted out.  
Overall, the findings in the OLS regression analysis shown in Table 59 confirms key findings 
from the bivariate analyses of the relations between cost effects and the variables used for 
explaining differences in cost effects.  
7.4.1.1 Alternative analysis  
An additional analysis (not shown) which includes an additional explanatory variable for the size of 
economic involvement (based on the assumption on greater returns from scale economic when the 
economic value of services contracted out are greater) also indicates that a larger economic size of 
the overall involvement of private contractors at the department level compared to a smaller 
economic size is significantly correlated with cost savings.
64
 The significance levels and signs for 
the explanatory variables included in the analysis shown in Table 59 remains approximately the 
same except for TFC which becomes insignificant (p = .152) while the unstandardized beta-
coefficient becomes smaller (change from -.012 to -.007). The changes in the estimates for TCF can 
be argued to be produced by an association between economic size and contractual framework (i.e. 
more encompassing formal contract frameworks are used for contracts or larger economic size).  
 
                                                 
64
 The included construct for measurement of economic size is based on a binary variable coded as either higher (=1) or 
lower (=0). The coding is based on groups defined by either a higher or lower value for median values for respectively 
park and road budgets separately (roads = 19.0 mil. DKK, parks = 3.475 mil. DKK). The coding is separate for the two 
sectors in order to avoid eventual ’frog pond’ effects (which would be the case if the coding was based on the median 
value for park and road budgets combined). Model summary: N=74 (three influential outliers removed), R
2
 / Adj. R
2
 = 
.421 / .360, MAX VIF = 1.717. Unstandardized beta-coefficient for economic size = -.048, p-level < .01. 
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7.5 Comparing cost effects across Denmark, Sweden, Norway and UK 
This section provides comparisons of cost effects on operational cost from contracting out park and 
road maintenance services in municipalities across Denmark, Sweden, Norway and UK. The 
comparisons are based on partly similar survey data for all countries. In particular, for UK the 
survey included different response options for cost effects.
65
 The survey data allows for 
comparisons of cost effects based on continuous data for all Scandinavian countries and for 
comparisons of cost effects based on categorical data for all four countries.  
 
7.5.1 Cross national comparison of size and direction of cost effects  
Table 60 provides comparable statistics for the average (un-weighted) cost effects from contracting 
out parks and road services in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The averages were calculated from 
all cases for roads and parks where estimates were provided in the national surveys. The 
comparison shows that cost decreases (i.e. savings) has on the average been achieved in Denmark (-
5.5 %) and Sweden (-2.7 %) while contracting out has entailed cost increases in Norway (11 %). 
Furthermore, the variations, measured by the standard deviation, between the cases in both Sweden 
and in particular Norway are higher than in Denmark. The range between the ‘extreme’ values is 
also higher for Norway (140 percentage points) and Sweden (120 percentage points) than for 
Denmark (66 percentage points).  
 
Table 60.  
Nordic countries: Comparisons of average cost effects from last procurement of park and road maintenance services. 
  
Parks and Roads – Cost effects 
Denmark Norway Sweden 
N  82 52 78 
Mean (un-weighted) - 5.5 % 11.0 % - 2.7 % 
Std. dev.  10.8 % 24.5 % 14.0 % 
Min. value (decrease) - 50 % - 40 % - 70 % 
Max. value (increase)   16 %  100 %   50 % 
All data based on valid cases with self-reported estimates. Respondents were asked to provide estimates on the effect on the total price 
and cost level for services contracted out after the last round of procurement. No survey data on estimates for cost effects in percentage 
available for UK.  
 
                                                 
65
 The research team for the UK survey as well as pilot tests evaluated the most appropriate response option to be a 
categorical format (i.e. ’increase’, ’decrease’) whereas the research teams for the three Scandinavian countries evaluated 
a continuous response format to be able to provide valid information. In addition, the UK format included additional 
survey items on the effect for quality.  
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Table 61 provides a cross national comparison of cost effects based on categorical data. Across all 
four countries 119 out of 278 municipalities – equal to 43 % – experienced a cost decrease the last 
time a park or road maintenance services was procured while 38 % experienced no cost change and 
19 % experienced a cost increase. Respondents in a relatively large portion of the municipalities 
also indicted that they didn’t knew the cost effect. In the three Scandinavian countries the portion 
which indicates a ‘don’t know’ is in the range between 22 % (Norway) and 39 % (Sweden). The 
portion for UK is around 13 %. The difference for UK in comparison with the three Scandinavian 
countries may also reflect difference in the response options for the survey items.
66
 
 
Table 61.  
Cross national comparison of cost effects from last procurement of park and road maintenance services. 
  
Cost effects  
Denmark 
(cases) 
Norway (cases) Sweden (cases) UK (cases) 
All Countries 
(cases) 
N (valid answers with estimates) 82 52 78 66 278 
  Cost increase 5 28 15 5 53 
  No cost change 40 18 38 10 106 
  Cost decrease 37 6 25 51 119 
Don’t know  27 15 30 9 81 
N (total)  109 67 108 75 359 
All data based on cases with self-reported effects.  
 
However, as also shown in Figure 27 below, the differences between the countries are notable. 
Sweden and Denmark are the two countries most alike, while Norway and UK represent the two 
extremes.  Norway is the country with the largest portion of municipalities which have experienced 
a cost increase (54 %) while UK is the country with the largest portion of municipalities which have 
experienced a cost decrease (77%).  
 
                                                 
66
 The portion of ‘don’t knows’ is smaller in UK than in the three other countries, but this may reflect the different and 
less demanding response option for cost effects (categories for direction of cost change versus the percentage for change 
in ex ante operational cost compared to ex post costs) in the survey. 
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Figure 27.  
Cross-national comparison of cost changes from last procurement of park and road maintenance services 
 
 
7.5.2 Explaining cost difference in Sweden, Norway and UK 
7.5.2.1 Explaining cost differences in Norway 
The analysis of the Norwegian context shows that Norway is characterized by a high number of 
very small municipalities distributed over a vast geographical area. The use of contracting out in 
Norwegian municipalities has furthermore only been promoted weakly by central government 
policies in Norway. The INOPS survey data also shows that the main reason for using private 
contractors in Norway is for provision of maintenance services which cannot be provided in-house 
– and less for the purpose of lowering cost of park and road maintenance. The variation in the 
emphasis on low maintenance cost as purpose for contracting out varies to a great extent among 
Norwegian municipalities. On a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very high degree) the Norwegian 
municipalities on the average scores the importance of low maintenance cost as purpose for using 
private contractors a little above the scale midpoint (5.8) while the standard deviation is as high as 
3.1 (also see chapter on reasons for using private contractors).  
Overall, the survey data shows that the most common scenario is a cost increase when 
Norwegian municipalities contract out parks and road maintenance. Table 62 shows the distribution 
of cost effects in terms of whether a ‘cost decrease’, ‘no cost change‘ or a ‘cost increase’ was 
reported from the last round of procurement of park and road maintenance. Five cases of cost 
decrease out of 39 cases (equal to 13 %) were reported for road maintenance. Only 1 case indicated 
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a ‘cost decrease’ out of the 13 cases (equal to 8 %) which was reported for park maintenance. 
Twenty-eight out of the 52 cases (equal to 54 %) experienced a cost increase.  
 
Table 62.  
Cost effects in Norwegian municipalities from last round of procurement of park and road services  
 Sector  
Cost effect 
a
 Park Road Total 
Decrease 1 5 6 
No change 5 13 18 
Increase 7 21 28 
Total 13 39 52 
a
 Variable based on transformation to categorical data of self-reported estimates on cost from last round of procurement 
of park and road maintenance services.  
 
However, as indicated by the statistics on variations (see Table 60), some Norwegian municipalities 
are able to achieve relatively better and more satisfactory economic outcomes than others. A 
bivariate analysis of the association between low maintenance costs as the strategic purpose for 
contracting out and the cost change from last procurement shows that contracting purpose are 
important for predicting the economic outcome. Table 63 shows an analysis of differences in cost 
effects between groups with respectively ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ emphasis on low maintenance cost as 
contracting purpose. 
 
Table 63.  
Differences in cost effects between Norwegian municipalities with higher and lower emphasis on low maintenance cost as contracting 
purpose. 
Cost effects 
a
 
Mean 
b
 
 
Higher emphasis 
c
 Lower emphasis  
c
 
Score  
difference 
d
 
ETA SQ 
  Cost effect, roads (N =36) 3.9 % 21.9 % 18.0 *  .151 
 
Cost effect, parks (N=12) 3.3 % 41.7 % 38.4 
†
 .293 
 Cost effect, parks AND roads (N=48) 3.7 % 25.0 % 21.3 ** .171 
 Contracting purpose: low maintenance costs (N=136) 8.3 3.2 5.1 ** .706 
 Satisfaction with cost levels, parks AND roads (N=86) 6.5 5.9 .6 
ns (p = .134)
 .026 
 Level of competition (N=112) 6.2 5.3 .9
 †
 .025 
 Level of contracting out, parks and roads (N=112) 43.6 % 27.8 % 12.7  ** .066 
Source: INOPS survey data for Norway 
a
 Data for cost effects based on cases with self-reported estimates. Respondents were asked to provide estimates on the effect on the total price / cost 
level for services contracted out after the last round of procurement. Negative values indicate a cost decrease (i.e. cost saving). 
b
 Groups based on median value for contracting purpose: low maintenance costs (median value = 6). Item for contracting purpose is based on a 
unipolar 11-point response scale with end anchors, where 0 = ‘not at all’, 10 = ‘very high degree. 
c
 Score differences evaluated at significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
 
 
The difference in the emphasis on low maintenance cost as contracting purpose between the groups 
with higher and lower emphasis is very high. Within the group with higher emphasis the mean score 
is 8.3 while the mean score the group with lower emphasis is 3.2. The difference in the cost effect 
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between the two groups is statistically significant for both parks and roads alone as well as for parks 
and roads combined. For parks and roads combined, the difference is 21.3 percentage points. The 
difference is higher for parks alone (38.4 percentage points) and smaller for roads alone (18.0 
percentage points). Analysis of the bivariate association between the two variables based on 
correlational analysis for parks and roads combined produce similar results (Pearson’s = -.435, p < 
.01). Furthermore, the satisfaction with economic performance is not significantly lower for 
municipalities with a lower emphasis on low maintenance cost compared to municipalities with a 
higher emphasis on low maintenance costs. To some extent it is also found that those municipalities 
which pursue a low cost contracting strategy also experience a higher level of competition.  
The short analysis of bivariate associations indicates that although economic results in terms 
of cost savings from contracting out among Norwegian seems very poor, some municipalities still 
pursues a low cost strategy relatively successfully. Figure 29 vividly illustrates the difference. It 
should be noted however, that none of the groups (e.g. municipalities with higher emphasis on low 
maintenance costs as contracting purpose) has experienced a cost decrease on the average. For 
example, the average change in operational costs from last procurement for parks and roads 
combined (N=48) is a 3.7 % increase. The finding in Norway (regarding the importance of the low 
maintenance cost strategy) is similar to the finding in the more elaborate explanatory analysis of 
contracting out among Danish municipalities.  
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Figure 28. 
Cost effects (percentage change in operational costs) from procurement of park and road maintenance 
in Norwegian municipalities with higher and lower emphasis on ‘low maintenance cost’ as purpose for 
contracting out.  
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A more detailed statistical analysis based on OLS regression analysis of explanatory factors for cost 
effects is shown in Table 64. The analysis investigates the importance of sector (park or road), 
municipal size (inhabitants), level of competition, procurement history, and low cost contracting 
strategy.  
 
Table 64. 
Explaining cost effects from contracting out park and road maintenance in Norway: OLS Regression.  
Predictor variables (scales) 
Unstandardized beta-coefficients (standard errors) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Sector (roads=1, parks=0) -.047 
ns
 (.079) -.059 
ns
 (.076) -.056 
ns
 (.074) -.069 
ns
 (.071) - - 
Municipal size (LN) -.012 
ns
 (.024) -.008 
ns
 (.024) -.001 
ns
 (.023) .008 
ns
 (.023) - - 
Level of competition (0-10) - - -.020 
†
 (.010) -.013 
ns
 (.011) -.007 
ns
 (.011) -.006 
ns
 (.011) 
Procurement history (1-4) - - - - -.068 
†
 (.038) -.066 
†
 (.036) -.063 
†
 (.035) 
Purpose: Low maintenance cost (0-10) - - - - - - -.026 * (.011) -.024 * (.011) 
N 47 47 47 47 47 
Max VIF  1.089 1.121 1.193 1.272 1.268 
R
2 
/ Adj. R
2
 .010 / -.035 .093 / .029 .157 / 077 .253 / .162 .229 /.175 
Significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, 
ns
 = non-significant. 
One influential outlier removed (std. residual > 3.0) in all models.  
 
The analysis finds that higher levels of experienced competition, a higher number of public 
procurements in the past as well as greater emphasis on a low cost contracting strategy are 
associated with relatively better economic outcomes in terms of the change in operational cost 
smaller cost increases (or a degree of cost savings). No difference in cost effects is found between 
the park and road sectors as well as municipal size is found to be unimportant (insignificant).  
The Norwegian case represents an ‘inverted’ case of the hypothesis of ‘Diminishing returns of 
competition’. The hypothesis states that benefits will tend to diminish from the introduction of 
additional competition in situations already characterized by a degree of competition (Boyne, 1998). 
The analysis in Table 64 shows that a variant of the ‘diminishing return of competition effect’ is in 
play in the Norwegian context of contracting out. However, the effect works somehow differently 
than originally formulated (i.e. cost savings / gains becomes smaller by introduction of additional 
competition). Table 65 provides a simple overview of the cost effect for groups of municipalities 
with different procurements histories (i.e. number of public procurements in the past ten years). It is 
found that while it on the average seems costly to contract out park and road maintenance for the 
first time for the Norwegian municipalities the ‘additional’ cost from procurement it also decreasing 
over time (i.e. by an increasing number of procurements). In addition, the percentage of 
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municipalities which do not experience a cost change increases over time (i.e. by an increasing 
number of procurements). In other words, the ‘diminishing return from competition effect’ in 
Norway works as a ‘diminishing loss from competition effect’. 
 
Table 65.  
Cost effects distributed according to the number of public procurements in the past ten years in Norwegian municipalities. 
Number of procurements  
in the past ten years 
Mean cost effect 
a
 S.D. 
Percentage which experienced: 
N 
a cost 
decrease 
No  
change 
a cost 
Increase 
  One  + 45.0 %  48.2 0 % 0 % 100 % 3 
  Two  + 5.7 % 16.9 14 % 15 % 71 % 7 
  Three + 17.5 % 28.6 16 % 21 % 63 % 19 
  Four or more + 2.8 % 13.7 9 % 66 % 35 % 23 
All cases + 10.3 % 22.1 33  % 48 % 19  % 52 
a
 The linear association between the four categories is significant, p-level = .018. R
2 
= .101. Deviation from linearity is also significant at p = .077. 
 
Another important finding in the OLS-regression analysis is the ‘interaction effect’ between 
competition level and procurement history. The significant correlation between cost effect and 
competition level in model 2 turns insignificant in model 3 by the inclusion of procurement history 
in the model. Technically, procurement history acts as a (partial) ‘mediator’ variable. The finding 
can be interpreted in the overall context of contracting out among Norwegian municipalities. In 
particular, use of contracting out and the markets for provision of park and road maintenance in 
Norway is not well-developed and uneven distributed across the country. Norwegian municipalities 
do not ‘tap’ directly into well-established and competitive markets when they chose to contracting 
out or not, but rather they seem to create markets and competition through recurrent use of 
procurement.  
 
Table 66.  
Norway: Average level of experienced competition distributed according to the number of public procurements in the past ten years. 
Number of procurements  
in the past ten years 
Mean N S.D. 
One 2.7  3 1.5 
Two  4.1 7 2.4 
Three 5.8  17 3.4 
Four or more 6.7  20 2.9 
Total 5.8 47 3.1 
The linear association between the four categories is significant, p-level = .011. R
2 
= .139. 
 
The analysis provided in Table 66 illustrates this interpretation. The analysis shows that the level of 
experienced competition as a general trend increases with the number of public procurements in the 
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past ten years. Norwegian municipalities have not readily ‘tapped’ directly into a competitive 
market, but have created this by the use of public procurement. The development of contracting out 
and competitive markets seems to come at a ‘cost’ in terms of rather poor economic results at an 
initial stage (e.g. increased operational costs).  
The initial lack of markets and the ‘inversed’ effect in Norway can be contrasted to the 
situation in Denmark. Denmark has more ‘matured’ and evenly distributed markets for road and 
park maintenance services. The contrast between Denmark and Norway also illustrates the 
importance of context.  
7.5.2.2 Explaining cost differences in Sweden 
The data for cost effects from contracting out of park and road maintenance in Swedish 
municipalities shows that about one-third has experienced a cost decrease from the last procurement 
round while about one half experienced no cost change (see Figure 27). An analysis by Bretzner et 
al (forthcoming) based on INOPS survey data finds that contracting out is more ‘rational’ in city-
regions with well-developed markets.  
Table 67 shows a bivariate analysis of differences in cost effects between municipalities 
which experience respectively higher and lower levels of competition (last time they procured 
maintenance services). The analysis shows that the group of municipalities which experienced 
higher levels of competition on the average has achieved a cost decrease for parks (-3.8 %), roads (-
7.6 %) and parks and roads combined (-6.0 %). On the other hand the group of municipalities which 
experienced lower levels of competition on the average has achieved a cost increase for parks (3.1 
%), roads (-6.5 %) and parks and roads combined (-5.5 %). 
 
Table 67.  
Differences in cost effects between Swedish municipalities with higher and lower levels of competition. 
Cost effects 
a
 
Means 
b
 
 
Higher level 
c
 Lower level  
c
 
Score  
difference 
d
 
ETA SQ 
  Cost effect, roads (N =47) - 7.6 % 6.5 % 14.1 **  .181 
 
Cost effect, parks (N=29) - 3.8 % 3.1 % 6.9
 ns (p=.186)
 .064 
 Cost effect, parks and roads (N=76) - 6.0 % 5.5 % 11.5 ** .135 
 Level of competition (N=136) 8.3 3.7 4.6 ** .754 
 Satisfaction with cost levels, parks and roads (N=104) 6.9 5.5 1.4 **
 
 .086 
 Level of contracting out, parks and roads (N=112) 53.6 % 38.4 % 15.2 * .041 
Source: INOPS survey data for Sweden 
a
 Data for cost effects based on cases with self-reported estimates. Respondents were asked to provide estimates on the effect on the total price / cost 
level for services contracted out after the last round of procurement. Negative values indicate a cost decrease (i.e. cost saving). 
b
 Groups based on median value for level of competition (median value = 7). Item is based on a unipolar 11-point response scale with end anchors, 
where 0 = ‘not at all’, 10 = ‘very high degree. 
c
 Score differences evaluated at significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
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Analysis of the bivariate association between the two variables based on correlational analysis for 
parks and roads combined produce similar results (Pearson’s = -.399, p < .01). Furthermore, Table 
67  includes an analysis which shows that the satisfaction with cost levels is significantly higher for 
Swedish municipalities which experienced higher levels of competition compared to municipalities 
which experienced lower levels of competition.  
 
Table 68.  
Average cost effects distributed according to geographical region in Sweden. 
Region Mean cost effect S.D. N 
Northern  + 1.5 %  10.4 25 
Eastern - 8.4 % 17.4 22 
Southern  - 2.0 % 13.1 31 
All of Sweden - 2.7 % 14.1 78 
Differences between regions are statistically significant, p = .051. ETA squared = .076. 
 
Table 68 shows an analysis of average cost effects for three regions in Sweden. The Northern part, 
which is the least densely populated part of Sweden and with smaller sized municipalities, is found 
to have experienced a minor increase in operational costs on the average (+ 1.5 %) from the last 
round of procurement of park or road maintenance services.  In contrast, municipalities in the 
Eastern part of Sweden have experienced a substantial cost decrease on operational costs (-8.4 %) 
while the Southern part has experienced a smaller cost decrease (- 2.0 %).  
 
Table 69. 
Explaining cost effects from contracting out park and road maintenance in Sweden: OLS Regression.  
Predictor variables (scales) 
Unstandardized beta-coefficients (standard errors) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Sector (roads=1, parks=0) -.011 
ns
 (.037) -.024 
ns
 (.034) -.019 
ns
 (.034) -.021 
ns
 (.034) - - 
Municipal size (LN) .001 
ns
 (.017) .003 
ns
 (.016) .006 
ns
 (.016) .004 
ns
 (.016) - - 
Northern Sweden (yes=1, no=0) .063 
ns (p=.125)
 (.040) .076 * (.037) .077 * (.037) .075 * (.037) .070 
†
 (.036) 
Level of competition (0-10) - - -.025 ** (.007) -.024 ** (.007) -.025 ** (.007) -.024 ** (.006) 
Procurement history (1-4) - - - - -.017 
ns
 (.018) -.020 
ns
 (.018) -.021 
ns
 (.018) 
Purpose: Low maintenance cost (0-10) - - - - - - -.007 
ns
 (.008) -.007 
ns
 (.008) 
N 69 69 69 69 69 
Max VIF  1.070 1.080 1.084 1.086 1.041 
R
2 
/ Adj. R
2
 .037 / -.007 .209 / .160 .220 / .159 .230 / .155 224 / .176 
Significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, 
ns
 = non-significant. 
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A fuller analysis, based on hierarchical OLS regression analysis, is shown in Table 69. The analysis 
includes six altogether predictor variables which are included stepwise in model 1-4. Model 5 
includes four predictor variables. The analysis confirms the findings on the importance of region 
and competition for cost effects. Higher levels of competition are significantly correlated with 
higher levels of cost savings. The location in Northern Sweden only becomes significantly 
correlated (at a p-level < .1) with cost savings when the level of competition is included in the 
analysis (model 2-5).  
The analysis also shows that procurement history and emphasis on a low cost contracting 
strategy apparently are of less or no importance for explaining cost effects in Sweden. In particular, 
greater emphasis on a low cost contracting strategy is not found to result in larger cost reductions on 
the average than a lower emphasis in the Swedish context.  
Procurement history was found to be important for explaining cost effects from contracting 
out in Denmark and Norway. The regression analysis apparently shows that it is of no importance in 
Sweden. An additional explorative analysis of the importance of procurement history for cost 
effects in Sweden is provided in Table 70.  
 
Table 70.  
Average cost effects distributed according to the number of public procurements in the past ten years in Swedish municipalities. 
Number of procurements  
in the past ten years 
Mean cost effect 
a
 S.D. 
Percentage which experienced: 
N 
a cost 
decrease 
No  
change 
a cost 
Increase 
One  - 10.0 %  11.6 50 % 50 % 0 % 4 
Two  + 4.2 % 19.8 46 % 17 % 37 % 13 
Three - 1.0 % 9.7 24 % 48 % 28 % 25 
Four or more - 5.5 % 13.9 31 % 61 % 8 % 36 
Total - 2.7 % 14.1 33  % 48 % 19  % 78 
a
 The linear association between the four categories is insignificant, p-level = .225. Differences between groups are close to being significant, p-level 
= .109, ETA Squared = .078 
 
The analysis finds that the size of cost effects varies between groups with different procurement 
histories. The variations (measured by standard deviations) within the four groups, however, are 
substantially larger than the variations between the four groups. Table 70 also includes the 
percentages within each group which experienced respectively a cost decrease and a cost increase. 
Inspection of the figures shows that the portions which experience cost increase and cost decrease 
becomes smaller by an increasingly higher number of procurements (except for the first category 
which however has a very low n, n=4). This finding may be interpreted as an indication of a 
decreasing effect on cost levels from competition over time (a variant of the ‘diminishing return 
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form competition’ effect). Over time, or by additional public procurements, the ‘market’ finds 
equilibrium where the chance for cost changes is diminished (or cost levels stabilized). Although it 
was found that the procurement history wasn’t important for explaining the average size of cost 
effect (see Table 69) the analysis in Table 70 highlight that a longer procurement history still is 
associated with different aspects of cost effects in terms of an increasing number of municipalities 
which experience ‘no cost’ change.  
7.5.2.3 Explaining cost differences in UK 
The UK survey included a unique item about the change in quality in conjunction with change in 
cost as a result from last round of procurement. Table 71 shows the distribution of cost and quality 
effects among all 66 cases in UK. Most notable is the (almost singular) association between the 
indications of decreased quality with a cost decrease (26 cases). All but one case, which indicated a 
decrease in quality level, also indicated that costs had decreased as a result from the last 
procurement round. It should be noted that the indication of change in quality levels do not 
necessarily equal a change in the managers’ satisfaction with the quality of maintenance services 
provided by private contractors. 
  
Table 71.  
Procurement of park and road maintenance in UK: Cost and change in quality level. 
 Quality level 
a
  
Cost effect 
a
 
Increased  
(observed / expected) 
No change 
(observed / expected) 
Decreased 
(observed / expected) 
Total  
Decrease 14 (13.1) 11 (17.0) 26 (20.9) 51 
No change 2 (2.6) 8 (3.3) 0 (4.1) 10 
Increase 1 (1.3) 3 (1.7) 1 (2.0) 5 
Total 17 22 27 66 
a
 Data based on self-reported impacts on cost and quality levels from the last round of procurement of park and road maintenance services  
Test statistics for relationship between variables (6 cells has an expected count < 5, minimum expected count = 1.3): Fisher’s exact test: 15.512, p = 
.001 (two-sided). Null hypothesis (no association) rejected. Cramer’s V = .347. Similar results are found by ordinary chi-test. 
 
Overall, analysis of the data in Table 71 indicates that changes in cost levels are significantly (p < 
.01) associated with changes in quality levels. In particular decrease in quality levels are 
significantly correlated with a decrease in cost levels. The analysis in Table 71 does not show 
whether the changes in quality / costs levels also is associated with change in managers’ satisfaction 
with the quality levels provided by private contractors. Further analysis is needed to address this 
question.   
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Results from a logistic regression with a binary variable for cost effects as the response 
variable is shown in Table 72. Cost effect is coded with ‘0’ for cases with no cost decrease and ‘1’ 
for cases with cost decreases. The logistic regression includes several predictor variables.  
The analysis shows that the odds for a cost decrease are 14 times larger when quality is decreased 
than if quality is unchanged (or increased). The odds for a cost decrease are almost 2 times larger 
when low cost as contracting purpose is emphasized (by respondents) by an additional scale unit 
(runs from 0 to 10).  
 
Table 72. 
Logistic regression: Cost decrease (yes = 1 / no = 0) from contracting out park and road maintenance in UK 
Variable 
Regression 
coefficient (B) 
S.E. P-value 
Exp. (B) 
(Odd Ratio) 
90% CI Exp. (B) 
Lower Higher 
 Quality decrease (1=yes, 0=no) 2.669 1.484 .072 14.429 1.256 165.835 
 No quality change (1=yes, 0=no) -1.442 .881 .102 .236 .055 1.007 
 Contracting purpose: Low cost (0-10) 
a
 .536 .233 .021 1.710 1.166 2.508 
 Satisfaction with provided quality (0-10) 
b
 -.002 .229 .993 .998 .684 1.456 
 Sector (park=0, road=1) 1.770 1.117 .113 5.868 .934 36.856 
 N  61 
 Cox & Snell / Nagelkerke R square .227 / .440 
 a
 Based on a unipolar 11-point response scale with anchors: 0 = ‘not at all’, 10 = ‘in very high degree’  
 b 
Based on a bipolar 11-point response scale with end anchors,  where 0 = ‘very unsatisfied’, 10 = ‘very satisfied’.
 
 
Two predictor variables are close to being significant at the p-level = .1, i.e. ’no quality change’ (p 
= .102) and ’sector’ (p = .113). The odds for a cost decrease are .235 (approx. four) times smaller 
when quality is unchanged than if quality is changed (increased or decreased). The odds for a cost 
decrease are almost 6 times higher in the road sector than in the park sector.  
The analysis furthermore shows that the level of satisfaction with maintenance quality of 
services provided by private contractors is unaffected by changes in cost levels (p = .993, B = -
.002). The findings from the logistic regression analysis in particular highlights the importance of 
contracting purpose (low maintenance costs) as well as changes in quality level for the economic 
outcomes from contracting out park and road maintenance services in Local Authorities in the UK.  
 
INOPS  Technical report 
 
206 
7.6 Performance evaluations 
Table 73 shows the evaluation of six performance dimensions of park and road maintenance 
services provided by private contractors for Danish municipalities. Performance was measured in 
the survey by respondents’ evaluation of their level of satisfaction on an 11-point scale where 0 = 
‘very unsatisfactory’ to 10 = ‘very satisfactory’. 
 
Table 73. 
Municipal managers’ performance evaluation of private contractors’ delivery of road and park maintenance (Denmark) 
Performance dimension 
a
 
Park maintenance (N=53) Road maintenance (N=62) 
N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. 
 
Quality of maintenance services 53 7.1 1.7 62 7.4 1.6 
 
Price / cost levels 53 7.1 1.7 62 7.4 1.4 
 
Flexibility and change 53 6.7 1.8 61 6.9 1.8 
 
Responsiveness and problem solving 
b
 52 6.2 2.0 60 6.7 1.9 
 
Development and innovative thinking 48 5.5 2.0 58 5.6 2.3 
 
Satisfaction of long-term service objectives 47 6.0 2.1 55 6.2 2.3 
a
 Data based on self-reported evaluations based on responses for all items on an 11-point response scale with anchors (0 = ‘very unsatisfactory’ and 10 = 
‘very satisfactory’). 
b
 Paired samples T-tests for each performance dimension shows no statistical significance at p-levels < .1 between road and park maintenance except for 
‘Responsiveness and problem solving’, where p = .020 and t(44) = -2.409. 
 
Danish municipalities are on the average most satisfied with the “quality of maintenance services” 
(mean score = 7.1 for parks and 7.4 for roads) and the “price / cost levels” (mean score = 7.1 for 
parks and 7.4 for roads) in case of both park and road maintenance. Municipalities are least satisfied 
with “development and innovative thinking” in case of both park and road maintenance (mean score 
= 5.5 for parks and 5.6 for roads). All average scores for roads are higher than the average scores 
for parks. However, only the higher score for ‘follow-up and problem solving’ for road maintenance 
(mean score = 6.7) compared to park maintenance (mean score = 6.2) is found statistically 
significant. For 5 out of the 6 performance dimensions there is no statistically significant difference 
between the scores for private contractors’ delivery of road and park maintenance.  
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7.7 Exploring differences in performance 
This section explores the importance of various characteristics which help explain differences in 
performance among Danish municipalities. In particular, the section explores the importance of 
contractual framework, collaborative norms, contracting strategy, competition, contracting levels, 
municipal size, and economic size of private sector involvement.  
 
7.7.1 Importance of formal contractual framework 
The series of analyses below investigate the importance of the formal contractual framework for 
private contractors’ performance of park and road maintenance services. The analysis differentiates 
between two different dimensions of the formal contractual framework.
67
 The first dimension, 
formalized transactional contractual framework (TCF), is an index variable constructed by four 
single items (Cronbach Alpha = .870). This dimension measures the importance of the ‘core’ 
contract in terms of service specification, juridical matters, and formal economic sanctions. The 
second dimension, formalized relational contractual framework (RCF), is an index variable 
constructed by four single items (Cronbach Alpha = .764). This dimension measures the importance 
of additional formalization of collaborative aspects in the contract, in term of engagement with 
users, competence requirements, joint planning and collaboration as well as more encompassing 
incentive structures. In the survey the eight items for formalized contractual framework dimensions 
were measured for both road and/or park maintenance (i.e. not measured separately).  
Table 74 shows a bivariate of the differences in performance evaluation of private contractors 
between groups with respectively high and low levels of formalized transactional contract 
framework (TCF). All scores for performance evaluations scores are higher for the groups with 
higher levels of TCF than the group with lower levels of TCF. In a statistical test the evaluation of 
five out of six performance dimensions are found to be significantly higher by the group with higher 
levels of TCF than the group with lower levels of TCF. Statistically the difference in effect is 
greatest for ‘quality’ (ETA SQ = .132). The analysis shows no statistically significant (p > .1) 
difference between the two groups for ‘flexibility and change’.  
 
                                                 
67
 See chapter on ’organizing contracting out’ for further information about the two index constructs.   
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Table 74. 
Differences in private performance levels for park and road maintenance between contractual relations with high and low level of 
formalized TRANSACTIONAL contract framework 
Performance dimension 
a
 
Mean scores 
b
 
 
High level of TCF Low level of TCF 
Mean score  
difference 
c
 
ETA SQ 
  Quality 7.8 6.6 1.2
 
** .132 
 
Price / Costs  7.6 6.7 0.9 ** .077 
 Flexibility / change  7.0 6.6 0.4 
ns
 .013 
 Responsiveness and problem-solving  7.0 5.9 1.1 ** .088 
 Development and innovation  6.0 5.0 1.0 * .050 
 
Long term goals for services 6.7 5.4 1.3 ** .088 
 Level of transactional framework 8.9 5.2 3.7 ** .686 
 Level of contracting out (self-reported) 
d
 43 % 35 % 8 % 
ns
 .015 
Sources: INOPS survey data (N = 130) and Statistics Denmark. 
a 
All items measured by an 11-point response-scale with anchors (0 = ‘very unsatisfactory’ and 10 = ‘Very satisfactory’).  
b
 Groups based on a split by the median value for all cases with valid data. Median value = 7.5 
C
 Score differences evaluated at significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant.  
d
 Self-reported estimates for contracting levels for park and road maintenance.   
 
Table 75 shows a bivariate analysis of the differences in performance evaluation of private 
contractors between groups with respectively high and low levels of formalized relational contract 
framework (RCF). All scores for performance evaluations scores are higher for the groups with 
higher levels of RCF than the group with lower levels of RCF. In a statistical test the evaluation of 
five out of six performance dimensions are found to be significantly higher by the group with higher 
levels of RCF than the group with lower levels of RCF. Statistically the difference in effect is 
greatest for ‘development and innovation’ (ETA SQ = .062). The analysis shows no statistically 
significant (p > .1) difference between the two groups for ‘price and costs’. The difference in 
contracting levels (respectively 44 % and 31 %) between the two groups is furthermore found to be 
significant (p < .1).  
Table 75. 
Differences in private performance levels for park and road maintenance between contractual relations with high and low level of 
formalized RELATIONAL contractual frameworks 
Performance dimension 
a
 
Mean scores 
b
 
 
High level of RCF Low level of RCF 
Mean score  
difference 
c
 
ETA SQ 
  Quality 7.5 6.9 0.6
 †
 .027 
 
Price / Costs  7.4 7.0 0.4 
ns
 .015 
 Flexibility / change  7.1 6.3 0.8 * .045 
 Responsiveness and problem-solving  6.8 6.0 0.8 * .040 
 Development and innovation  6.0 4.9 1.1 * .062 
 
Long term goals for services 6.5 5.6 0.9 * .043 
 Level of relational framework 6.0 2.7 3.3 ** .628 
 Level of contracting out (roads, self-reported) 
d
 44 % 31 % 13 % * .043 
Sources: INOPS survey data (N = 130) and Statistics Denmark. 
a 
All items measured by an 11-point response-scale with anchors (0 = ‘very unsatisfactory’ and 10 = ‘Very satisfactory’).  
b
 Groups based on a split by the median value for all cases with valid data. Median value = 4.5 
C
 Score differences evaluated at significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant.  
d
 Self-reported estimates for contracting levels for park and road maintenance.   
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The bivariate analyses of differences in performance evaluation of private contractors between 
groups with respectively higher and lower levels of TCF and RCF show that both types of contract 
frameworks are important in some degree. The differences, measured by the effect size in terms of 
estimates for ETA SQ
68
, are larger between the groups with higher and lower levels of TCF than the 
groups with higher and lower levels of RCF.  
 
7.7.2 Importance of collaborative norms 
Table 76 shows a bivariate analysis of the differences in performance evaluation of private 
contractors between groups with respectively higher and lower levels of collaborative norms. The 
measure for collaborative norms is an index variable based on six survey items (Cronbach Alpha = 
.784).
69
  
 
Table 76.  
Differences in private performance levels for maintenance between contractual relations with high and low level of collaborative 
norms 
Performance dimension 
a
 
Mean scores 
b
 
 
Higher level of 
collaborative norms 
Lower level of 
collaborative norms 
Mean score  
difference 
c
 
ETA SQ 
  Quality 7.9 6.6 1.3 ** .136 
 
Price / Costs  7.7 6.8 0.9 ** .094 
 Flexibility / change  7.4 6.2 1.2 ** .098 
 Responsiveness and problem-solving  7.1 5.7 1.4 ** .128 
 Development and innovation  6.3 4.6 1.7 ** .156 
 
Long term goals for services 6.9 5.1 1.8 ** .165 
 Level of collaborative norms  8.0 5.6 3.0 ** .680 
 Level of contracting out (parks, self-reported) 
d
 50 % 29 % 21 % **  .114 
Sources: INOPS survey data (N = 122). 
a 
All performance items measured by an 11-point response-scale with anchors (0 = ‘very unsatisfactory’ and 10 = ‘Very satisfactory’).  
b
 Groups based on a split by the median value for all cases with valid data. Median value = 6.833. 
C
 Score differences evaluated at significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant.  
d
 Self-reported estimates for contracting levels for park and road maintenance.   
 
All scores for performance evaluations scores are higher for the groups with higher levels of 
collaborative norms than the group with lower levels of collaborative norms. In a statistical test the 
evaluation of six out of six performance dimensions are found to be significantly higher by the 
group with higher levels of collaborative norms than the group with lower levels of collaborative 
                                                 
68
 ETA SQ is a measure for the percentage (i.e. a value between 0 and 1) of the variance in a dependent variable 
explained by a factor. See Richardson (2011).   
69
 See also chapter on ’organizing contracting’. 
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norms. Statistically the difference in effect is greatest for the satisfaction with ‘long term goals for 
services’ (ETA SQ = .165). The difference in contracting levels (respectively 50 % and 29 %) 
between the two groups is furthermore found to be significant (p < .1).  
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7.8 Explanatory analysis of performance in Denmark 
The explanatory analysis is divided into two analyses. The first analysis is partial and explores the 
importance of the formal contractual framework for contractual performance. The formal 
contractual framework is operationalized by two constructs which measures two different 
contractual dimensions. The first construct is the level of formalized transactional contract 
framework (TCF). TCF roughly measures the contract dimensions emphasised as important for 
well-performing contracts in the mainstream theories on contracting out in the public sector. The 
second construct measures the formalization of additional relational contract dimensions in the 
contractual framework (RCF). The dimensions in the RCF are roughly associated with contract 
features mentioned in the literature on new forms for public-private relations, based on 
collaborative approaches (e.g. partnerships). The second and ‘full’ analysis includes the level of 
‘collaborative norms’ as an additional explanatory variable for the level of contractual performance. 
Both analyses include a set of control variables which might also influence the level of contractual 
performance. The control variables are: level of competition, level of contracting out, municipal 
size and sector. Sector is included as control because the performance data are based on data from 
both the park and road sector (‘pooled’).  
 
7.8.1 Main explanatory analysis 
Table 77 shows results from several OLS regression analyses run in a ‘partial’ models based on six 
single items as measures for contractual performance (model A-F) and one ‘full’ model with an 
index variable as measure for contractual performance (model G). The level in TCF is an important 
explanatory factor for differences in the satisfaction with ‘quality’ and ‘responsiveness and 
problem-solving’. The level in RCF is found to an important explanatory factor for differences in 
the satisfaction with ‘responsiveness and problem-solving’, ‘development and innovation ‘ and 
‘long term goals for services’. The level in RCF is also important for explaining differences in 
overall performance measures by the performance index in model G. Also, the results from the 
various models show that the level of competition is an important factor for explaining differences 
in performance levels. Remaining controls have only limited explanatory power across the models. 
The municipal size (population size) is apparently important for the differences in the satisfaction 
with quality as well as the contracting level is important for the differences in the satisfaction with 
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costs. A key finding is that both TCF and RCF help explain differences in contractual performance, 
however, they add to explaining different performance dimensions.   
 
Table 77.  
OLS regressions: Performance evaluation of private contractors: Importance of contract framework   
  Performance of private contractors provision of maintenance (scale 0-10) 
Predictor variables 
Model A  
Quality 
Model B  
Costs 
Model C  
Flexibility / 
change 
Model D  
Responsiveness 
/ problem-solving 
Model E 
Development / 
innovation 
Model F  
Long term goals 
for services 
Model G 
performance 
index (A-F) 
e
 
Unstandardized beta-coefficients 
a
 
TCF 
b
  
(index, scale: 0-10) 
+ .274 ** + .093 
ns
 + .005
 ns
 + .213 
†
 -.019 
ns
 + .154 
ns
 + .092 
ns
 
RCF 
b
 
(index, scale: 0-10) 
+ .101 
ns
 ÷ .043 
ns
  + .147 
ns
 + .186 
†
 + .506 ** + .457 ** + .237* 
Level of competition  
(scale: 0-10) 
+ .229 ** + .087 
ns
 + .198 * + .313 **  + .315 * + .288 ** + .231 ** 
Contracting level 
(Scale: 0-1) 
d
 
÷ .193 
ns
 + 1.009 
† + .487 ns + .016 ns ÷ .701 ns ÷ .383 ns + .195 ns 
Sector  
(park=0, road=1) 
+ .341 
ns
 + .239 
ns + .207 ns + .466 ns + .405 ns + .491 ns + .392 ns 
Population (LN) ÷ .406 
†
 + .179 
ns
 + .002 
ns
 + .022 
ns
 ÷ .079 
ns
 ÷ .125 
ns
 ÷ .047 
ns
 
N 97 98 99 97 97 91 88 
VIF MAX 1.612 1.590 1.557 1.562 1.643 1.703 1.772 
R
2
 / Adjusted R
2
 .222 / .170 .114 / .056 .111 / .054 .266 / .217 .264 / .213 .314 / .265 .274 / .220 
Data sources; INOPS survey data (pooled) for Denmark and Statistics Denmark.  
a 
Coefficients
 
indicate the level of change in the dependent variable by changing one scale unit in a predictor variable. Beta-coefficients in bold indicate a 
statistical significant correlation Negative sign (÷) indicates a negative correlation. Positive sign (+) indicates a positive correlation. Significance levels: 
† 
p < 
.1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. Diagnosis for outliers run for all models (cases with std. residuals >= 3.00). Influential outliers removed in model 
A (one case). 
b 
Index variables for respectively formalized transactional and relational contract frameworks.  
c 
Index variable based on six items. Cronbach Alpha = .784 
d 
Self-reported estimates for contracting levels (in percent of total maintenance budget) for respectively park and road maintenance.   
e
 index variable based on six items. Cronbach Alpha = .905 
 
Table 78 shows the results from several OLS regression analysis run in a ‘full’ model with six 
single items (model A-F) and one index variable as measures for contractual performance (model 
G). A variable, which measures differences in the level of ‘collaborative norms’, is added to the 
predictor variables already used throughout the models shown in Table 78. Overall, the inclusion of 
the additional predictor variable adds explanatory power to the model. Estimates for R
2
 are 
increased in all models. Comparison of the partial and full models also shows that several statistical 
‘interaction effects’ are present.  
Higher levels of collaborative norms are significantly correlated (associated) with higher 
levels of satisfaction with all performance dimensions (model A-F) as well as the index variable for 
overall performance (model G). Inclusion of the variable for collaborative norms furthermore 
changes some of the associations found in the models shown in Table 77. In particular higher levels 
of collaborative norms seem to work partial as a substitute (intervening variable) for a formalized 
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relational contract framework. In the full models shown in Table 78 compared to the partial models 
shown in Table 77 the level of formalized relational contract framework becomes insignificant in 
model D and model G. One interpretation of this finding is that a formalized relational contract 
framework in a ‘chain of causation’ generate a higher level of collaborative norms which in turn 
results in higher levels of performance related to ‘responsiveness and problem-solving’ as well as 
the overall performance measured by the index in model G. In the comparison of the partial and full 
models E and F, the level of formalized relational contract framework remains an important 
predictor variable (but gain slightly lower beta-coefficients). The findings for model E and F are 
indicative of interaction effects between collaborative norms, the formalized relational contract 
framework and performance.  
 
Table 78.  
OLS regressions: Performance of private contractors: Importance of contract framework and norms 
  Performance of private contractors provision of maintenance (scale 0-10)
 a
 
Predictor variables 
Model A  
Quality 
Model B  
Costs 
Model C  
Flexibility / 
change 
Model D  
Responsiveness 
/ problem-solving 
Model E 
Development / 
innovation 
Model F  
Long term goals 
for services 
Model G 
performance 
index (A-F) 
e
 
Unstandardized beta-coefficients (β)
a
 
TCF 
b
  
(index, scale: 0-10) 
+ .287 ** + .183 * + .065 
ns
 + .261 * + .040 
ns
 + .222 
†
 + .160 
†
 
RCF 
b
 
(index, scale: 0-10) 
÷ .047 
ns
 ÷ .120 
ns
 + .035 
ns
 + .054 
ns
 + .339 ** + .269 
†
 + .078 
ns
 
Collaborative norms  
(Index, scale: 0-10) 
c
 
+ .482 ** + .452 ** + .389 ** + .446 ** + .541 ** + .541 ** + .507 ** 
Level of competition  
(scale: 0-10) 
+.138 
†
 + .064 
ns
 + .171 
†
 + .278 **  + .259 * + .225 * + .162 * 
Contracting level 
(Scale: 0-1) 
d
 
÷ .536 
ns
 + .145
 ns + .089 ns ÷ .360 ns ÷ 1.113 ns (p=.127) ÷ .515 ns + .101 ns 
Sector  
(park=0, road=1) 
+ .351 
ns
 + .099 
ns + .192 ns + .467 ns +.430 ns +.465 ns + .336 ns 
Population (LN) ÷ .455 * + .137 
ns
 ÷ .085 
ns
 ÷ .035 
ns
 ÷ .123 
ns
 ÷ .142 
ns
 ÷ .041 
ns
 
N 93 92 95 93 91 87 86 
VIF MAX 1.825 1.791 1.749 1.743 1.885 2.140 2.274 
R
2
 / Adjusted R
2
 .314 / .258 .310 / .253 .196 / .132 .355 / .302 .373 / .323 .409 / .356 .437 / .386 
Data sources; INOPS survey data (pooled) for Denmark and Statistics Denmark.  
a 
Coefficients
 
indicate the level of change in the dependent variable by changing one scale unit in a predictor variable. Beta-coefficients in bold indicate a 
statistical significant correlation. Negative sign (÷) indicates a negative correlation. Positive sign (+) indicates a positive correlation. Significance levels: 
† 
p < 
.1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. Diagnosis for outliers run for all models (cases with std. residuals >= 3.00). Influential outliers removed in model 
A (one) and B (two). The regression in model A with influential outlier included change level of competition to insignificant (p=.109), sign maintained (+.133). 
The regression in model B with influential outliers included change RCF to significant (p < .1), negative sign maintained (-.167) and TCF change to 
insignificant (p = .108), positive sign maintained (+.148).  
b 
Index variables for respectively four items for formalized transactional framework (Alpha = .846) and four items for relational contract framework (Alpha = 
.757). 
c 
Index variable for collaborative norms based on six items. Cronbach Alpha = .784. 
d 
Self-reported estimates for contracting levels (percentage of maintenance budget spend on private providers) for respectively park and road maintenance. 
e
 index variable for performance based on six items. Cronbach Alpha = .905.   
 
The inclusion of collaborative norms also changes the importance of TCF in several models. In 
particular, the level of TCF becomes more important for explaining performance in several models, 
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including model B (cost) and model F (long term goals for services) as well as model G 
(performance index). The analysis indicates that some cases with higher levels of formalized 
transactional contract framework perform relatively poorly on the cost dimensions (model B) due to 
lower levels of collaborative norms, but this is not revealed in the partial model B shown in Table 
77 due to the exclusion of the variable for collaborative norms (which acts as a ‘suppressor’ 
variable). By inclusion of the control for the level of collaborative norms in the full model B shown 
in Table 78 it is indicated that higher levels of TCF are positively associated with cost performance 
at fixed levels of collaborative norms. In addition the explanatory power (R
2
) of model B is 
improved by inclusion of the variable for collaborative norms in model B (from .114 to .311). The 
suppressor effect of collaborative norms on TCF found in model B is also found in model F and G.  
Theoretically, the effect can be explained by the increased flexibility, that collaboration adds to the 
formal parts of the contractual relation, through which the parties can adjust for unforeseen 
contingencies in ways that improves (public managers’ satisfaction with) contractual performance. 
Without the flexibility provided by collaboration the formal contract becomes ‘rigid’ and less able 
to address unforeseen contingencies in ways that impede contractual performance. The apparent 
change from inclusion of RCF in significance and beta-coefficients for contracting level in model B 
indicate that TCF are correlated with contracting level.     
The overall finding, from the analysis shown in Table 77, that the formalized contract 
framework is an important predictor of performance, is confirmed by the analysis shown in Table 
78. The finding that TCF and RCF are also important for predicting differences between 
performance dimensions is also confirmed. The overall importance of competition level is 
confirmed as well.   
 
7.8.1.1 Alternative explanatory factors  
Alternative analyses were run with different combinations of predictor variables as well as inclusion 
of additional predictor variables. In particular the effects from two additional predictor variables 
were investigated. The first ‘alternative’ variable was a categorical variable for whether a cost 
saving or not has been achieved in the last procurement round (coded: yes = 1, no = 0). This 
variable was only tested in an alternative model (B1) where it was added to the model B shown in 
Table 78. The second ‘alternative’ variable was also a categorical variable for the total economic 
value of the engagement with private contractors (coded, high = 1, low = 0). The coding was based 
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on the median values for respectively parks and roads (as the economic size of the two sectors 
differs by almost a factor 3 in municipal budgets). Inclusion of the two variables provides additional 
insights to the findings from the main analysis shown in Table 78. 
The addition of a categorical variable for the cost effect from last round of procurement 
(percent change in operational cost) in model B in Table 78  (performance measured by satisfaction 
with costs) added explanatory power.
70
 In an alternative model ‘B1’ a categorical variable for 
whether a cost savings had been achieved or not (or cost were increased) in the last round of public 
procurement was significantly correlated, however close to the cut off value p = .1 (p = .099) with 
the satisfaction level with cost levels. The direction of the beta-coefficient (-.507) indicates that a 
cost saving are positively correlated with a higher satisfaction with cost levels. An alternative 
analysis to the main model B was also run with inclusion of a categorical variable for the size of the 
economic value of services contracted out (high / low).
71
 In the alternative model ‘B2’, the size of 
economic value was not directly correlated with the satisfaction with cost levels, but increased the 
size of the beta-coefficient for RCF (from -.120 to -.216) as well as changed the significance of the 
correlation (p = .042). The findings from the alternative analyses in model B1 and B2 challenges 
findings in the main model (B) and indicate that higher levels of RCF may be associated with 
relatively less satisfaction with cost levels.   
No substantial effects were found from including economic value as an additional predictor in 
an alternative model A2 (satisfaction with maintenance quality). Neither was any substantial effects 
found from including economic value included as predictor in an alternative model C2. However, 
explanatory power (R
2
) and values for significance are slightly improved as well as effect sizes of 
significant predictors were slightly increased in the alternative model C2 compared to the findings 
in the main model C. The alternative model D2, with economic value included as predictor, 
changed the findings in the main model (model D). The categorical variable for ‘sector’ changed to 
significant (p = .082) with a β = .658. The finding indicates that, when additional control for 
economic value (which acts as a ‘suppressor variable’ for sector) is included, the satisfaction with 
‘Responsiveness / problem-solving’ is higher in the road sector than the park sector. This finding is 
                                                 
70
 Model summary: R2 / adj. R
2
 = .391 / .312. N = 71. Max VIF = 1.950. The number of cases in the alternative model 
B1 is reduced due to missing data and estimates should not be compared directly between the models. One influential 
outlier removed (std. residual >= 3.00). Unstandardized beta-coefficient for cost effect = -.501, p < .1. The variable for 
cost effect also interacts with RCF which become negatively associated with cost performance (beta = -.235, p < .05).  
71
 Model summary: R2 / adj. R
2
 = .265 / .190. N = 87. Max VIF =1.900. The number of cases in the alternative model 
B2 is reduced due to missing data and estimates should not be compared directly between the models. No influential 
outliers detected (std. residual >= 3.00). Unstandardized beta-coefficient for economic value= -.261, p = .547. 
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congruent with findings from comparison of satisfactions levels between park and road maintenance 
for ‘Responsiveness / problem-solving’ (test of mean difference for item by t-test, p-level < .1).  
The alternative model ‘E2’, with economic value included as predictor, changed the findings 
in the main model (model E). In particular, the correlation for contracting level becomes significant 
and the effect (β) is increased (p = .029, β = -1.963) as well as economic value is significantly 
correlated (p = .080, β = .972). The finding indicates that higher satisfaction levels with 
development and innovation of maintenance operations are found in cases of large scale economic 
involvements with private contractors; however, mainly when lesser shares of the maintenance 
budget is allocated to private contractors (or larger shares of maintenance budgets are allocated to 
the in-house provider).  
The alternative model ‘F2’ with economic value included as predictor, changed the 
correlation for TCF to insignificant (p = .268, beta-coefficient = .158). However, the observed 
effects from the inclusion of economic value are likely to be due to a simple ‘mediation effect’ as 
higher levels of TCF is positively correlated with a larger economic value (i.e. more formal and 
elaborate contractual frameworks are used in contracts with higher economic value).  
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7.9 Comparing performance across Denmark, Sweden, Norway and UK 
This section provides a comparison of municipal managers’ performance evaluations of private 
contractors’ delivery of park and road maintenance in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and UK. 
Performance is evaluated by scores for the satisfaction among municipal managers for altogether 5 
performance dimensions. Overall, the comparison shows that the differences in performance 
evaluations for both parks and roads between the countries are small. The scores for the 
performance of private contractors in UK are overall slightly higher for both parks and roads than in 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway. The scores for the performance of private contractors’ delivery of 
maintenance services seem to be slightly lower in Norway than in UK, Sweden and Denmark. The 
tendency for lower scores in Norway is most notable for the score for ’price / cost levels’ and for 
‘satisfaction with ‘long term service objectives’ as well as  being more pronounced for park 
maintenance compared to road maintenance.  
Given the relatively higher inter-municipal variations for performance evaluations within each 
country (measured by standard deviations, see country appendices) it is furthermore indicated that 
intra-country differences are larger than inter-country differences.  
 
Table 79.  
Cross-national comparison of performance evaluations of private delivery of road maintenance services 
  
  
  
   
 
  
Performance dimensions of road maintenance* 
Quality of 
maintenance 
services 
Price / cost levels 
Flexibility and 
change 
Follow- up and 
problem solving 
Development and 
innovative 
thinking 
Long-term 
service 
objectives 
Denmark (N=62) 7.4 7.4 6.9 6.7 5.6 6.2 
Sweden (N=71) 7.1 6.5 7.1 6.8 6.2 6.0 
Norway (N=69) 7.1 6.3 7.3 6.8 5.5 5.2 
UK (N=23) 7.4 7.2 7.3 7.2 6.6 6.5 
Weighted average (N=225) 7.2 6.8 7.1 6.8 5.9 5.9 
* Data based on responses for all items on an 11-point response scale with anchors (0 = ‘very unsatisfactory’ and 10 = ‘very satisfactory’) 
 
Table 79 shows the average scores for municipal managers’ performance evaluation of private 
provision of road maintenance services in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and UK. Across all countries 
(N=225) private contractors’ delivery of road maintenance receives the highest scores for ‘quality of 
maintenance’ (average score = 7.2) and ‘flexibility and change’ (average score = 6.8) while the 
lowest scores are received for ‘development and innovative thinking’ (average score = 5.9) and 
‘satisfaction of long-term service objectives’ (average score = 5.9). Furthermore, none of the 
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average scores are below the scale mid-point (‘5’) which would indicate a degree of ‘unsatisfactory’ 
performance evaluation (on the average).   
Some differences in the scores for performance evaluations exist among the countries for 
individual performance dimensions. Notable, the scores for UK are either at level of slightly higher 
than the scores for the three Scandinavian countries – in particular in comparison with Norway. 
Only for ‘price / cost level’ a lower score is received for UK (average score = 7.2) than for another 
country (Denmark, average score = 7.4).  
Table 80 shows the results from an ANOVA analysis of differences in satisfaction levels with 
private contractor’s performance of road maintenance services. The statistical analysis of mean 
differences for satisfaction levels with private contractors’ performance of road maintenance 
services between countries finds only very few statistical significant differences. The low N as well 
as relatively high variation for UK Local Authorities contributes to the lack of statistical 
significance for the mean differences to Sweden, Norway and Denmark.  
 
Table 80.  
Four countries: Managers’ satisfaction with private contractors’ performance of road maintenance services 
Performance dimension 
Mean scores (standard deviations) 
UK  
(N=23) 
b
 
Sweden  
(N=71) 
Norway  
(N=69) 
Denmark  
(N=62) 
Four countries  
(N = 225) 
c
 
Maintenance quality 7.4 (2.4) 7.1 
ns
 (1.6) 7.1 
ns
 (1.6) 7.4 
ns
 (1.6) 7.2
 ns
 (1.7) 
Cost / price levels 7.2 (2.6) 6.5 
ns
 (1.7) 6.3 
ns
 (1.7) 7.4
 ns
 (1.4) 6.8 ** (1.8) 
Flexibility and change  7.3 (2.9) 7.1
 ns
 (1.7) 7.3 
ns
 (1.7) 6.9
 ns
 (1.8) 7.1 
ns
 (1.9) 
Follow up and problem solving 7.2 (2.6) 6.8 
ns
 (1.8) 6.8 
ns
 (1.9) 6.7
 ns
 (1.9) 6.8 
ns
  (1.9) 
Development and innovative thinking 6.6 (2.5) 6.2 
ns
 (2.1) 5.5 
ns
 (2.1) 5.6 
ns
 (2.3) 
5.9 
ns 
(p=.117)
 
(2.2) 
Long term objectives 6.5 (2.9) 6.0
 ns
 (1.9) 5.2 
† 
 (2.2) 6.2
 ns
 (2.3) 5.9 * (2.2) 
Performance index (six items) 
d
 7.0 (2.5) 6.6 
ns
 (1.6) 6.4 
ns
 (1.5) 6.8
 ns
 (1.5) 6.6
 ns
 (1.7) 
Source: INOPS survey data  
a
 All items measured by the respondent’s agreement with the statement on an 11-point response scale with anchors (0 = ‘very unsatisfactory’ and 10 = ‘very 
satisfactory’). 
b 
UK is used as a ‘benchmark country‘ for comparison of differences with three other countries (ONE-WAY ANOVA with Tukey and Games-Howell post hoc 
test, assessment of homogeneity of variance based on Levene’s test, p <.05). Significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
c 
Test for significance of differences between at least one country and the others (ONE-WAY ANOVA). 
d 
Index based on all six single performance items. Alpha = .932 (N valid for all four countries =194).  
 
 
 
The satisfaction with ‘cost / price levels’ in Denmark is found to be significantly higher than in 
Norway (mean difference = 1.1, p = .001) and Sweden (mean difference = .9, p = .005). Also, the 
difference in satisfaction levels for ‘long term objectives’ between Norway and Denmark is 
significant (mean difference = 1.0, p = .068).   
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Table 81 shows the average scores for municipal managers’ performance evaluation of private 
provision of park maintenance services in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and UK. Across all countries 
(N=185) private contractors’ delivery of road maintenance receives the highest scores for ‘quality of 
maintenance’ (average score = 7.1), ‘price / cost levels’ (average score = 7.0) ‘flexibility and 
change’ (average score = 7.0) while the lowest scores are received for ‘development and innovative 
thinking’ (average score = 5.8) and ‘satisfaction of long-term service objectives’ (average score = 
5.7). Furthermore, all except one of the average scores are above the scale mid-point (‘5’) which 
indicate a degree of ‘satisfactory’ performance evaluation (on the average).   
Some differences in the mean scores for satisfaction levels with private contractors’ 
performance of road maintenance are found across the countries for individual performance 
dimensions. Notable, all scores for UK are slightly higher than the scores for the three Scandinavian 
countries – in particular in comparison with Norway. An exception is the mean score for ‘price / 
cost levels’ where the mean score for Denmark (7.4) is slightly higher than the mean score for the 
UK (7.2). 
Overall, the comparison of mean scores for satisfaction levels with private contractors’ 
performance of road maintenance in the four countries finds that the highest satisfaction levels are 
found in the UK (although mean differences were statistically insignificant), followed by Denmark 
with the second highest satisfaction levels and Sweden with the third highest satisfaction levels. The 
lowest satisfaction levels with private contractors’ performance of road maintenance services were 
found in Norway.  
 
Table 81. 
Cross-national comparison of performance evaluations of private delivery of park maintenance services 
  
  
  
   
 
  
Performance dimensions of park maintenance * 
Quality of 
maintenance 
services 
Price / cost 
levels 
Flexibility and 
change 
Follow- up and 
problem solving 
Development 
and innovative 
thinking 
Long-term 
service 
objectives 
Denmark (N=53) 7.1 7.1 6.7 6.2 5.5 6.0 
Sweden (N=48) 6.8 6.6 7.2 6.8 5.9 5.3 
Norway (N=26) 6.5 5.8 6.4 6.3 5.3 4.6 
UK (N=57) 7.6 7.8 7.6 7.5 6.4 6.3 
Weighted average (N=184) 7.1 7.0 7.1 6.8 5.8 5.7 
* Data based on responses for all items on an 11-point response scale with anchors (0 = ‘very unsatisfactory’ and 10 = ‘very satisfactory’) 
 
A comparison of the performance evaluation of private contractors’ delivery of respectively park 
and road maintenance services shows only minimal differences in the absolute scores. The largest 
differences in the absolute scores for the various performance dimensions are between private 
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delivery of respectively park and road maintenance in Norway (e.g. price/cost levels, parks = 5.8 
and roads =6.3).   
Table 82 shows the results from an analysis of differences in satisfaction levels with private 
contractor’s performance of park maintenance services between the UK, Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark. For park maintenance it is found that the satisfaction levels among Local Authorities in 
the UK are significantly higher for several performance dimensions than among municipalities in 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway. The differences in mean scores as well as the statistical 
significance of the differences are most distinctive between the UK and Norway. The mean scores 
for the UK are higher for all items compared to all three Scandinavian countries. Only for 
‘maintenance quality’ and ‘development and innovative thinking’ there are no statistical significant 
differences between the satisfaction levels in the four countries.  
Comparison of mean scores for a composite performance index based on the six single items 
(summative) reduces the cases in the analysis from 184 (for the analysis of maintenance quality) to 
159. The comparison of scores for the performance index shows that the mean differences are 
statistically significant between the UK and Norway (p = .029) and the UK and Sweden (p = .080). 
The mean difference between the UK and Denmark are insignificant (p = .203).  
 
Table 82.  
Four countries: Managers’ satisfaction with private contractors’ performance of park maintenance services 
Performance dimension 
Mean scores (standard deviations) 
UK  
(N=57) 
b
 
Sweden  
(N=48) 
Norway  
(N=26) 
Denmark  
(N=53) 
Four countries  
(N = 184) 
c
 
Maintenance quality 7.6 (1.9) 6.8 
ns
 (2.2) 6.5 
†
 (1.7) 7.1 
ns
 (1.7) 7.1
 †
 (2.0) 
Cost / price levels 7.8 (1.8) 6.6 **  (2.3) 5.8 ** (2.2) 7.1
 ns
 (1.7) 7.0 ** (2.0) 
Flexibility and change  7.6 (2.1) 7.2
 ns
 (2.0) 6.4 
†
 (1.8) 
6.7
 ns 
(p=.125)
 
(1.8) 7.1 *
 
 (2.1) 
Follow up and problem solving 7.5 (2.0) 6.8 
ns
 (2.1) 6.3 
†
 (2.5) 6.2
 
** (2.1) 6.8 **  (2.1) 
Development and innovative thinking 6.4 (2.5) 5.9 
ns
 (2.3) 5.3 
ns
 (3.2) 5.5 
ns
 (2.0) 
5.8 
ns 
(p=.116)
 
(2.3) 
Long term objectives 6.3 (2.6) 5.3
 ns
 (2.4) 4.6 *
 
 (2.2) 6.0
 ns
 (2.1) 5.7 * (2.4) 
Performance index (six items) 
d
 7.2 (1.9) 6.2 
†
 (1.9) 5.9 * (1.7) 6.4 
ns
 (1.6) 6.6 * (1.8) 
Source: INOPS survey data (N for items varies between 184-159) 
a
 All items measured by the respondent’s agreement with the statement on an 11-point response scale with anchors (0 = ‘very unsatisfactory’ and 10 = ‘very 
satisfactory’). 
b 
UK is used as a ‘benchmark country‘ for comparison of differences with three other countries (ONE-WAY ANOVA with Tukey post hoc test, homogeneity 
assumed, Levene’s test, p = .05). Significance levels: 
† 
p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, ns = non-significant. 
c 
Test for significance of differences between at least one country and the others (ONE-WAY ANOVA). 
d 
Index based on all six single performance items. Alpha = .932 (N valid four countries = 159). 
  
INOPS  Technical report 
 
221 
Additional findings from the analysis (not shown) are that the mean score for ‘price / cost levels’ is 
significantly higher in Denmark than Norway, (mean score difference = 1.3, p = .029) as well as for 
‘long term objectives’ (mean score difference = 1.4, p = .080).  
Overall, the comparison of mean scores for satisfaction levels with private contractors’ 
performance of park maintenance in the four countries finds that the highest satisfaction levels are 
found in the UK, followed by Denmark with as the second highest satisfaction levels and Sweden 
with the third highest satisfaction levels. However, the differences between Denmark and Sweden 
were marginal and statistically insignificant for all items. The lowest satisfaction levels with 
performance were found in Norway.  
A comparison of the analysis of satisfaction levels with private contractor’s provision of 
respectively park maintenance and road maintenance in the four countries highlights that 
differences between the four countries generally are greater for parks than for roads.  
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8 ANALYSIS – CASE STUDIES 
 
8.1 Case overview  
This chapter contains summaries of a range of case studies on contracting out of park and road 
maintenance services in Denmark, Norway, the UK and Sweden. Full reports are available in 
separate documents.  
The cases have been chosen because they represent some special – or innovative – features in 
comparison with the ‘normal’ case for contracting out. Special features consists in both the stage of 
maturity of contracting out as well as forms for contracting out which can be regarded as 
‘innovative’ compared to a standard approach to contracting out. Table 83 provides an overview of 
altogether ten case-studies of contracting out. Six cases are from Denmark, two cases are from the 
UK, one case is from Norway and one case is from Sweden. Most cases are presented with full 
identification of the municipality and involved contractors, however, one case is presented without 
reference to its identity.   
In contrast to the quantitative analysis based on survey data and register based data, the case 
studies enable exploration of what is ‘going on’ within particular context and trace outcomes to the 
particular conditions within a given context. While findings from case studies normally are regarded 
to have a limited scope for generalizability, they nevertheless warrant improved reflections and in-
depth assessments of whether particular experiences and outcomes can be transferred across context 
(‘natural generalization’). The chapter relies mainly on analysis of each case within its particular 
context rather than comparative analysis across all cases. However, the selected cases also allows 
for addressing cross-case questions. For example, the cases illustrate well the findings from the 
quantitative analysis on the comparative advancement of different contractual arrangements. A 
cross-comparison of cases from each country-context, for example, shows that contractual 
arrangements with the highest degree of involvement and engagement of private contractors are 
found in the UK while Norwegian municipalities are still challenged by the basic issues in the use 
of contracting out (e.g. effective markets and competition).  
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Table 83.  
Ten cases of contracting out park and road maintenance – an overview 
Case Key-words Characteristics 
Anonymiseret 
(’standard’) 
kommune, 
Danmark 
Standardtilgang til udlicitering.  
Vigtigheden af et ’godt løbende samarbejde’ i forhold 
til kommunens styring, planlægning og udvikling af 
driften.  
Stor kommune, Socialdemokratisk domineret byråd. 
Fortsætterkommune (2007). 
Alt er udliciteret (primært geografisk opdelt i flere kontrakter), 
standardtilgang til udbud (kontraktgrundlag og 
opgavebeskrivelse).  
Skive 
kommune, 
Danmark 
Erfaringer med implementering af vejpartnering 
(byområder) og langvarige funktionskontrakter 
(landområder).  
Besparelser og årsager til besparelser. 
Markedsdynamik og kontraktformer.  
Mellemstor kommune (47.000 indb.), Venstredomineret 
byråd (tidligere domineret af soc. demo.). 
Sammenlægningskommune (2007) 
Delvist udlicitering på vejområdet, ingen udlicitering på 
parkområdet. Funktionskontrakt (siden 2014) og 
vejpartnering (siden 2016) på asfaltbelægninger / 
vejområdet.  
Holstebro 
kommune, 
Danmark 
Erfaringer med anvendelse af udlicitering (totaludbud) 
siden 2000.  
Udvikling af udlicitering over tid. Fokus, samarbejde og 
partnerskab.  
Mellemstor kommune (58.000 indb.) Byråd skiftevis 
domineret af socialdemokratiet og venstre. 
Sammenlægningskommune (2007). 
Alt vej- og parkdrift er udliciteret siden 2000.  
Solrød 
kommune, 
Danmark 
Erfaringer med ’omvendt’ licitation ved 
førstegangsudbud (totaludbud på parkområdet).  
Involvering af entreprenøren i planlægning og 
prioritering af driftsopgaver.  
Lille kommune (22.000 indb.).Venstredomineret byråd. 
Fortsætterkommune (2007). 
Al parkdrift udliciteret siden 2013.  
Favrskov 
kommune, 
Danmark 
Erfaringer med udlicitering (totaludbud på vej og 
parkområdet) ved førstegangsudbud.  
Udviklingsstrategi for park- og vejområdet 
Besparelser og årsager til besparelser.   
Mellemstor kommune (47.000 indb.). Byråd skiftevis 
domineret af socialdemokratiet og venstre.  
Sammenlægningskommune (2007). 
Al drift udliciteret i samlet kontrakt på vej- og parkområdet, 
siden 2012.  
Roskilde 
kommune, 
Danmark 
Anvendelse af markedet som driver til udvikling og 
’benchmark’ af egen driftsorganisation.  
Større kommune (86.000 indb.), Byråd domineret af 
socialdemokratiet. Sammenlægningskommune (2007). 
Mindre og fast andel af parkdriften er udliciteret siden 
1990’erne. 
Oslo 
kommune, 
Norge 
Udfordringer ved markedsgørelse af vej- og parkdriften 
i Norges største kommune.  
Erfaringer med kommunalt driftsselskab og udlicitering.  
Stor kommune (620.000 indb.). Byråd domineret af 
borgerlige partier (1997-2015).  
Al vej- og parkdrift er udliciteret (siden 2007 på parkområdet 
og 2013 på vejområdet).  
Täby 
kommune, 
Sverige 
Erfaringer med unik model for partnerskabstilgang til 
udlicitering i Skandinavien.  
Inddragelse af entreprenør i forhold til opfyldelse af 
kommunens strategiske målsætninger for 
parkområdet.  
Mellemstor kommune (64.000 indb.). Byråd domineret af 
borgerlige partier.  
Al drift på vej- og parkområdet udliciteret i samlet kontrakt 
siden 2004.  
UK, Burgess 
Park 
Erfaringer med partnerskabsmodeller for udlicitering, 
hvor entreprenøren også inddrages i forhold til 
opfyldelse af sociale og lokale målsætninger/politikker.  
Burgess Park, Southwark Council. Udlicitering af drift og 
forvaltning til en privat entreprenør i en langvarig kontrakt (op 
til 14 år).   
UK, Olympic 
Park 
Erfaringer med partnerskabsmodeller for udlicitering, 
hvor entreprenøren også inddrages i forhold til 
opfyldelse af sociale og lokale målsætninger/politikker 
Olympic Park, London. Oprettelse af særlig 
planlægningsmyndighed med ansvar for forvaltning af 
parkanlæg, der geografisk indgår i flere kommuner.  
 
The presentation of the case-studies starts out with a resume of a case-study of a ‘base-line 
scenario’ in terms of an example of a well-working implementation of a standard or ‘conventional’ 
approach to contracting out. The ‘opening’ case represents a case of the dynamics of key 
dimensions of contractual relationships in terms of formal and informal parts. Formally, the case is 
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characterized by the standard ‘transactional’ contract framework in combination with a well-
working regime for contract management.   
 
8.2 The ‘standard’ municipality 
Traditionelt drejer udlicitering sig om at få prissat en på forhånd beskrevet opgave og sikre at 
opgaven bliver udført som beskrevet. Kommunen har i denne forbindelse ofte en kontrol- og 
tilsynsfunktion tilknyttet kontraktstyringen. Casestudiet af ‘standardkommunen’ viser at udlicitering 
fungerer bedst i det daglige, når der samarbejdes, opbygges tillid og deles viden, og når opgaverne 
kan tilpasses og udvikles.
72
 Casestudiet undersøger særligt betydningen af transaktionelle og 
relationelle dimensioner for et kontraktforløb, der bygger på en standardtilgang til udlicitering.  
8.2.1 Den konventionelle forståelse: De transaktionelle dimensioner 
 I både administrativ praksis og i gængse politologiske teorier har en vellykket brug af udlicitering 
traditionelt set været anset for et spørgsmål om, hvorvidt de fire følgende forudsætninger kan 
opfyldes: 
 
 Kan opgaven beskrives klart og entydigt? 
 Kan opgaven prissættes gennem konkurrence mellem en række tilbudsgivere? 
 Kan det kontrolleres/dokumenteres, at opgaven bliver udført som beskrevet? 
 Kan der anvendes økonomiske sanktioner, såfremt at opgaverne ikke bliver udført som 
beskrevet?  
 
De fire forudsætninger kan samlet set betegnes som de ’transaktionelle dimensioner’. I en 
konventionel forståelse af udlicitering er udfordringen at tilvejebringe en klar og tydelig 
opgavebeskrivelse, som tilbudsgivere kan beregne deres omkostninger ud fra, og som efterfølgende 
kan bruges til at styre og dokumentere, om det vindende firma leverer det aftalte. Da den primære 
motivation for at løse opgaven anses for at være ønsket om at tjene penge, har den primære metode 
til at sanktionere en eventuel utilfredsstillende opgaveløsning taget udgangspunkt i muligheden for 
                                                 
72
 Casestudiet er publiceret i artikelform i 2015 i tidsskriftet Politica, årgang 47, nr. 4, side 522-540, med titlen: 
”Samarbejdets betydning i den ’klassiske udlicitering’: en analyse af de transaktionelle og relationelle dimensioners 
betydning.” Nærværende tekst er baseret på artiklen.   
INOPS  Technical report 
 
225 
at anvende økonomiske sanktioner. En økonomisk sanktion kan eksempelvis være en reduktion i 
den aftalte betaling.  
Samtidigt anses en løbende kontrol og dokumentation som nødvendig, da et firma kan tjene 
penge – ikke bare ved at få betaling for at løse opgaven, men også ved ikke at løse opgaverne i det 
omfang det ikke bliver opdaget. Da en effektiv kontrol og dokumentation af opgaven typisk kræver 
en del tid og ressourcer, er det på den anden side ønskværdigt, at dette kan begrænses i størst muligt 
omfang. En række offentlige opgaver er blevet anset som særligt velegnede til at blive udliciteret, 
fordi de fire forhold i høj grad anses for at kunne blive opfyldt. Det drejer sig eksempelvis om 
rengøring, affaldsindsamling eller driftsopgaver på vej- og parkområdet. En række studier af 
udlicitering viser også, at det især er ved sådanne typer af opgaver, at der kan opnås besparelser.  
 
8.2.2 En alternativ forståelse: De relationelle dimensioner 
Sociologisk kontraktteori påpeger, i modsætning til de gængse politologiske teorier, at langt de 
fleste kontraktforhold i virkelighedens verden også indebærer en grad af samarbejde, løbende 
kommunikation, tilpasning og tillidsopbygning mellem de involverede personer for at kunne 
fungere i det daglige. I denne alternative forståelse er opfyldelse af de konventionelle 
forudsætninger ikke tilstrækkeligt.  
I den sociologiske kontraktteori påpeges det især, at langt de fleste af virkelighedens opgaver 
ikke kan beskrives i alle detaljer på forhånd, og at forudsætningerne for kontrakten kan ændre sig 
uventet. Derfor skal parterne ikke bare se på den formelle opgavebeskrivelse, men de må også 
løbende etablere en fælles forståelse af opgaven. I tillæg til de transaktionelle dimensioner er der 
således også en række ’relationelle dimensioner’, som må anses som vigtige, når udlicitering af 
offentlige opgaver skal fungere i det daglige.  
 
8.2.3 Case-kontekst 
Case-kommunen er en større dansk kommune, der har anvendt udlicitering som primær strategi for 
organisering af driften af de kommunale parker og grønne områder i mere end 10 år. Efter en 
afvikling af egen driftsorganisation har al drift af parker og grønne områder været udliciteret til 
forskellige private virksomheder i en række sideløbende og primært geografisk afgrænsede 
kontrakter. Case-kommunen havde i forbindelse med implementeringen af udlicitering opbygget en 
intern driftsstyringsenhed med ansvar for udbud, driftsplanlægning og kontraktstyring af driften af 
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parker og grønne områder. I casen blev den danske kontraktstandard AB92 (almindelige betingelser 
for arbejder og leverancer i bygge- og anlægsvirksomhed) anvendt til regulering af almindelige 
kontraktmæssige vilkår og som forlæg for opbygningen af det samlede materiale. AB92 indeholder 
en række standardvilkår for entreprisearbejder i Danmark, hvortil der er udarbejdet ministeriel 
vejledning til anvendelsen af standarden. Kommunen anvendte sit eget system for specifikation af 
de fagtekniske krav til selve arbejdets udførsel og kvalitet. I sin opbygning og indhold fremstod 
kommunens specifikation som en lokal tilpasning og videreudvikling af parksektorens oprindelige 
standard for specifikation af opgaver (Juul m.fl., 1998).  
 
8.2.4 Relationelle dynamikker  
Betydningen af velfungerende relationelle dimensioner blev fremhævet i forhold til flere kritiske 
forhold i kontraktforløbet. I casen fremgik det særligt, at velfungerende relationelle dimensioner var 
centrale i forhold til: a) kvaliteten af det udførte arbejde, b) karakteren af kontraktstyringen og 
funktionen af de transaktionelle dimensioner og c) tilvejebringelse af vigtig viden i forhold til den 
overordnede planlægning og styring af driften samt parkområderne generelt.  
I informantens beskrivelse af de betydende dimensioner i kontraktforløbet i forhold til 
kvaliteten i det udførte arbejde fremgik det, at både en række transaktionelle og relationelle 
dimensioner var anset som værende af væsentlig betydning i et givent kontraktforløb. I 
overensstemmelse med den konventionelle teori om udlicitering blev eksempelvis en præcis 
opgavespecifikation og den efterfølgende håndhævelse af denne i et kontraktforløb fremhævet. I 
sammenhæng hermed blev det fremhævet, at ’samarbejdet’ var den mest betydende faktor i et 
kontraktforløb, herunder for opnåelse af en tilfredsstillende udførsel af driften:  
 
”På den ene side er det vores kvalitetsbeskrivelse, som vi gør meget ud af at lave meget præcise 
under udbuddet, men som vi også gør meget ud af at håndhæve. På den anden side, så er det 
samarbejdet med entreprenøren. Hvis samarbejdet med entreprenøren ikke fungerer, så går det ’ud 
over det hele’, og dermed også kvaliteten af arbejdet [udførsel af driftsopgaverne]. Det er altså det 
med samarbejdet, der betyder mest.”  
 
Et velfungerende ’samarbejde’ blev således anset som en afgørende forudsætning for, at der blev 
leveret den forventede kvalitet i udførslen af driftsopgaver. Generelt fremhævedes kontraktforløb, 
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hvor de relationelle dimension var velfungerede, i modsætning til kontraktforløb, hvor de 
relationelle dimensioner ikke var velfungerende, som positive i forhold til både kvaliteten i 
arbejdets udførsel og kontraktstyringen. I denne forstand er det muligt at tale om velfungerende 
relationelle dimensioner, som en forudsætning for en velfungerende funktion af de centrale 
transaktionelle dimensioner.  
I forhold til en dårlig funktion af de relationelle dimensioner, i form af manglende ’kemi’ i de 
interpersonelle relationer, blev det endvidere fremhævet at de centrale transaktionelle dimensioner i 
den formelle kontraktstyring ikke alene var utilstrækkelige for at sikre en velfungerende drift, men 
også at karakteren af kontraktstyringen efterfølgende kunne skifte kararakter til et kontraktforløb 
præget af magtspil og opportunistisk adfærd:   
 
”Hvis de to ikke ’kan sammen’, hvis ’kemien’ ikke er der, hvis de ikke kan finde ud af at samarbejde 
om opgaven, så er det næsten lige meget hvor godt vi har lavet materialet, hvor god 
kvalitetsbeskrivelsen er, hvor god en procedure vi har. Hvis kemien ikke er der, så betyder det at 
man modarbejder hinanden. Entreprenøren forsøger at udnytte alle små uklarheder, der måtte være 
i systemet – og forvalteren på hans side udnytter sin magt.” 
 
I ovennævnte citat påpeges det, at dårligt fungerende relationelle dimensioner havde betydning for, 
hvordan de transaktionelle dimensioner kunne anvendes og sættes i spil. Forvalterenes ’magt’ lå 
eksempelvis i muligheder for at udføre ekstra kontrol og tilsyn og efterfølgende anvende 
økonomiske sanktioner ved mangler i det udførte arbejde. På den anden side kunne entreprenøren 
anvende eventuelle mangler og svagheder i opgavebeskrivelsen eller kontraktgrundlaget til at 
minimere indsatsen i udførslen af opgaven. Samtidig peges der på, at de transaktionelle dimensioner 
i fravær af velfungerende relationelle dimensioner var ineffektive i forhold til at sikre et givent 
kontraktforløb.  I denne forstand er det muligt at tale om, at de transaktionelle dimensioner ikke kan 
erstatte (substituere) relationelle dimensioner. I konsekvens kan de relationelle dimensioner 
fremhæves som en nødvendig (omend ikke tilstrækkelig) forudsætning for velfungerende 
kontraktforløb.  
Velfungerende relationelle dimensioner i et givent kontraktforløb blev yderligere anset som 
en forudsætning for tilvejebringelse af den nødvendige viden for både den langsigtede planlægning 
af parkdriften og prioriteringer i de enkelte parkområder. Det var igennem de løbende møder 
mellem medarbejdere hos kommunens driftskontor og de forskellige entreprenørers medarbejdere – 
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både de mere formaliserede møder og de mere uformelle møder i form af gennemgange ’ude i 
marken’ – at driftsstyringen opnåede den ’nødvendige’ viden om både områdernes anvendelse og 
tilstand samt hvordan selve driften kunne tilrettelægges. 
 
”En ulempe ved udlicitering er, at vi kommer længere og længere væk fra marken. Vi mister viden 
på sigt om, hvad der foregår i marken. Vi kommer til at sidde bag en skærm uden føling med hvad 
der foregår. Derfor lægger vi vægt på, at det skal være et tæt samarbejde. Det kan vi ikke undvære. 
At vi har regelmæssige driftsmøder, at vi har fælles tilsyn og kontrol. Det er på 14-dagsmøderne at 
jeg [driftsstyrer] i virkeligheden får en fornemmelse af hvad det er der sker derude og hvad det er, 
der bliver lavet og også kommer ud og ser – rent fysisk – sammen med entreprenøren, hvad der er 
deres viden og får del i alt det de ved om drift og udførsel. Den viden vil gå tabt, hvis vi ender med 
bare at sidde inde.” 
 
En transaktionel tilgang til udlicitering – uden samarbejde og deling af viden – blev i casen således 
anset for at føre til tab af viden og dermed muligheder for at varetage almindelige planlægnings- og 
styringsfunktioner. Omvendt sikrede samarbejdet igennem de løbende driftsmøder og den fælles 
driftskontrol at nødvendig viden i forhold til den videre planlægning og styring af driften blev 
tilvejebragt. I case-kommunen havde valget af udlicitering som primære driftsstrategi og oprettelsen 
af et selvstændigt driftskontor, uden udførende medarbejdere i driften afskåret kommunen fra 
løbende at få opdateret viden om eksempelvis ny teknik, materiel og nye metoder eller løbende at 
have en direkte og daglig gang i kommunens parker og grønne områder gennem kollegaer i egen 
organisation. Varetagelsen af de transaktionelle funktioner var også anset som kontoropgaver 
(’sidde inde’) som lå fjernt fra den fagtekniske viden, som varetagelsen af den udførende del af 
driften påkrævede.  
8.2.5 Transaktionelle dynamikker  
Betydningen af velfungerende – eller mindre velfungerende – transaktionelle dimensioner blev 
fremhævet i forhold til flere centrale forhold i et givent kontraktforløb. I casen fremgik det særligt, 
at velfungerende transaktionelle dimensioner var centrale i forhold til a) præcisering og sikring af 
opgaveudførslen, b) prissætning og tilstrækkelig allokering af ressourcer i forhold til en 
tilfredsstillende varetagelse af driften, c) sikring af driften gennem enten kontrol eller læring, d) 
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skift i kontraktstyringen fra kontrol (negativt fokus) til udvikling (positivt fokus) og e) etablering af 
tillid.  
I overensstemmelse med den konventionelle teori om udlicitering blev tilfredsstillelsen af en 
række transaktionelle dimensioner i casen anset som centrale forudsætninger for et givent 
kontraktforløb. De fremhævede forudsætninger omfattede en præcis specifikation af opgaven, en 
tilstrækkelig prissætning og ressourceallokering fra entreprenørens side samt sanktionsmuligheder, 
såfremt at kontraktforløbet ikke levede op til forvaltningens forventninger til løsning af 
driftsopgaverne:   
 
”Det er meget vigtigt at have præcise beskrivelser af hvad der skal laves. Det er også meget 
nødvendigt at have nogle nøjagtige mængdeopgørelser og et nøjagtigt kortmateriale. Vi er også 
nød til at have nogle bodsmuligheder og nogle ’skarpe muligheder’ vi kan trække frem, hvis 
samarbejdet ikke kører eller hvis de [entreprenøren] ikke leverer ydelsen.” 
  
Samtidigt med at kommunens muligheder for at tilfredsstille de transaktionelle forudsætninger 
gennem udarbejdelse af fyldestgørende specifikationer samt opfølgningsmuligheder ved et 
mangelfuldt kontraktforløb blev påpeget, var driftskontoret også opmærksom på en række risici og 
afvejninger i de transaktionelle forudsætninger:  
 
”En af de værste ting at starte med er sådan en entreprenør, der i virkeligheden starter med at 
opdage – ’hov, jeg har givet for lave priser og nu skal jeg lige have det her til at hænge sammen’. 
Man kan aldrig gardere sig imod at nogen kommer til at lave en forkert pris. Det eneste vi kan gøre 
er at lave udbudsmaterialet så klart som muligt, så det er så klart som muligt, hvad det er man 
byder på, hvad opgaven indebærer. Så de [tilbudsgiverne] får afsat det rigtige antal timer og 
ressourceforbrug.”  
 
I citatet fremgår det i overensstemmelse med den konventionelle teori om udlicitering at en tydelig 
og præcis specifikation af opgaven var central i forhold til en tilbudsgivers prissætning – og dermed 
efterfølgende allokering af ressourcer. Samtidig blev det også påpeget, at specifikation af de 
pågældende driftsopgaver dybest set indebar en række dilemmaer:  
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”Ved tilstandskrav er det meningen, at entreprenøren selv skal tilrettelægge, hvad der skal udføres 
af aktiviteter hen over året... Det har vi på fornemmelsen at de [entreprenørerne] ikke får regnet 
rigtigt med ind i tilbuddene… Udførselskrav gør det tydeligt hvad opgaven indebærer at der skal 
laves, så de [tilbudsgiverne] får sat det rigtige ressourceforbrug på og afsat det rigtige antal 
timer… Det er et dilemma. Det er en afvejning ved hvert eneste element i udbuddet. Skal man 
basere det hele på tilstandskrav eller skal man lægge nogle udførselskrav ind?” 
 
I den fagtekniske terminologi inden for sektoren (Juul, Bjerregaard og Dam, 1998) opereres der 
med henholdsvis ’tilstandskrav’ og ’udførselskrav’, som de to primære metoder til specifikation af 
’kvalitet’ i driftsopgaver. Anvendelsen af udførselskrav, hvor blandt andet antallet og indholdet af 
arbejdsrutiner bliver specificeret (fx angivelse af antallet af græsklipninger i vækstsæsonen samt 
angivelse af metoder og maskiner til græsklipningen), ville give en større præcision og 
sammenlignelighed mellem afgivne tilbud, men samtidig også øge risikoen for at det udførte 
arbejde i selve kontraktforløbet enten var for lidt eller for meget i forhold til ’den nødvendige pleje’ 
set ud fra et fagprofessionelt synspunkt. Modsat ville anvendelsen af tilstandskrav, hvor acceptable 
tilstande for et grønt element specificeres (fx angivelse af minimums- og maksimumshøjde for 
græsset en bestemt type af græsflade), give et mere upræcist grundlag for afgivelse af priser i tilbud, 
men samtidig en lettere kontrol og mere tilpasningsdygtig drift i forhold til behov set ud fra et 
fagprofessionelt synspunkt.  
I casen fremgik det at vigtigheden af de enkelte transaktionelle dimensioner i et givent 
kontraktforløb kunne variere i forhold til graden af opfyldelse af de enkelte transaktionelle 
forudsætninger:  
 
”Hvis vi får en entreprenør, der ikke kan løfte opgaven, eller fra starten af har givet en for billig 
pris og er presset og derfor hele tiden skal forsøge at springe over, der hvor gærdet er lavest, så er 
vi nød til at stramme skruen meget, bruge vores kvalitetsbeskrivelse meget, bruge vores kontroller 
meget. Så bliver det pludselig vigtigt at de [kvalitetsbeskrivelserne] er meget udspecificerede, er 
meget nøjagtige, entydige. Så skal man hele tiden holde dem [entreprenørerne] op på det.”   
 
 Særligt fremgik det, at såfremt at en entreprenørs prissætning og allokeringen af ressourcer var 
utilstrækkelig, så blev anvendelsen af kontrol og kvalitetsbeskrivelsen vigtigere i kontraktstyringen. 
Samtidig fremgik det også, at en utilstrækkelig drift ikke nødvendigvis var et spørgsmål om en 
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forkert ressourceallokering, men også kunne være et spørgsmål om manglende kompetence (’ikke 
kan løfte opgaven’). I sidste tilfælde skiftede kvalitetsbeskrivelsen funktion fra at være et led i en 
kontrol af en svigefuld entreprenør til at være et udgangspunkt for læring og udvikling af 
kompetence i entreprenørens organisation.  
Omvendt gav en situation, hvor den økonomiske ramme var tilstrækkelig, anledning til en 
mindre vægt på anvendelse af kvalitetsbeskrivelsen og kontrol i kontraktstyringen:   
 
”(Omvendt) hvis vi starter ud med et godt samarbejde og nogen der har givet en fornuftig pris, som 
kan få det til at løbe rundt økonomisk og ikke er presset, så bliver det mindre vigtigt om 
kvalitetsbeskrivelsen er helt præcis. Så skal vi ikke bruge det værktøj så meget. Så er der ikke brug 
for at måle med tommestokken.” 
 
I casen var det også tydeligt, at ’tillid’ (relationel dimension) til en entreprenør blev etableret i 
starten af et kontraktforløb på baggrund af et transaktionelt fokus på de løbende kontraktresultater:  
 
”Typisk vil vi bruge det med at kontrollere i det første halve år af entreprisen, indtil vi er tunet ind 
på hinanden. Når man har kalibreret øjne og fundet ud af at det kører godt, så bliver man ikke ved 
med at fare bevidstløs rundt, lave en masse kontroller og bruge en masse tid på det. Når tingene er i 
orden så bliver kvalitetsbeskrivelsen også mindre vigtig.” 
 
I ovenstående citat fremgår det endvidere at den opbyggede tillid medførte at fokus og aktiviteter 
vedrørende monitorering (transaktionsomkostninger) efterfølgende kunne reduceres. I casen var det 
også tydeligt at vigtigheden af transaktionelle og relationelle dimensioner skiftede undervejs i et 
kontraktforløb. I starten af et kontraktforløb var der eksempelvis relativt større fokus på 
monitorering (kontrol) og overholdelse af specificerede krav til opgaven (kvalitetsbeskrivelsen). I 
de tilfælde, hvor entreprenøren levede op til kravene i starten af kontraktforløbet, kunne 
kontraktstyringen skifte fokus og den relative vigtighed af centrale transaktionelle dimensioner blev 
mindre. Et centralt aspekt, som blev fremhævet ved kontraktforløb med velfungerende 
transaktionelle dimensioner, var et skift i kontraktstyringen fra et fokus på kontrol af opgavernes 
udførsel til et fokus på udvikling af og tilpasninger i driften/parkområderne:  
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”Man begynder jo at snakke om udvikling, hvad man kunne lave af ekstraopgaver, hvordan man 
kunne lave opgaverne på en anden måde, hvordan man kan optimere opgaven. Det bliver der tid og 
overskud til når man ikke skal rende og kontrollere hele tiden.”  
 
Endeligt fremgik det i casen at inden for de begrænsede tilrådeværende administrative ressourcer 
kunne tiden prioriteres forskelligt af de kommunale medarbejdere alt efter behov. I forhold til 
kontraktstyringen kunne fokus således prioriteres til de transaktionelle styringsmæssige behov, hvor 
det mest fundamentale var, hvorvidt driften levede op til kontraktgrundlaget. I forlængelse af heraf 
kan det fremhæves, at velfungerende transaktionelle dimensioner i casen fremstod som er en 
forudsætning for udvikling af velfungerende relationelle dimensioner. Et vedvarende fokus på 
kontrol blev dog betragtet som meget negativt af kommunens medarbejdere. Modsat blev 
etableringen af en relationelt orienteret kontraktstyring med fokus på udveksling af viden, udvikling 
og tilpasninger betragtet som både positivt – og nødvendigt i forhold til den fortsatte varetagelse af 
de transaktionelle dimensioner.  
 
8.2.6 Opsummering 
Casestudiet viser, at transaktionelle og relationelle dimensioner i den fortløbende kontraktstyring 
kan betragtes som gensidige forudsætninger der indgår i en helhed. I bredeste forstand kan det 
siges, at velfungerende transaktionelle dimensioner er en forudsætning for velfungerede relationelle 
dimensioner og velfungerende relationelle dimensioner er en forudsætning for velfungerende 
transaktionelle dimensioner. På den ene side var dette eksempelvis udtrykt i casen gennem 
driftsstyringens behov for samarbejde og kommunikation med entreprenøren for, at få tiltrækkelig 
med viden og indsigt til at kunne varetage driftsplanlægningsopgaver. På den anden side var det 
eksempelvis udtrykt gennem nødvendigheden af, at den økonomiske og ressourcemæssige ramme 
var på plads førend fokus i styring kunne udvikle sig fra at være kontrolorienteret til at være 
udviklings- og samarbejdsorienteret. I forlængelse heraf viste casen, at relationelle dimensioner 
ikke nødvendigvis erstatter de transaktionelle dimensioner – dimensionerne fremstår derimod i høj 
grad som komplementære. 
Yderligere belyste casestudiet hvordan dilemmaer, som opstår når udlicitering administreres 
ud fra et transaktionelt kontraktideal, kan håndteres gennem implementeringen af et relationelt 
fokus i kontraktstyringen. Et velkendt dilemma er problemet med manglende viden i de centrale 
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styrings- og planlægningsmæssige funktioner, når organisatoriske funktioner (’strategisk 
planlægning’ og ’operationel drift’) separeres gennem implementeringen af udlicitering i en skarp 
bestiller-udfører model. De relationelle dimensioner i form af samarbejde, personlig 
kommunikation og udveksling af viden er netop de forudsætninger, der kan håndtere de 
transaktionelle dilemmaer omkring hvordan den nødvendige viden til driftsplanlægning og 
driftsstyring tilvejebringes. Endvidere viste casestudiet at kontraktstyringsaktiviteter ikke kun er at 
betragte som ’transaktionsomkostninger’, i form af anvendt tid og ressourcer, men også har 
produktive funktioner i form af eksempelvis overførsel af viden og læring mellem de involverede 
organisationer eller skift i styringsfokus fra kontrol til udvikling af driften.   
 
8.3 Five Danish cases of change in contractual arrangements 
The following section presents five Danish cases which all explores the individual contracting 
histories. The cases are summaries of full case-reports (available in Danish). The cases can be read 
as ‘standalone’ examples of experiences with contracting out as well as they can be compared in 
terms of context, contractual arrangements, contracting history and overall lessons learnt.  
 
8.3.1 The case of Favrskov  
In a Danish context, Favrskov municipality is a ‘new’ municipality established in 2007 through a 
merger of 5 small municipalities. In the years following the merger, the key challenges for the park 
and road services were related to implementing a new organization, integrating and aligning 
administrative systems and ensuring similar service levels across the municipality. From an early 
stage, the municipality based its strategy for the reorganization on the objective that the 
organisation should end up being ‘competitive’ measured by the means of market tests. Private 
involvement was in the time after the merger limited to purchases of investment intensive surface 
road works based on one-year contracts. The involvement was a continuation of former practices in 
the five earlier municipalities. Key challenges in the strategy encompassed rationalization and 
alignment of the park and road organization in terms of structure, staff and machinery, physical 
locations and equipment yards, administrative systems, and service levels and provisions.  
After the reorganization was completed, a contract for provision of all park and road services 
in the municipality for a potentially six year period where tendered in 2012 to the market to test the 
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competitiveness of the internal organization. An external consultant was involved in important roles 
for advice, preparation and management of the tender process. The tender took place in the context 
of severe budget constrain and a clear objective for the organization of the tender was to test 
whether the market could provide cost reductions. Based on that objective it was decided to tender 
the whole organization in one contract, potentially allowing for scale economies, minimizing 
administrative costs and attracting larger and competent firms in the market. Following the initial 
strategy for park and road services, the tender also included an internal bid with intends to keep 
services in-house in case of the internal bid would win. The contract was based on well-known 
sector standards in terms of evaluation criteria (a mix of price and quality), the contract objectives 
(an ‘input’-based contract in terms of delivery of pre-defined services), specification of terms, 
payment scheme, service descriptions as well as the roles of the client and contractor.  
The tender was won by a private contractor and the immediate economic result was a 20-
percent cost reduction compared to earlier spending levels. The internal bid came in second while 
two other bids from private contractors came in above the internal bid. As a consequence, 
operational staff was transferred, machinery sold off and physical facilities (equipment yard) was 
rented to the private contractor. Subsequently, the number of dedicated full-time staff was 
significantly reduced by the private contractor in a rationalization of the organization dedicated for 
the contract. After a period, staff was also transferred from public to private employment terms as 
part of a normalization. The new contractor also embarked on a more intensive and effective use of 
subcontractors as well as investments in machinery.  
Contract management was initially organized as a purchaser-provider relation with clearly 
separated responsibilities for the two parties. The purchaser-function in the municipality is well-
staffed and holds formal responsibilities for overall planning, prioritization and monitoring of 
maintenance operations. The contractor (provider) holds formal responsibilities for delivery of 
maintenance operations according to predefined service descriptions. Payments are based on the 
level of provided services (‘input based’). However, the relationship between the municipality and 
the contractor developed in a collaborative direction with emphasis on decentralization of decision-
making for non-scheduled operations through the ‘invention’ of a new management concept 
(labelled ‘easy maintenance’), information sharing (in particular on operational priorities and costs), 
re-investment of savings in service improvements, pursue of social responsibilities (education and 
training activities) and adjustment of formal service specifications to the actual requirements and 
conditions of roads and parks.  
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In terms of institutional dynamics, the Favrskov case represents an example of a strategic and 
well-prepared ‘critical juncture’, albeit accentuated by immediate financial circumstances, which 
resulted in a complete displacement of internal provision with private provision. The primary 
outcome (the complete displacement) was not inevitable due to the overall strategy implemented by 
the municipality. The longstanding objective was to ensure a competitive organisation of services 
delivery – not a shift to private delivery as such. The displacement was, for example, not due to 
some crisis in terms of a severe government failure (note that the internal bid came in second).  
Following the critical juncture, the subsequent developmental pathway is observed to take 
place through informal ‘conversions’ of the standard approach for managing the exchange relation 
into a relational and collaborative oriented approach. In the conversion process the initial cost-
oriented focus was furthermore supplemented with a development focus. However, the exchange 
relation was still formally governed by a standard approach defined by the terms of the initial 
contract. In addition, institutional development also took place through small additions to the 
original contract through ‘layering’. Layering was, for example, observed in the invention of a new 
concept for decentralizing operational decisions (‘easy maintenance’).  
The initial displacement also exhibited a degree of ‘lock in’. Future insourcing seems unlikely 
in the Favrskov case as long as no severe market failure arises. The ‘lock in’ is sustained by the 
discontinuation of internal operational capacity in the municipality as well as the private contractors 
re-structuring and integration of operations within a larger organization. Insourcing would therefore 
impose increased cost related to (re-)establishment of internal operational capacity anew as well as 
loss of efficient gains provided by the capacity of the private organisation for effective use of 
resources within a larger organisation and markets for subcontractors. 
 
8.3.2 The case of Skive  
Skive municipality is a new municipality established in 2007 by a merger of three smaller 
municipalities with one larger (and dominant) municipality. The merger implied that park and road 
services went through a longer process with integration and reorganization of responsibilities for 
administration and maintenance operations (rather similar to Favrskov).  
The municipality employed a differential strategy to the involvement of private contractors 
within respectively park and road services. The political and strategic motivations for using markets 
took point of departure in a long-standing aspiration to test the cost levels of in-house provisions 
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and bring down overall costs. The aspiration was not based on a deliberative attempt to contract out, 
but has still resulted in increased private involvement over time. In particular, the level of 
involvement has increased from relatively low levels to medium levels since the merger in 2007 as 
well as the types of contract implemented in exchange relations have changed and differentiated 
into several sub-types. The municipality has kept some types of maintenance works in-house, but in 
the course of the changes more types of maintenance works has been included in the shifts to new 
contract types. For roads the share of maintenance budgets spend on private involvement has 
increased from about 40 percent in 2007 to 55 percent in 2015. 
Within road services the involvement of private contractors changed from a longstanding use 
of short term contracting (1 year contracts) for investment intensive services (surface works) into a 
differential use of a medium term (4 year) road partnering contracts for city zones and long term (15 
years) performance contract for rural zones. Skive municipality implemented the performance 
contract in 2013 and the partnering contract in 2015.  
The change in contracts for roads and inclusion of more types of work was spurred by a 
combination of severe budget constrain in the municipality and immediate requirements for new 
investments in road surface works to improve road quality and keep the costs for recurrent 
maintenance services down. The immediate economic result of the change in contracts was a 
massive reduction in budgeted annual maintenance cost around 50 percent for both contracts. The 
change in contracts was also a deliberative attempt to adapt contract types to the tasks at hand. Road 
maintenance in city zones is typically characterized by higher degrees of unforeseen contingencies 
which are hard to plan for in advance and requiring a degree of flexibility in service provisions and 
multilateral planning and coordination efforts. Road maintenance in rural zones is, on the other 
hand, typically characterized by lower degrees of unforeseen contingencies which make unilateral 
long-term planning and coordination easier. The municipality aligned the content of the two 
contracts, in terms of the level of coordination, contract duration, service specifications and 
payment schemes, with task characteristics of respectively maintenance in urban and rural zones. 
The change was not spurred by internally accumulated experiences, but by experiences accumulated 
elsewhere. The idea for the change in contract types came from experiences circulated in political 
and administrative networks as well as the preparation and implementation of the new contracts 
were carried out by external consultants.  
The strategy for provision of park services in Skive Municipality was based on an overall 
development plan which aimed at continued development of internal capabilities to carry out 
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maintenance operations. In the strategy, involvement of private contractors was found to be limited 
and primarily based on a benchmarking strategy based on competitive tendering of standard 
contracts encompassing limited task portfolios. Prices in external tenders were in the strategy used 
for comparisons with in-house cost levels and an indicator for internal rationalization potentials. 
Thus, the strategy ‘locked in’ the contractual arrangement used for provision of park services by 
confining this to standard contracts with a limited portfolio of services.  
In the case of Skive Municipality, the change in contract type for parks has taken place as a 
displacement of the former standard approach to contracting out with two more refined forms for 
contracting out (tendency to reliance on hierarchy and markets toward greater reliance on 
‘hybridization’). The change was spurred in a critical junction characterized by immediate financial 
pressures (limited internal budgets for investments) and investment requirements as well as the 
availability of new contract model available within the organizational field. The displacement 
would therefore have been unlikely to take place ten years earlier.  The long contract duration for 
one of the contracts, however, indicates a temporary ‘lock-in’ as it would incur high costs (e.g. an 
outright contract failure) to shift back to a standard approach.  
 
8.3.3 The case of Holstebro  
Holstebro municipality has contracted out all park and road maintenance services since 2000. 
Throughout the 1990s, the municipality sought to make their own in-house provider more effective, 
but a market test in the late 1990s resulted in a complete transfer of the park and road organization 
to a private contractor. The preparation of the first tender relied heavily on external expertise by 
involvement of the national road agency as well as a private consultancy. The first contract resulted 
in a cost saving around 10 percent, but maintenance operations was challenged by poor technical 
work specifications and a need for the parties to adapt the contract into a workable framework in a 
municipal context. The challenges partly reflected the overall stage of development of contract and 
technical standards in the park and road sector. The parties subsequently engaged in collaborative 
behaviours in order to make the contract workable. The initial managerial approach was in this 
stage converted from a cost-focused strategy toward a collaborative strategy. Park and road 
maintenance has since the first contract been tendered every fifth year. Over the years the formal 
contract has developed substantially by amendments and adjustments for each tender. In particular, 
additional features have been added to the formal contract. The latest contract is organized as a 
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framework for close collaboration, service development and citizen involvement besides standard 
features such as technical work specifications and juridical matters. Thus, the institutional 
developments have over time resembled dynamics related to both conversion and layering. 
Conversion dynamics took in particular place under the first contract while layering has 
characterized the long term development. The development in Holstebro Municipality has also 
entailed a degree of lock in of contracting out as the overall arrangement for provision of park and 
road maintenance. After the critical junction in the late 1990s internal capacity for carry out has 
devolved. The municipal merger in 2007 gave the opportunity to rethink the strategy as the smaller 
municipalities in the merger had operational expertise organised in-house. However, economic 
calculations showed that it would be (too) expensive to establish full capacity anew. The role of 
external experts in terms of involvement of consultant for assistance with drafting and procuring 
contracts has been diminishing over the years. While external assistance was paramount in the 
preparation of the first contracts the last contract was prepared and procured without any external 
assistance.  
 
8.3.4 The case of Solrød  
In 2002, Solrød municipality put out their first competitive tender including all park and road 
services. The tender was won by Solrød municipality’s own in-house organization, which resulted 
in a continued internal organization of the provision of park and road services. Private involvement 
was mainly limited to investment intensive services (surface works) based on short term contracts 
for maintenance of roads. Later, and as a consequence of a national municipal reform, Solrød 
municipality was required in the late 2000s to consider anew potentials for restructuring their 
provision of park and road services. The municipality firstly considered to reorganize service 
delivery by establishment of an inter-municipal cooperation together with a larger neighbour 
municipality (Greve). The consideration was driven by expected prospects for greater scale 
economics which were expected to provide (greater) efficiency and (lower) spending for both 
municipalities. The municipalities used substantial resources for analysing how an inter-municipal 
cooperation could be organized, but ultimately the plan failed in 2012 due to uncertainties and 
disagreements about the economy and management in an inter-municipal cooperation.  
Shortly after the failed plans for an inter-municipal cooperation, Solrød municipality choose 
to tender anew all its park and road services in a single contract. The procurement strategy was 
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exceptional in comparison with most other municipal strategies. In particular the tender included 
both service- and construction tasks, an overall price limit in combination with high emphasis on 
quality as competition criteria, a decentralized contract structure with a high degree of delegation of 
managerial responsibilities to the contractor and a monitoring system mainly based on citizen 
complains. The procurement strategy was also formed part of a new and more lean organization 
where all operational expertise should be outsourced. The strategy was based on intents to ensuring 
bids (only) from larger and highly competent contractors, ensuring a contractor's ownership as well 
as minimizing the municipality’s overall administrative costs for contract management. A private 
consultant was heavily involved in planning the new internal organisational structure, procurement 
planning, drafting contract materials and executing the procurement process. 
In early 2013, a private contractor was handed over the responsibilities for providing all park 
and road maintenance services for a three-year period with an option for a two-year contract 
renewal. In terms of cost, Solrød municipality estimated that the contract saved the municipality 
about 0.5 million DKK annual (equal to about 5 % cost reduction) along with a one-time quality 
‘boost’ worth around 1 million DKK. The economic outcome was evaluated to be a result of the 
private contractor's more efficient organization model and involvement of a more skilled workforce 
than the prior in-house organization. The contract included a staff transfer from the in-house 
organization to the private contractor. The former municipal staff was, however, slowly phased out 
of the private contractor’s workforce due to layoff, resignation or retirement. The layoff of the prior 
municipality workers was primarily grounded in a lack of skill and inability to adapt to (more 
demanding) work norms in the private organization. 
In the beginning of the contract there were several disagreements between Solrød 
municipality and the private contractor. The disagreements were the result of various factors; 
misunderstanding of contract material (quality specifications) on behalf of the municipality, 
inadequate meeting structure between the parties, lack of local knowledge from the private 
contractor in order to perform faithfully according to the contract, and an economic control system 
that created problematic incentives. Through dialogs the two parties managed to make mutual 
adjustments which solved most of the disagreements and improved their relationship significantly. 
Overall, the private contractor had a high degree of delegation of responsibilities for planning, 
operation and monitoring through the whole contract period. The municipality did not have a 
dedicated staff for contract monitoring (as customary), and where therefore relying on the private 
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contractor’s self-monitoring systems along a yearly progress report where overall assessment of 
service quality mainly is based on the level of citizen complaints.  
In the case of Solrød, an external consultant introduced the formal contract and the new 
organization of the contractual relation which the parties subsequently needed to learn how to 
manage in sensible and satisfying ways for both parties. In the process, earlier behaviours congruent 
with standard approaches had to be abandoned and new behaviours were institutionalized through a 
mutual learning process in the contractual relation. In this process, transferred staff was also 
excluded due to inabilities to adapt to norms and requirement in the new private organization as 
well as requirements for carry out work under the new contract. Overall the Solrød case represents 
an example of emergence and to some degree a case of displacement.  
 
8.3.5 The case of Roskilde  
In the case of Roskilde Municipality, a limited range of services has been re-currently contracted 
out since the 1995. Small portfolios of services have been put out in open tenders to the market 
based on standard contracts. All tenders have been open for bids from the in-house provider as well 
as private contractors. One result is that provision of small portfolios of services has shifted several 
times over the years between internal and external provision. The market tests have been used to 
benchmark the economic performance of the in-house provider and set internal prices and 
calculating internal budgets. The strategy has in combination with deliberative restructuring efforts 
contributed to ensuring a competitive in-house organization. By 2015, the organization of the 
internal service provider was based on financial and managerial principles very similar to private 
organizations.  
In the case, a relatively stable pattern has been maintained over the years. The case represents 
a case of ‘lock-in’ of the overall arrangements for organizing contractual relations and reliance on 
mixed service delivery. The stable pattern has been reinforced by the development of a steadily 
more efficient in-house provider organization which legitimacy and political support is upheld by 
continued successful market tests. In this strategy, attracting bids from private contractors at a 
certain economic level is necessary in order to provide credible market tests.  
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8.3.6 Contract development across the cases 
The five cases represent a set of different pathways in the development of contractual arrangements. 
Across the cases more radical and more incremental approaches could be identified in the 
development. More radical forms for change were in particular found to be located outside 
contractual relations whereas more incremental changes or stable patterns were found to be located 
both outside and inside contractual relations.  
 
 
Table 84.  
Change as a result of location of change and contract history. 
Contract history 
Location of institutional change 
Outside contractual relations  Inside contractual relations 
  First contract Radical change  Incremental change  
  Subsequent contracts  
Radical change, Incremental 
change or stable patterns 
Incremental change or stable 
patterns 
Note: Table summarizing observed change patterns in five cases according to location of change and 
contract history.  
 
All cases represent examples of municipalities which aimed to explore prospects for gaining cost-
efficiencies at an initial stage by introducing competitive tendering as well as cases where private 
contractors has become involved in service delivery. At a basic level all cases represent cases of 
critical junctures with shifts from internal provision with external provision. This is trivial due to 
the selection criteria of the five cases in the study. It should be noted that several instances of 
market tests with subsequent annulation of tenders and continuation of internal production can be 
identified among Danish municipalities. However, less trivial in the five cases is a differentiation 
between different types of shifts. In Skive Municipality the shift took place gradually while in the 
cases of Holstebro, Favrskov and Solrød Municipalities the shift took place as wholesale shifts. The 
case of Roskilde Municipality represents a more stable case of an early and partial shift and a 
subsequent ‘lock-in’ of the mix between internal and external provision. The case of Skive 
regarding park services resembles a similar partial shift. In terms of potential ‘lock-in’ where a 
municipality becomes dependent on one particular type of service provision, all wholesale shifts 
also represent situations where reliance on contracting out has become fully locked-in. However, 
the case of Roskilde represents a case of lock-in where the continued legitimacy and efficiency of 
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internal delivery requires the use of external delivery (to prove competitiveness of internal 
organisation).    
Of further interest is the observation that in all cases (except Roskilde and partially Skive), 
attempts to restructure internal or inter-municipal organizational forms were deliberatively tried out 
before the possibility for private contractors to become involved at a larger scale was realized.  
All critical junctions leading to establishment of contractual relations with private service 
providers can also be observed subsequently to involve a degree of learning and incremental 
adaptation to a new logic of managing services. The case of Solrød Municipality represent the 
clearest example of learning and adaptation where the parties subsequent the decision to contract 
out needed to ‘learn by doing’ what the contract was all about before a more stable patterns for 
interaction were established.  
The cases also represent different kind of experiences at different ‘ages of contacting histories’. 
The case of Solrød municipality, for example, tells the story on the initial challenges with 
implementing a new contract type and a new organization. The case of Holstebro municipality, as a 
contrasting example, tells the story of how contractual arrangements have developed and still 
develops over a fifthteen-years period. 
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